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Preface 
Writing is the passage way, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of the other in me 
– the other that I am and am not, that I don’t know how to be, but that I feel passing,
that makes me live, that tears me apart, disturbs me, changes me…. (Cixous cited in 
Sellers 1994:42). 
Animals have always featured large in my life. From my dog, Lulu, given to me on my 
ninth birthday, to my first horse that I had from age eleven, I have seldom not been in the 
company of dogs and horses. Working and training with the animals is an abiding 
interest, which has extended into all aspects of my life including this formalised study of 
the human-animal interface. 
In the sixties as a young student when I was majoring in psychology at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, my interest in animals found a home in a study of primate behaviour; the 
grooming behaviour of Bushbabies (Galago Senegalensis) and the sexual behaviour of 
Vervet Monkeys (Chlorocebus Pygerythrus) respectively. These two empirical studies were 
conducted within the influence of the dominating doctrine of behaviourism that was 
taught with almost evangelical fervour at Witwatersrand University at that time. 
Specifically, behaviourism claimed a rational and objective view of animal behaviour 
filtered through the lens of conditioning – either Pavlovian (reflexive) or Skinnerian 
(learned). In terms of this doctrine it was regarded as “unscientific” to impute thinking or 
emotion to an animal, a mode of thought that smacked of sloppy “anthropomorphism”, a 
word that became a swear word in the then lexicon of the psychology department.  
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Behaviourism served to reinforce a mechanistic view of animal behaviour, approached 
almost exclusively in terms of stimulus and response1. Within this circumscribing system of 
thought, imputing any kind of emotion or reason to the animal was regarded as a major 
flaw in research practice. In the field of psychology my ideas (and feelings) about animals 
were suppressed, only surfacing decades later, in the iconography of my art.  
 
Although animals featured early on in my artistic oeuvre, notably in an early solo 
exhibition, Portrait of my Friends and Other Animals (1987)2, it was in 2007 that my ideas 
on animal human interface were first clearly articulated. The exhibition, Cocks Asses &: I 
Can’t Hear, (2007-2009)3, was based on the premise of the inadequacy of language as a 
means of communication between ourselves as human beings and between humans and 
the other sentient beings that inhabit our planet. Through life-size ceramic figures, prints 
and the pages of The 100 Page Diary4,  I explored humankind’s inability to listen to each 
other, the environment and the other inhabitants of the world. The 100 Page Diary was 
central to the exhibition. It acted as a parallel text to the other art works. In the pages of 
the diary I explored ideas through phrases, aphorisms, questions and erasures thereby 
documenting the halting progress of writing meaning into the visual objects (Fig 0.1). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Added into the mix were the then new ideas of Konrad Lorenz in the embryonic field of Ethology, 
who wrote inter alia about the imperatives of instinct. In addition, influential at the time, were the 
philosophical ideas of the Logical Positivists whose rejection of psychoanalysis, (and therefore the 
unconscious) reinforced a materialist, rationalist view of psychology as a branch of science. 
2 Portrait of my friends and other animals (1987). Beuster-Skolimowski Gallery, Pretoria, 2 – 14 
August. 
3 Cocks, Asses &…(I can’t hear), University of Johannesburg Art Gallery 7 - 28 November 2007; 
Kizo Art Gallery, Durban, 20 June – 28 July 2008; White River Art Gallery March – April 2009; 
Oliewenhuis Art Museum (Reservoir), Bloemfontein, 7 July – 16 August 2009; iArt Gallery, Cape 
Town, 9 November – 11 December 2009. 
4 The 100 Page Diary  
2006 – 2007 
Pen and ink with various media 
100 A3 pages 
!
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Fig 0.1 Wilma Cruise The 100 Page Diary installation view, Kizo Art Gallery Durban 2008. 
 
That I chose Lewis Carroll’s two texts, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and 
Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871)5, as a conduit for my 
research needs some explanation6. Alice in Wonderland was the first book I read, or could 
remember reading. Thus it has been a part of me since the inception of my conscious self. 
However, the chief reason for using it as a “meta-metaphor” for my visual research is that 
the animals in “Alice” have the knowledge, the language and the (albeit upside down) 
reason, as to how Wonderland works. The White Rabbit, much like a modern corporate 
executive, is forever rushing off somewhere lamenting his lateness. “Oh my paws and 
whiskers”, he cries as he rushes past the bewildered Alice. His task is urgent, but it is never 
made clear to Alice or to us, her sympathetic co-journeyers, what this urgent business is. 
Likewise, the Cheshire Cat appears and disappears, sometimes leaving only his enigmatic 
smile behind. He knows, but just what he knows remains unclear. Like Derrida’s cat, 
before whom7 [sic] the philosopher stood naked and ashamed (Derrida 2008:7), the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!All the excerpts in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking Glass, and 
What Alice Found There (1871), were taken from the 1982 edition of The Complete Illustrated 
works of Lewis Carroll. I have used the punctuation that appears in this edition. The punctuation 
might thereby appear antiquated to the contemporary reader.  
6 In the text I often use an abbreviated form of the titles: “Alice in Wonderland” and “Through the 
Looking Glass”. 
7!I deliberately use personal pronouns usually reserved for humans to refer to the other animals to 
include them in the realm of personhood.!
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Cheshire Cat has the power to unsettle certainty. His god-like presence and his ironic 
smile confuse more than they elucidate. In the upside down rabbit-hole world, all sense of 
who Alice is falls away. She is not even sure of her size. “Who are you?” asks the haughty 
caterpillar and a little later, the pigeon, who thinks she just might be a serpent, asks, 
“What are you?” Alice does not have the answer to either question. The caterpillar’s 
question is significant. Who is Alice and, by extrapolation, who are we? Are we right to 
presume our position of superiority in relation to the animals? Do we really deserve our 
place on top of the Cartesian pile? Carroll’s creatures pose these questions and others of 
an ontological and logical nature. As Tully remarks, “…Carroll’s speaking animals exhibit 
an unusually keen force of their own, that resists the customary outcome of the 
anthropomorphic representation (in word and image) of animal beings, namely to 
figuratively reference human attributes and circumstances” (Tully 2012:8).  
 
That Lewis Carroll’s writings provide such a fecund metaphor for a discussion on the 
question of the animal is echoed by Derrida, who said about his seminal seminar on the 
animal, which was later formalised into the text The Animal Therefore I am, “Although I 
don’t have the time to do so, I would have liked to inscribe my whole talk within a reading 
of Lewis Carroll. In fact you can’t be certain that I am not doing that…” (Derrida 2008:7). 
Referring to the hedgehogs in “The Queen’s Croquet Ground” (2008:7) he said, 
Alice wanted to give the hedgehog a blow with the head of the flamingo she held 
under her arm, and it would “twist itself round and look up in her face” until she 
burst our laughing” (2008:7). 
 
Derrida goes on to ask: “How can an animal look you in the face?” (2008:7). This is not 
only the core of Derrida’s question on the animal but also embodies the central tenet of 
this research – what happens in the "space-between" the animal's look and one’s 
perception of it? What knowledge is conveyed at that moment when the animal looks 
back at its observer; is this knowledge reciprocal? Is the non-human animal aware of its 
interlocutor as ashamed and naked as Derrida was, or clothed and curious as this 
researcher is? !
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Introduction!
 
 
... ‘tis an unweeded garden that grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature 
possess it… (Hamlet Act I, Scene II). 
 
The field of animal studies is becoming an increasingly important multidisciplinary area of 
investigation. As the world tries to come to terms with a looming environmental crisis 
more and more intellectuals across diverse fields of endeavour are questioning the 
traditional relationship between humankind and the non-human animal. From literary 
figures such as JM Coetzee, to continental philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and animal right activists like Peter Singer, there is a 
notion gaining traction that the Cartesian view8 demands a radical re-orientation of 
thinking about animals. Entrenched humanist, logocentric patterns of thought are no 
longer adequate. In a posthumanist world a solution to the question of the animal has 
become of paramount importance. As Matthew Calarco has noted, we need to think 
unheard of thoughts about animals, “…we need new languages, new artworks, new 
histories even new sciences and philosophies” (Calarco 2008:6). Heeding Calarco’s call to 
arms, I investigate the question of the animal through the metaphoric and metonymic 
means of the art object. In Thinking with animals: An exploration of the animal turn 
through art making and metaphor9 and a series of exhibitions entitled The Alice Sequence 
(2011–2016)10 I examine the issue of the animal. I specifically focus on the "space-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 René Descartes (1596–1650) perception of animals as automata or soul(less) beings confirmed 
the biblical dualistic divide between humans and other living beings implicit in the injunction to,  
“…have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that 
moveth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:28). 
9 Turning away from entrenched humanist views and turning towards the animal, opens the 
possibility of new ways of seeing and interacting with other animals. “The turn to animals, in art as 
in theory, is an attempt to envision a different understanding of what we humans are and 
consequently to enlarge or change the possibilities for what we can think and what we can do in 
the world” (Weil 2010:10).  
10 The sequence opened in July 2011 with an exhibition entitled The Animals in Alice at The 
Wembley Square branch of iArt Gallery in Cape Town. The second exhibition in the sequence was 
held at the University of the North West in October of the same year. Entitled Alice and the 
Animals, it expanded the theme both in the inclusion of other sculptures and the introduction of 
further ideas. In July 2012 the third exhibition in the sequence, The Alice Diaries, opened at Circa 
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between" the animal's look and one’s perception of it.  I ask the possibly unanswerable 
question, “What knowledge is conveyed at that moment when the animal looks back at its 
observer?” This is a key question. The traditional view is for the human subject to view the 
animal as an object. But if one were to invert the subject/object positions the viewpoint 
changes. As, Jacques Derrida suggests, Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, and 
What Alice Found There (1871) could be regarded as a type of mirror stage in which case 
questions about the animal could be asked from the other side, that is from the point of 
view of the animal (2008:8). What is required is a shift from a humanist anthropocentric 
point of view to one that is more inclusive of all animal kind. In dealing with this question, 
Derrida falls back on the word. “The question of the animal response often has as its stake 
the letter, the literality of a word, sometimes what the word word means literally” (2008:8). 
Derrida’s dependence on the word points to the central conundrum of this thesis. How do 
you speak about that which is beyond language without using language? Irigaray phrases 
it thus: “How can we talk about them? How can we talk to them?” (Irigaray cited in Atterton 
and Calarco 2011:xxiv). This begs the question: How do we begin to challenge the 
human/self, animal/other divide and (as a corollary) how do we do this without resorting 
to that all too human faculty of language? As Kari Weil phrases it,  
 
the turn to animals can be seen as responding to a desire for a way out of this ‘prison-
house of language.’ It responds to a desire to know that there are beings or objects 
with ways of knowing and being that resist our flawed systems of language and who 
may know us and themselves in ways we can never discern… . The difficulty, of course, 
is discovering how and where to cite what is outside of our language. In fact, animal 
studies may be seen as both a culmination and turning away from poststructuralism’s 
insistence that there is no outside of language (Weil 2010:10).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
on Jellico in Johannesburg. A catalogue accompanied this exhibition with two scholarly essays by 
Gavin Younge and Ann-Marie Tully. During 2013 – 2014 Will you, won’t you, will you join the 
dance? was shown at the National Arts Festival, Grahamstown, 27 June to 7 July and at  
Oliewenhuis Museum, Bloemfontein July – August 2014. Menagerie at Tokara, curated by Ilse 
Schemers, and accompanied by a catalogue, was held at the sculpture garden at Tokara Wine 
Estate, 16 March - October 2014. Two small solo exhibitions, Advice from a Caterpillar (David Krut 
Projects, Johannesburg, June – July 2015 and Cape Town 2015) and Red Queen to Play (Rust en 
Vrede Gallery, Durbanville, August – September) provided a testing site for ideas for the final 
exhibitions, Six Impossible Things to do Before Breakfast and The 8th Square (Gallery University 
Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch and Cavalli Gallery on the Cavalli Wine Estate near Stellenbosch) in 
2016. 
!
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Bluntly put, how do we speak to the animals and how do we speak about the animals? 
What precisely is (or should be) the nature of our ethical interface? How do we begin to 
make sense of the animal world without imposing our anthropocentric views? How do we 
communicate across the space between human and animal? Theorising this gap in order 
to bridge it, is the aim of this artistic enterprise. 
 
In the manner of creative praxis research, I address the problem of the space-between in 
two ways. I explore the inchoate gap between human and animal in a series of exhibitions 
in which I employ the slippage of language and the implied nonsense of Lewis Carroll's 
texts, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking Glass, and What 
Alice Found There (1871) as an overarching metaphor – a meta-metaphor as it were. In so 
doing, I produce a series of sculptures, paintings, drawings and prints. These art works 
are neither illustrations nor explanations of Lewis Carroll's texts. Instead they are inspired 
by the problems implicit in the tales, specifically those around the question of animal, 
which I read metaphorically and retrospectively into the texts.  
 
Secondly, in spite of the inherent contradiction of using visual and symbolic language to 
analyse that which is beyond language, I subject my artworks to a verbal analysis in which 
I explore the issues surrounding the question of the animal.  I filter concepts through the 
conceptual lens provided by contemporary discourses on the question of the animal in a 
number of diverse fields. Thus, this study is multi-disciplinary, relying on research in the 
areas of literature, philosophy and the behavioural sciences as integral to the core domain 
of study within which I work, namely the visual arts. In keeping with the multi-disciplinary 
nature of the field, my theoretical research methodology is of a qualitative nature – open-
ended rather than closed, fluid rather than fixed and creatively expansive rather than 
analytically reductive. Deleuze and Guattari’s image of a rhizome provides a useful 
construct in describing the way the research was conducted. Eschewing a preplanned 
structure, both the theoretical and practical research follows a winding pattern. 
Sometimes the path leads in contradictory ways; other times it runs into dead ends and I 
backtrack. But, always the core question provides the focus: the urgent need to 
understand the gulf of incomprehensibility between the human and the animal other – a 
need to break the silence of the animals. In this manner I follow the pattern of animal 
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studies that range across disciplines searching for a multivalent solution to the broader 
question of the animal. 
 
Ron Broglio offers the intriguing suggestion that it is (contemporary) artists rather than 
philosophers who are likely to offer new insights into the question of the animal. As 
philosophy is delimited by language and reason “(including the limits of reason)”, artists 
are able to address the question free from rational constraints in a material and engaged 
way. This is achieved not in the sense of  
…mimesis or representing animals in a natural history tradition or kitsch 
assimilation of animals into our world as tamed or cute or defeated; rather these 
artists have unmoored themselves, even ever so slightly, from the cultural 
grounding of meaning and the solidification of being over becoming…. In other 
words these artists take seriously the problem of animal phenomenology (Broglio 
2011:xx). 
  
Using the argument that the Cartesian view has denied the animal a phenomenology, 
thereby reducing animal lives to the surface (Broglio 2011:xvi), Broglio suggests that 
because contemporary artists are experienced in negotiating optical and material 
surfaces they are able to exploit this surface “fault”. Artists are thus able to develop (visual) 
languages that permit new insights into animal encounters. Admitting to the impossibility 
of an answer to the question “What is animal phenomenology?”, he nevertheless suggests 
that the open ended nature of the problem permits new modes of thought and creates 
new possibilities for thinking about the animal other (Broglio 2011:xxi).  
 
Thinking in a similar optical and material way guides my studio praxis, which is led as 
much by the imperative of the material as it is durationally by the act of making rather than 
by pre-planned action. Since knowledge generated by the embodied act of making art 
cannot be known with any clarity before the act takes place, my research modus operandi 
challenges the conventional model of academic research that depends in large part on 
articulating a proposition and then proving or disproving the hypothesis. In art praxis it is 
the “doing” that generates new knowledge, becoming a non-linguistic knowing that itself 
is embedded in the act.  In this respect I depend on the theoretical formulations of 
Graeme Sullivan who says, “The process of making insightful decisions when carrying out 
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visual arts research is not predicated on the assumption that there is a prescribed body of 
knowledge one learns and then applies” (Sullivan 2010:111). It is in the act, through the 
action of making, using the body of the artist, that meaning is sought. As Elizabeth 
Costello, so passionately articulated, truth does not only reside in the reasoning, thinking 
being – it is felt by the body – in the body – it is embodied! 
To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation of being – 
not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly reasoning machine thinking 
thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation – a heavily affective sensation – of being 
a body with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive to the world. This 
fullness contrasts starkly with Descartes’ key state, which has an empty feel to it: the 
feel of a pea rattling around in its shell (Coetzee 1999: 78). 
 
Embodiment is the key. It is through the act of moving one's body in the process of 
creation that meaning is achieved11. Ironically my art praxis can be said to imitate the 
interaction that occurs between human and animal, one that I proposed occurs between 
two bodies in which the “space-between” is articulated. In other words, I perceive myself 
to utter or literally enact the human/animal relationship in my art where it can acquire 
material form. Thus, I suggest that knowing the end result of the art process cannot 
precede the praxis of it, but grows out of it. It is a process of imbrication – layering 
meaning on meaning through the act of doing. This is not to deny the theoretical or 
linguistic aspects, rather these are dependent and logically follow on the discoveries 
made through the art process. Implied in this approach is the presence of the artist as part 
of the construction of meaning. Sullivan has termed this “visual knowing” transcognition: 
that which involves a wider set of embodied cognitive and contextual factors (2010:133). 
Since the insights gained through, and by the act of creation are as unfathomable as the 
slippages of language and (non)communication between animals and humans, the 
resultant findings are a priori unknown. What lies beyond is a terra incognito.  
Deleuze and Guattari provide an analogy. In their essay Becoming Animal they claim that 
there is no “preformed logical order to becomings…” (cited in Kalof and Fitzgerald 
2007:47), although there are criteria “and the important thing is that they not be used 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Referring to Elizabeth Costello in The Lives of Animals, Selbach suggests that her capacity for 
sympathetic imagination depends on a resistance to the language of philosophy and relies instead 
on somatic projections (Selbach 2012:313). 
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after the fact, that they be applied in the course of events, that they be sufficient to guide 
us through the dangers” (2007:47 emphasis mine). 
The structure of the argument developed throughout the dissertation owes something to 
another metaphor by Deleuze and Guattari. The rhizome is a figure they use to oppose 
the structuralist image of the tree with its genealogical implications. They claim to have 
written A Thousand Plateaus like a rhizome, thereby giving their book “a circular form” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987:22). “Each plateau can be read starting anywhere and can be 
related to another plateau” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:22). Their approach provides a 
model for the shape of the chapters that are represented by “plateaus” made up of 
images, discussion around the artworks, metaphors from the Alice tales and theoretical 
argument. Thus, while the dissertation as a whole may have a logical (arborescent) 
structure, each chapter will be rhizomatic in the inclusion of these equally weighted 
elements. 
In the matrix supplied by my investigation into the liminal in-between-space between 
human and the other animal, certain key ideas are embedded. These are intimately 
intertwined one with the other, but for the sake of analysis they are teased out into 
chapters. Each chapter focuses on a core idea. The discussion in the chapters is pinned to 
one or two of the exhibitions in The Alice Sequence; the artworks adding not so much 
clarity as a complicating factor to the discussion. Lewis Carroll's tales provide a fecund 
metaphor for the exploration. Thus, each chapter has a tripartite structure – theory, art and 
metaphor. While the theoretical points of departure are teased out into chapters for the 
sake of convenience, they overlap and intertwine. For example, animal subjectivity is 
inextricably linked to language. Even though there is a great degree of correspondence, 
for the sake of clarity, they are dealt with in two separate chapters. Key issues discussed in 
the dissertation include the meaning of the word “animal” and its relation to human; the 
role of language in and around the question of the animal; the problem of 
anthropomorphism and sentimentality; the artists’ ethical conundrum; animal subjectivity, 
and finally, and most problematically, the interpretation of the artworks in the context of 
the above ideas.  
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At the beginning of this research the assumption was that the finished artworks would 
provide insight into the inchoate ideas that drove their creation. This proved not to be so. 
The artworks often remained mute. They failed to offer clear directions as to their 
meaning. However, taking my lead from Steve Baker, who in his book Artist/Animal, says 
that the function of a work of art is to disrupt (2013:90), I have come to accept that it is 
art’s role to complicate and not necessarily to explain. Nevertheless, since it is the nature 
of this enterprise to decode the artworks, I do attempt to interpret my visual production 
with an awareness that there is a possibility of other of readings. The task is not without 
problems. To interpret my own artworks raises the spectre of intentional fallacy. The 
notion of intentional fallacy was first articulated by Wimsatt and Beardsley in 1946 (The 
Penquin dictionary of critical theory 2000. Sv. ‘intentional fallacy’). They maintain that 
critical criteria must be perceptible in the work of itself and the author's intention is 
external to the fact (Blocker 1979:246). This has been interpreted as the death of the 
author/artist. It is as if the artwork arose unbidden in a vacuum. Yet it is something of a 
sophistry, to pretend that the artist's intention has absolutely no bearing on the meaning 
of the artwork. While the end result is seldom envisaged there is always an initial idea – 
that which Steve Baker calls “a clear sense of purpose”. But, he asks, how is that actually 
manifested in the work artists make? (Baker 2013:90). His answer is not simple. He 
acknowledges the artist's intention, which he interprets as a kind of initiating forward 
momentum [emphasis mine]. Yet, he maintains that meaning resides not in the 
psychology of the artist but in the object of the artwork. The object is the place where the 
work gets done.  “[I]t is both the site of the work getting-done and the thing that shapes 
the works getting-done” (Baker 2013:91). Quoting Guattari, Baker says, “The work of art, 
for those who use it, is an activity of unframing, of rupturing things” (Baker 2013:90). In my 
experience the work itself grows and attains meaning through the process of creation. 
Meaning is not a priori to the artwork but grows through the pushes and pulls of its 
creation. The medium dictates as the game proceeds; setting new problems and finding 
new solutions. If I were to evoke an overall intention to my work, that aspect that initiates 
the creativity, it would be to have a sense of what animal means in relation to human. This 
manifests itself in The Alice Sequence in the form of sculptured dogs, pigs, rabbits, cats, 
rats, sheep, baboons and humans. 
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But, the problem of post hoc interpretation remains. How do I interpret my own artwork 
beyond describing the process? Since interpretation always involves more than the artist, 
by including the viewers, I attempt to resolve the problem by becoming another viewer. 
That is, in regard to the interpretation of the artworks in this dissertation, I maintain a 
position of being outside of myself observing myself making art – and interpreting it. As I 
wrote in the preface to The Alice Diaries, the catalogue that accompanied the eponymous 
exhibition: 
 
Much as an outsider would carefully watch the behaviour of another I note changes 
in my thought patterns and ideas. This act of watching finds concrete form in diaries 
– A3 size pages in which I draw, scribble and muse. The pages document the 
progress of not so much linear time as the stuttering backwards and forwards 
motion of my ideas. This way I fill diary pages with sketches, annotations and 
exhortations to myself. A number of these framed pages are exhibited at Circa as 
The Alice Diaries. But in a sense the exhibition as a whole can be read in the same 
way as the diary, only this time it is writ large in the form of sculptures, paintings and 
an installation of multiple ceramic forms (Cruise 2012:3).  
 
In this sense this research is unashamedly autobiographical and self-reflexive. Taking my 
cue from Derrida who began his exposition The Animal That Therefore I Am, on an 
autobiographical experience with his cat, my research emanates from the specificity of the 
works in my studio. From the particulars of the artworks, to the larger question of the 
animal, I circle the problem of the space-between like a lion circling its prey, or like a 
rhizome growing in multiple directions.  
 
I begin this exposition, in Chapter 1, The Space-Between, by developing thematic 
concerns implicit in my earlier exhibitions12, the dominant theme of which is the 
inadequacy of spoken language in communicating between humans and non-human 
animals. Through visual articulations in the form of sculptures, prints, and drawings I 
employ visual strategies to point out humankind’s inability to listen to one another, and to 
other non-human animals. My core problem is articulated in an aphorism I wrote in 2007 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 In particular Cocks, Asses &…(I can’t hear), University of Johannesburg Art Gallery 7 to 28 
November 2007; Kizo Art Gallery, Durban, 20 June to 28 July 2008; White River Art Gallery March 
to April 2009; Oliewenhuis Art Museum (Reservoir), Bloemfontein, 7 July to 16 August  2009; iArt 
Gallery, Cape Town, 9 November to 11 December 2009.!
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and which stands here a cipher for my (re)search: “We have shut our ears to their primal 
screams, their rumbles, hisses, purrs…” (Cruise cited in Schmahmann 2007:n.pag.). 
 
The metaphor of willful deafness points to a state of ignorance and arrogance on the part 
of humankind; a refusal to entertain the notion of the animal as an(other) being worthy of 
full attention. Formalising this metaphor into a statement of intent, I propose that this gulf 
of silence creates a “space-between” humankind and other sentient beings. I interpret this 
metaphoric space as a liminal border state between the human “I” and the animal “other”. 
The visual and theoretical analysis of this divide provides the focus of the research that is 
an attempt to restore the sense of the animal as a worthy and equal An/other. But not only 
do I provide the historical context of my art, I also look at the work of contemporary artists 
who deal with the animal in various ways. I question the role of the artist in the ethical 
conundrums thrown up by the use of animals in art, and in so doing I suggest that the 
artist has to negotiate the moral terrain free from any absolutist moral positions. I depend 
on Steve Baker whose book Artist/Animal investigates in depth what happens in the 
alignment and juxtaposition of the terms “artist” and “animal” (Baker 2013:3). 
 
In Chapter 2, I consider the concept of “the animal”, an idea that has been debated in 
recent years by, amongst others, Jacques Derrida. Derrida, succumbing to the knowing 
gaze of his cat, presents questions about the fundamental concept of “animal”, a word 
that circumscribes all the living entities on the other side of the human divide. Raising 
questions about the linguistic and institutional forces around the distinction between 
human and animal exposes not only what it is to be animal, but also what it is to be 
human. He interrogates the concept of “animal” as an essentialised reductive entity.  He 
nevertheless does not suggest a Darwinian continuity between human and animal. 
Instead he argues for the complication of the “abyssal rupture” (Derrida 2008:12) – an 
acknowledgment of the difference between human and animal, and animal and other 
animals. In this way, he multiplies the differences found among and between human 
beings and animals. His exposition is based on the singular autobiographical recognition 
of the Other, in this case his own little cat. Calarco has labeled Derrida’s stance a 
“difference” [sic] theory: “Difference theorists open the way to an animal ethics that is 
based on singularity and that allows us to appreciate the richly differentiated modes of 
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existence found among animals” (2015:50). In Derrida’s philosophy, the human is 
decentred as the measure of all things. Human essence and exceptionalism is challenged 
and hegemonic ideas about animal and animality are interrogated (Calarco 2015:34). 
  
Other continental philosophers13 such as Deleuze and Guattari engage with the 
ontological nature of the human-animal divide by collapsing the binary terms into a single 
concept, “becoming-animal”. They go a step further than Derrida and offer a radical 
dissolution of the opposites human and animal (Deleuze & Guattari 2004:94). In this way, 
they challenge the “insuperable boundaries typically posited between human beings and 
animals by dominant intellectual and cultural traditions” (Calarco 2015:49). By displacing 
the human, they dispel any lingering anthropocentrism from ethical reflection (Calarco 
2015:50). It is a radical approach that not only dehumanises the human, but also 
challenges all hierarchical structures. This allows human beings to take into consideration 
”various minor, non-dominant, modes of existence that are commonly viewed as being 
the ‘other’ of the human” (Calarco 2015: 57). To this end, their concept of the rhizome, a 
metaphor that opposes the kind of arborescent structures usually associated with the 
discourse on the animal particularly those on the Darwinian phylogenetic model, is useful. 
I discuss their central concept “becoming-animal” in relation to its embodiment in art and, 
in so doing, suggest that becoming raises problems for the artist. In spite of this, I 
propose that their idea of “writing like a rat” is a useful metaphor in describing the artistic 
process. 
 
In contrast to the Continental philosophers, I consider the utilitarian approach of Peter 
Singer and those of the animal-rights proponents Tom Regan and Gary Francione. These 
philosophers are less interested in the ontological significance of the concept “animal” 
than in the welfare of animals and their rights. These “identity theorists”, “seek to establish 
an egalitarian ethics based on ethically relevant similarities among human beings and 
animals” (Calarco 2015:48). Their ethics are dictated by the closeness of the animal to the 
human. They tend to extend human traits to animals – to compare the two and accord 
equality of consideration and rights on that basis. This still leaves human beings at the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The continental approach to philosophy is characterised by, amongst other things, its 
commitment to existential, ethical and socio political issues…. (Calarco 2008: 2). !
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centre of the moral universe. Nevertheless, useful concepts such as “equal consideration” 
(Singer), “subject of a life” (Regan) and “moral emotion” (Scruton) allow for a practical 
ethics of care. 
 
But the question of the animal goes beyond the formal canon of philosophy and is 
investigated by “techno-scientists” such as Donna Haraway (2007, 2008). Haraway offers a 
critique of both Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari on the basis that they do not engage 
with the actual animal. She accuses Derrida of failing to read his cat’s semiotics and, as 
such, did not get to know what his cat was actually saying beyond the abstractions of 
philosophy. Haraway is equally scornful of Deleuze and Guattari’s “fantasy wolf-pack 
theory”, accusing them of a profound absence of curiosity about actual animals (Haraway 
2008:27). In Haraway’s approach, (ironically like Deleuze and Guattari’s), the difference 
between human and animal is completely collapsed so that all distinctions are erased. 
Calarco calls this “indistinction theory” (Calarco 2015:51). “Instead of stressing abyssal 
differences, many indistinction theorists instead emphasise and affirm ‘the pleasure of 
connection of human and other living creatures’” (Calarco 2015:51-52). It is the living, 
breathing creature with all its co-entanglements with the human that an indistinction 
theorist like Haraway is interested in. 
 
The analysis of some of the theories underpinning human/animal studies is only one of 
the plateaus considered in Chapter 2. The tales of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and 
Through the Looking Glass continue to be a rich supply of metaphor including Alice's 
display of speciesism in the Pig and Pepper chapter (Carroll 1982:56–65) when Alice, 
favouring the human baby’s life over the pig’s, demonstrated the 19th century prejudice 
of its author – a bias still manifest in the 21st century. The third plateau is provided by the 
analysis of my own artworks. Acting as parallel texts to the thoughts expressed on paper, 
the artworks function on the edge of language. In this sense, they act more as affective 
grace notes than explanatory or illustrative images. 
 
John Berger’s lament over the loss of real animals in contemporary life suggests that we 
have lost the sacred connection to the animal (Berger 2007:252). In order to regain it, 
humankind has to suspend reason and the comfort of thought. The implication is that we 
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have to unknow in order to reconnect with the animal other. In Chapter 3, We’re all mad 
here. I’m mad. You’re mad, I consider the role of the artist as sorcerer and shaman and 
suggest that, in order to unknow, one has to enter the space between reason and affect, 
animal and human. This is the place where there is no certainty and where symbolic 
language fails in its structured discourse. Much like in dreamland there is no guidance as 
where to go or how to go. All appears to be nonsense. This stumbling around dreamland 
mimics the practice of making art that initially, at least, is directionless and inchoate. The 
hand is the organ that has the intelligence. It appears to be guided more by affect than 
reason, which, like the interchange between human and animal, is only known by its 
emotional resonances.   
 
I consider various metaphoric models to describe this process. Deleuze and Guattarri’s 
figure of “writing like a rat” aptly describes the scampering forward imperative of the 
creative act, one which is demonstrated by Nicolene Swanepoel in her ceramic sculptures.  
The “Little Creatures” are made rapidly and without conscious pre-conception. The 
figures that emerge from her studio are neither animal nor human but uniquely 
themselves. Deleuze and Guattarri’s central concept of “becoming-animal” is also a useful 
allegory in describing the suspension of self that occurs in the creative act. I consider this 
process in terms of the animal drawings of Elizabeth Gunter in which a meditative 
muteness, one that is not without meaning, connects her to her own animality. Following 
Deleuze and Guattarri’s notion of the sorcerer I consider the artist's role in the animal turn 
in terms of shamanism.  The idea of the artist as a sorcerer is not a new one as Joseph 
Beuys demonstrated in the 20th century. I argue that this metaphor should be 
approached cautiously since the artist works within the realm of material reality. The 
psychological disconnect of shamanistic trance states, often aided by psychogenic drugs, 
is inimical to the act of creation. As always Lewis Carroll’s texts provide a fecund source of 
metaphor.  The Cheshire cat perched on his lofty branch declared, “we’re all mad here. 
I’m mad. You’re mad” (Carroll 1982:64). The cat’s madness is of a knowing kind which 
challenges the ordered, rational, humanist view as represented by Alice.   
In Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There, Alice was confronted by a 
giant game of chess. Her task was to negotiate herself towards the eighth square where 
her status as white pawn would be changed to that of Queen, a position that she aspired 
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to. Her journey across the chequered landscape did not subscribe to the rules of chess 
but followed its own “mad” narrative. Along the way she meets a number of characters 
including the Red and White Queens, the White Knight, Tweedledum and Tweedledee 
and Humpty Dumpty. The story begins and ends with the black kitten transmogrifying into 
the Red Queen and back again. “Now, Kitty!” [Alice] cried, clapping her hands 
triumphantly. “Confess that was what you turned into!” (Carroll 1982:231). The Red Queen 
provided inspiration for the penultimate exhibition in The Alice Sequence. Entitled Red 
Queen to Play14 it exploited the nonsense inherent in Lewis Carroll's tale by alluding to the 
animal question while not supplying any one-to-one correspondence or necessary 
explanation.  The basic tenet of the exhibition was illustrated in an aphorism I fixed to the 
gallery wall, “You know you are not real”! This phrase is echoed in Elizabeth Gunter’s 
query: “What then, is real …? Could it be that both reality and realism are mere constructs 
in equal measure?” (E Gunter, personal correspondence, 2016). Gunter’s drawings refer 
to another realism, which is neither physical or metaphysical, but affective and felt. It is a 
knowledge that depends on belief and intuition. As the Unicorn said to Alice, “Well, now 
we have seen each other, if you believe in me, I'll believe in you. Is that a bargain?”  
(Carroll 1982:197). 
 
In Chapter 4, Language: The wound without a name, I consider the role of language both 
as one of the traditional defining features of humanity and the way it has been used as a 
tool to mark the difference between human and the other animals, thereby confirming the 
essentialist assumption of the superiority of humankind. Derrida noted language as the 
pre-eminent marker of difference between humankind and animals. 
 
…the essence of animality …is a mute stupor, stupefaction, or daze. … in order to 
attenuate somewhat euphemistically the potential violence of this qualification but 
also in order to render the sense of a type of encircling (Umring) within which the 
animal, as a logon, finds itself, according to Heidegger, deprived of access in its very 
opening to the being of the entity as such, to being as such, to the "as such" of what 
is. It is true that, according to Benjamin, the sadness, mourning, a melancholy 
(Traurigkeit) of nature and of animality are born out of this muteness (Stummheit, 
Sprachlosigkeit), but also out of and by means of the wound without a name: that of 
having been given a name. Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the 
power to name, to name oneself, indeed to respond to one's name (2002:388). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Rust en Vrede Gallery, Durbanville, August to September 2015.!
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Deprived of a name and the power to name, the animal is rendered mute and in that 
there is great sadness. Alice discusses the significance of naming with a small insect that 
she meets in the railway carriage. Asserting the human-centred 19th-century view of the 
world, she observes that naming is useful to humans but not to the animals:  
 
What’s the use of their having names,” the Gnat says, “if they won’n’t answer to 
them?” “No use to them,” said Alice; “but its useful to the people that name them, I 
suppose. If not, why do things have names at all?”  (Carroll 1982:150). 
 
Naming also forms part of Alice's conversation with Humpty Dumpty, in which he 
pompously assigns a meaning to his name while simultaneously claiming that Alice's 
name is “stupid” “[M]y name means the shape I am and a good handsome shape it is too” 
(Carroll 1982:180). Humpty Dumpty arbitrarily ascribes meaning to words, sometimes 
restricting them to the literal or denotative, at other times releasing them from any fixed 
meaning at all (Dunn and McDonald 2010: 3). While Humpty Dumpty demonstrates a 
form of intolerable logic to Alice’s considerable frustration, his conversation with Alice 
nevertheless provides a useful metaphor to demonstrate both the arbitrary nature of 
language and its power to control and obfuscate. 
 
That language has the capacity to govern perceptions was highlighted by the feminist 
movement in which it was shown that language was used to perpetuate a patriarchal 
system through its gendered construction. The feminists’ activism effectively changed the 
way we speak. Words were released from their gender specific, and often pejorative, 
roles. As an example words such as “sculptor” became gender-neutral, and the word 
“sculptress” fell into disuse. Similarly, the language we use to address animals governs the 
way we perceive them. This is most apparent in the use of the personal pronoun. 
Traditionally animals have been referred to as “it’s” never as “who’s”.  Changing the use of 
pronouns for animals to those used with reference to humans, changes their status from 
object to subject, thereby suggesting a relationship based on intersubjectivity instead of 
one based on power implied by the subject-object relationship.  
 
Metaphors are powerful tools that can be used to diminish or enhance. Evoking animality 
in phrases such as, “He eats like a pig.”  “He died like a dog.” “They behave like 
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monkeys”15 raises the spectre of Homo monstrosus in which “animality” is constructed in 
opposition to “humanity” (Hurn 2012:19). That is, every attribute that humans have, the 
animal is said to lack. “Animal” is thus negatively constituted by the sum of these 
deficiencies (Ingold cited in Hurn 2012:14). These metaphors are not only an insult to the 
human, but do the other animals a great disservice by corralling them into rigid 
categories and forever foreclosing perception of them as worthy others.  
 
The fictional Elizabeth Costello via her author JM Coetzee, and Jacques Derrida have 
used the metaphor of the Holocaust to argue for the rights of animals used and abused in 
contemporary factory farming practices. In this sense, the phrase that “They were led like 
animals to the slaughter”, in which the abattoir is compared to the gas chambers of the 
WWII genocide of the Jews, becomes a literal description of modern farming practices. 
Elizabeth Costello is taken to task for such an extreme use of metaphor by Abraham Stern, 
an appalled attendee of her lecture (Coetzee 2003:94).  
 
While language can be powerful, in other respects it fails. Carl Safina, for example points 
out that language collapses in the face of interpretation from animal to human language. 
He points out that there is a limited range of words to describe the various sounds, 
vocalisations and gestures that animals use to communicate with each other. Humankind's 
failure to translate from their languages to ours, forecloses understanding. He points out, 
that in spite of traditional views to the contrary, current ethological studies (chiefly of 
primates, elephants and cetaceans) show that other than human animals in fact do have 
the capacity for learned language, as well as having the demonstrable ability to use syntax 
to convey specific meanings (2015:87). 
 
In the context of these ideas, I pursued my inquiry through the visual means of sculptures 
and words in the exhibition Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2013)16. In Will 
you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2013), I particularly focus on the character of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 This phrase is particularly relevant in the South African context. In 2016 Penny Sparrow was 
charged and convicted of hate speech because she compared the behaviour of “black” people to 
monkeys. The phrase caused great offense. 
16 National Arts Festival, Grahamstown, 27 June to 7 July and Oliewenhuis Museum, Bloemfontein 
July to August 2014.!
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Humpty Dumpty, as he is the one character in Lewis Carroll's tales who appears most 
concerned with the meaning of words – even though he frequently shifts their meanings 
to suit his own purposes. In the act of creating him in three-dimensional form I found 
myself conflating him with a mythic character from my childhood – Arnoldus.  My mother 
invented Arnoldus to personify and externalise my childhood tantrums. He was said to sit 
on my shoulder and whisper “naughty” deeds into my ear. Arnoldus merged with Humpty 
Dumpty to become HD Arnoldus, a pompous, ridiculous character whom I depicted in 
most forms as balanced precariously on skinny legs and shod in a pair of ballet pumps. As 
always Lewis Carroll's texts provide a rich source of metaphoric comparison. No more so 
than The Walrus and The Carpenter who in Through the Looking Glass trick the oysters 
into becoming part of their feast. This scene demonstrates what Derrida would call 
“carno-phallogocentrism”17. The assumption being that humankind, exemplified by The 
Walrus and The Carpenter, assigns itself the right to eat other animals, and in the process 
tricks them into being complicit in their own demise. 
 
Language is further implicated in the discussion in Chapter 5, Take a Bow, on the subject 
of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the late mid 20th century flowering of the 
extreme Cartesian view of animals as automata, beings that respond in a prescribed way 
to pre-determined stimuli. In Take a Bow, I argue that fear of the accusation of 
anthropomorphism precluded empathetic identification with other animals. Under the 
guidance of “scientific” objectivity it permitted the emotional distancing that opened the 
door for forms of abuse such as factory farming and medical experimentation. I illustrate 
this contention with reference to the Nim Project, in which a chimpanzee named Nim 
Chimsky was taught American Sign Language (ASL) under controlled experimental 
conditions. The experiment was considered a failure when Nim failed to produce the 
required level of competence in ASL. However, I argue that Nim was communicating with 
these experimenters affectively using bodily semiotics, a fact they chose to ignore to the 
detriment of the animal. While anthropomorphism is now cautiously permitted in the 
discourse on the animal, it has to be appropriate. To this end I propose the concept of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Phallogocentrism: “[T]he term, exacts not only criticism of male dominance within Western 
society, but also suggests this dominance is supported by the values instituted and articulated 
through Western philosophy” (Richards 2008:101). 
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relational epistemologies (Woodward 2008:3) in which species-specific points of view 
need to be taken into account. Such an example of canine communication is the play 
bow.  I investigate the play bow through an artwork entitled, Take a Bow in which two 
sculptures of dogs are placed in relational proximity to each other. The space-between 
becomes activated by the communication from one dog to the other signalled by the 
bow, which translated means, “come play with me”.  
 
In Chapter 6, Wittgenstein's Lion and Heidegger’s Hand, I return to the question whether 
animals can reason, feel, talk, manipulate and take decisions. That is, whether they have 
an interior life. Based on Wittgenstein statement “If a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him” (Wittgenstein cited in Wolfe 2003:44), I follow Wolfe in raising questions 
about relations between language, species and the question of the subject and in so 
doing raise doubts as to whether the ontological difference between human and animal 
should be constituted by human symbolic language. I query whether language alters the 
question of the difference between a human and animal (Wolfe 2003:47).  
 
The literature on ethological and laboratory studies reveals that most researchers are still 
in the thrall of behaviourism and empiricism, exposing a tendency to use human 
logocentric language as the rod against which to measure other animal languages. This 
anthropocentric approach is fraught with complications. Jacob Beck offers three reasons 
as to why this should be (Beck 2013). Initially, as Wittgenstein suggested, it is because we 
lack the epistemic knowledge to know what the other animal is thinking, in Wittgenstein's 
case the lion. Because the lion’s thought processes are so different from ours there is no 
way to access them. Secondly, if one acknowledges animal cognition, our language is 
inadequate in dealing with the contents of the cognitive processes. And thirdly, it is 
entirely possible that animals think in a different format from human natural language, a 
difference as marked as that between analogue and digital forms (Beck 2013:254)18. 
Nevertheless, since we do understand a lot of animal communication, he suggests we 
share an evolutionary “core cognition”, one that permits cross-species mutuality (Beck 
2013:255). In this context, Carl Safina proposes the concept of prosody (2015:202). These 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Beck uses the analogue/digital opposition to emphasise his point that animals’ thinking 
processes are markedly different from the logos dependent human practices. 
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are sounds that are based on nonlinguistic communication that significantly is understood 
across species. 
 
In Chapter 6 I consider Derrida’s critique of Lacan and Heidegger in The animal therefore I 
am, in which he accuses them of a “quite literally Cartesian” response to the animal 
question (Derrida 2008:123). In Lacan’s case, he inculpates him of entrapping the animal 
in the realm of the imaginary, thereby forever denying it access to the symbolic – that 
which makes us human (Derrida 2008:120). Moreover, he takes Lacan to task for 
proclaiming on flimsy evidence, that animals are incapable of second order pretense – 
pretense of pretense. That is, they are unable to pretend that they are practicing 
deception (Derrida 2008:120). Heidegger, like Lacan, asserts a discontinuity between 
humans and other animals. He does this in spite of his attempts to approach the 
distinction between human and animal in a new non-anthropocentic way. His tripartite 
thesis that the stone is “worldless”, the animal is “poor in world”, and man is “world-
forming” (Heidegger cited in Atterton & Calarco 2004:170) served only to reaffirm the 
discontinuity between human and other animals. To all intents and purposes he 
confirmed the Cartesian model. That is, in spite of his anti-Cartesian initiative, he 
essentially emphasised the ontotheological view of human exceptionalism (Atterton &  
Calarco 2004:24). Yet Heidegger made one observation that, in terms of this project, is 
significant. He distinguished between the human hand and the animals’ paw, claw or 
talon.  The human hand is capable of giving, while apes, for example, have extremities 
that can only grasp. That is, the hand is one extra attribute that Heidegger grants 
exclusively to the human. Moreover it is a thinking hand! As noted by Baker and 
confirmed by my own artistic practice, the hand has a will-to-form that appears to bypass 
rational control. Yet, while acknowledging the hand’s imperative, I reject Heidegger’s 
implication that the human hand is distinct in kind from the animal’s paw – a point I make 
in a sculpture entitled Heidegger’s Hand in which the animal’s hands are iconographically 
conflated with those of the artist’s. 
 
In the conclusion I attempt to summarise my theoretical position in relation to the animal 
turn. I align myself with theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Donna Haraway, and in so 
doing, I rely on Calarco’s analysis of the philosophical terrain on the animal question, 
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which he groups into three different categories: “identity”, “difference” and “indistinct” 
(Calarco 2015:3-4). I pay a passing nod to the irony that I depend on the word in my art 
praxis, while simultaneously critiquing the central role played by language in separating 
humans from the other animals. I draw attention to the tension between reason and affect 
in both art practice and animal-human communication. I also emphasise the embodied 
nature of creative activity and animal-human interchange. Finally, I follow Elizabeth 
Costello, who says that it is via the poets (and poetics) that understanding with the animals 
might be reached, “thereby returning the living being to language” (Coetzee 2004:111); I 
end with Rainer Maria Rilke’s The 8th Duino Elegy, which poetically summarises my 
position. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Space-Between 
 
 
Fig 1.1 Wilma Cruise Adam and Eve Before the Fall (2006–2007). Ceramic on steel base, 
Adam 187 cm, Eve 180 cm. (Photographed by Carla Crafford). 
 
 
In the question that suspends and defers clear answers, we learn the intrigue of 
thought (Broglio 2011:xxi).  
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Exhibitions 
Portrait of my friends and other animals (1987) 
The Dolly Suite (2003–2006)  
Cocks Asses &… (I can’t hear) (2007–2009) 19 
 
That the animal question should be addressed by artists is no surprise, since artists from 
time immemorial have acted as reflectors of their society. But just how art addresses the 
problem is an area of contestation. In this chapter I address the efficacy of art in dealing 
with the ethical question of the human animal interface. I look at the work of 
contemporary artists who deal with the animal in various ways and test their approach 
against Steve Baker’s dualistic division – art that is “animal-endorsing” and art that is 
“animal-skeptical”.  I investigate earlier work from my 1987 exhibition Portrait of my friends 
and other animals through to The Dolly Suite (2003–2006) and Cocks Asses &... (I can’t 
hear) (2007–2009) and trace the use of animal imagery and in so doing I introduce the 
core concept of my argument which I have named “the space-between”. I identify this 
space as the rupture between language and experience, and the gap of silence that 
occurs between two relating, experiencing subjects including human and other sentient 
beings.  
 
 
The binary opposition of human and the (other) animal is based on the possession or lack 
of the logos, which in ontotheological humanism has become an ingrained mode of 
thought. This view has been extolled by philosophers through the ages. The separation of 
human and the (other) animal and the superiority of one above the other is entrenched in 
the Judeo-Christian system of belief as expressed in God’s injunction in Genesis that 
(hu)man should “have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the air, and over 
every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:28)20. From Aristotle’s zōon 
logon eschon, the rational animal, to Descartes’ mechanistic version of animals as 
unreasoning automata, and further to “Heidegger… Kant, Levinas and Lacan” (Derrida 
2008:27) the anthropocentric view has seldom been challenged. Little has changed to 
upset the implicit notion that humankind is above and separate from the (other) animals. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Portrait of my friends and other animals (1987) Beuster-Skolimowski Gallery, Pretoria, 2–14 
August 1987. 
The Dolly Suite is an ongoing project that centres on the being of a sheep as a point of departure. 
Cocks Asses &… (I can’t hear) University of Johannesburg Art Gallery 7–28 November 2007; Kizo 
Art Gallery, Durban, 20 June to 28 July 2008; White River Art Gallery March to April 2009; 
Oliewenhuis Art Museum (Reservoir), Bloemfontein, 7 July to 16 August 2009. 
20“Dominion”can be interpreted in two ways:  humankind has dominance over the animals or is in 
a position of caring stewardship (Regan 2006:9). 
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Derrida maintains that this is “an immense disavowal …[that] traverses the whole history of 
humanity” (Derrida 2008:14).  
 
The binaries of human and animal suggest a chasm of difference – that which Derrida calls 
the “abyssal” rupture (2008:12) and which I refer to as the “space-between”. Theorising 
this space in an attempt to bridge the gap between humans and other animals is the aim 
of this thesis, in both written and practical forms. I articulate the theoretical space-
between with sculptures, prints, drawings and paintings. Via the materiality of art making 
and the act of doing I attempt to make visible the invisible. Functioning in the space of the 
subliminal and the subconscious, I use the human and animal bodies as the framing text. 
In so doing, I offer the proposition that (logocentric) language and prescriptive art making 
fail to capture realities that function beneath the surface of conscious apprehension. I 
propose that artistic knowledge is achieved by and through the embodied act of doing. 
Similarly, I argue that the kind of knowledge arrived through human-animal interactions is 
an embodied and affective one. 
 
 
 
Fig 1.2. Wilma Cruise Blue Doris (1988). Ceramic, 55 x 90 cm.  
(Photographed by the artist) 
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My earliest sculptures, circa the late eighties, showed an incipient interest in the human 
animal equation in which I combined human and animal in a single therianthropic form. 
Two such examples are Blue Doris (1988) (Fig 1.2) and Dog with Options (1987). Blue 
Doris is a blue ursine form with a humanoid face. It is a (psychical) portrait of the artist 
Doris Bloom. Although Bloom is female Blue Doris sports male genitalia. The sculpture is 
constructed in two parts that slot one into the other. The male aspect is shaped like an 
enlarged penis but is hidden when the form is assembled. Thus, bear-like Doris is twice 
blessed with a phallus, which is an indication of the desire for the power represented by 
the physical organ. As I wrote, “It is the signified not the sign that provokes envy” (Cruise 
1997:17). The phallus was an ironic tribute to Bloom’s power as a female artist. In this 
respect Blue Doris’ animal being was used as a cipher for an essentially human concern, 
feminism, and had little to do with the animal as such. Berger terms this use of the animal 
“a moral metaphor”, one that serves human ends and which has little to do with the 
animal as such (Berger 2007:258). 
 
In his 1980 essay published in About Looking (1980) and reproduced in Kalof and 
Fitzgerald (2007), Berger laments the loss of real animals in contemporary human life. 
Identifying the rupture from the time of Descartes to its apogee in modern times, he 
maintains we, as humankind, have isolated ourselves from other species. By marginalising 
animals in zoos21, exploiting them as bio-commodities, reproducing their images – not 
symbolically but realistically and thereby reducing the animal to its sign – we have 
effectively pushed the animal into a “receding past” (Berger 2007:255). “Therein lies the 
ultimate consequence of their marginalisation. That look between animal and man…has 
been extinguished” (Berger 2007:261). 
 
In a posthumanist world the assumption is that humankind is no longer the central being – 
the single experiencing subject around which the world revolves in a kind of pre-
Copernican manner22. In contrast to the posthumanist assumption, the humanist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 As in his earlier thesis on the male gaze in which women were the recipients of the voyeuristic 
gaze, Berger maintains that zoo animals are the observed never the observer (Berger 2007:251). 
22 I use Copernicus as a metaphor because before Copernicus discovered the heliocentric 
universe, humans thought that the universe revolved around the earth.   
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enterprise, founded in the enlightenment, foregrounds reason, rational discourse, and 
language. The animal in this scenario is relegated to the margins; its lack of language 
rendering it, according to Heidegger, “poor in world” (Derrida 2008:80,155). In post 
humanism the humanist assumptions are challenged, not necessarily to reject the human 
but to render it with “greater specificity once we have removed meaning from the 
ontologically closed domain of consciousness, reasons, reflection and so on” (Wolfe 
2010:xxv) 23. The human animal thereby becomes at one with the evolutionary continuum 
of animal life. By opening the pathways philosophically, humans can once more connect 
practically and spiritually with animals in a way that, according to Berger, we have lost. In 
this way posthumanism is also pre-humanism, referring to a time in pre-history when we 
(humans and animals) were embedded in a biological continuum (Wolfe 2010:xv). 
 
In the present (posthumanist/postmodernist) era, as the question of the animal becomes 
more urgent in the face of the environmental crisis, the critical task is then to re-imagine 
the animals not as absent referents (Adams 2015), (such as the pig in roast pork), as 
symbolic cut-outs, or as metaphors for human characteristics, such as Blue Doris, but as 
living partners in a shared world. It is a return to a possibly idealised age when man and 
animal co-existed as partners in an environmentally balanced world. 
 
…the respectful representation of the animal as an individual and the avoidance of 
using the animal as symbol or signifier is a matter of great importance to be heeded 
by artists and curators, lest the animals be exploited as beasts of burden forced to 
carry inappropriate conceptual agendas… (Watt 2011:62). 
 
The question begs itself, just how do we return the animal to its rightful place in a shared 
universe? Elizabeth Fontenay observes that in sacred societies it was the mystics and 
artists that had the right to pray for animals (cited in Salaud 2011:123). Like Berger she 
laments the transformation of “the talkative animal into inert meat”, without awareness of 
the sentience of the once living being. Her desire is to create a language that “shatters the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The foundational ontological question in philosophy has always been the nature of being: “Who 
am I?”But it is an exclusively anthropocentric question, which can essentially be transcribed as 
“what is it to be human?”However, as exclusive as this question insists on being, it must always rely 
on a direct comparison with everything that is not human. This means the foundational ontological 
question always comes with a rider attached, namely: What makes humans different from (other) 
animals? (Cruise A. 2014:50). 
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silence of animals” (cited in Salaud 2011:123). Elizabeth Costello says that it is via the 
poets (and poetics) that understanding with the animals might be reached, thereby 
returning the living being to language (Coetzee 2004:111).  
 
Assuming that artists have a role to play, problematical questions arise as to the nature of 
the message. Should it be evangelistic and didactic? Does the artist who uses animal 
imagery have a moral responsibility to proselytize for animal rights as Tom Regan argues 
(Gigolotti 2011:48), or, is the artist one who stands outside the discourse using the 
indirect tools of metaphor, metonymy and irony? This latter position is favoured by 
Broglio, who says understanding is achieved not by “…mimesis or representing animals in 
a natural history tradition or kitsch assimilation of animals into our world as tamed or cute 
or defeated; rather these artists have unmoored themselves, even ever so slightly, from 
the cultural grounding of meaning and the solidification of being over becoming…” 
(Broglio 2011:xx). 
 
In inclination and praxis Broglio’s view is one I support. It underpins my thesis that it is 
possible via affective, metaphorical and metonymic means to access the lost connection 
to the animals. In this way the rupture between human and animal can be closed – the 
space-between can be bridged. The underlying assumption of my argument is that art 
and artists can play a role in bridging the chasm, thereby returning the animal to a 
significant spiritual place in the posthumanist enterprise. But, rather than acting as 
evangelists, I suggest that artists can (and perhaps should), enact and perform their 
equality with animals. 
 
However, the utilitarian philosopher, Peter Singer disagrees. He is dismissive of the role of 
the artist claiming that no contemporary work of art has done very much to change our 
attitudes to animals (cited in Aloi 2011:13). He goes so far as to say, “the energy used by 
... the air-conditioned art galleries in which we view art contributes to climate change 
(cited in Baker 2011:5), which, as Steve Baker notes, is a criticism that apparently does not 
extend to “the air-conditioned lecture theatres in which philosophers present their ideas” 
(Baker 2011:5).  
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Humorous spats aside, Baker, in his discussion of What is the Postmodern Animal? in 
2007, favours a distinction between art that is “animal-endorsing” and art that is “animal-
skeptical” (Baker 2007:278), which elsewhere he articulates as “putting ethics before art or 
art before ethics” (Baker 2013).  He thereby suggests that there are only two positions 
artists can adopt in relation to the animal question, a position he retracts in 2013 when it 
becomes clear it is an oversimplification. But in 2007 it seemed to be a useful distinction. 
The advocacy position aligned itself with the animal rights activists while the non-
advocacy one was more likely to question the cultural construction of the term “animal” 
and its meaning vis-à-vis “human”.  In this sense the division paralleled the split between 
the Anglo-American philosophers and those of the Continental school, in which the 
former adopt an activists’ position while the latter tend to deconstruct the terms of the 
debate (Calarco 2008:2). By adopting Baker’s distinction one can investigate 
contemporary artists who centralise the animal in their work and assess their ethical 
positions. 
 
The artist, Sue Coe, adopts a conscious advocacy approach (Gigliotti 2011:48) (Fig 1.3). 
Her graphic images of animal slaughter are intended to shock and in so doing are 
designed to effect changes in the attitude and behaviour of the viewers. Amongst others, 
her works depict the interior of slaughterhouses, the de-finning of hammerhead sharks, 
the mass gassing of pigs and views of dying fish on fishmongers’ slabs (Aloi & Bennison 
2011:106). She says, “My work is used in fundraisers all the time by animal protection 
groups. So firstly, it provides money to save animals, it educates and makes aware, and 
unlike much of my other social political work, the viewer gets the message. Then rather 
than feeling helpless, that same viewer can do something about this immediately: 
becoming a vegan, and avoid all animal products, including the wearing of their skins, 
and the eating of their bodies” (cited in Aloi & Bennison 2011:107).  
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Fig 1.3. Sue Coe Finning (2011) 
(Aloi & Bennison 2011: 110 – Antennae Issue 19). 
 
But while her proselytising intention is clear there are those, like Donald Kuspit, who 
question her artistic integrity. 
 
Coe, I think, is torn between a wish to communicate instantaneously to as large an 
audience as possible, and thus to use a public and invariably clichéd language, and a 
desire to make “high art,” that is, art so dense with visual substance that it cannot be 
exhausted at first sight. When she manages to balance these impulses, she takes her 
place among the Expressionist masters, but when she makes images for ‘the cause,’ 
her works dwindle to militant cartoons, lacking even the saving grace of Daumier’s wit 
(Watt 2011:30).  
 
A consideration of Coe's work raises the spectre of political art. Just how engaged should 
artists be in proselytising for change? As Watt noted, there is a general avoidance of the 
politics of animal representation in the visual arts, which is at odds with other disciplines 
where ethical and political issues are foregrounded (Watt 2011:70). Her argument is 
based on a belief that it is important to question artists’ intentions and ethical stance vis-à-
vis the animal.  
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Nevertheless the answer to the question of ethical intention is not always clear as it is in 
the case of Coe. The Australian sculptor, Patricia Piccinini, for instance, works on the 
human and animal figure in a representational yet more nuanced way. Piccinini creates 
mutant creatures that have human features such as pink flesh and human hair. She terms 
her hybrid animals “mechanical fauna”, thereby drawing attention to the interface 
between nature and technology (Orgaz & Piccinini 2007). Such a work is The Young 
Family (2002) (Fig 1.4) in which a half pig, half human is depicted suckling her young 
mutant offspring.  
 
 
 
Fig 1.4. Patricia Piccinini The Young Family (2002). Silicone, polyurethane, leather, 
plywood, human hair, 80 x 150 x 110 cm.  Photograph by Graham Baring, Courtesy of the 
artist and Haunch of Venison (file://localhost/(http/::weirdfictionreview.com: 
2012:09:patricia-piccininis-mythic-imagination:) 
 
 
The Young Family evokes feelings of revulsion raising the spectre of Homo monstrosus – 
monstrous humans or human-animal hybrids in which “animality” is constructed in 
opposition to “humanity” (Hurn 2012). “[E]very attribute that is claimed we [humans] 
uniquely have, the animal is consequently supposed to lack; thus the generic concept of 
‘animal’ is negatively constituted by the sum of these deficiencies” (Ingold cited in Hurn 
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2012). Yet strangely and contradictorily, the scene of the mother tenderly suckling her 
young evokes feelings of compassion, suggesting that we share our humanity and 
animality. Piccinini deliberately blurs the binaries of nature, culture and technology and in 
so doing refuses to adopt an obvious didactic or condemnatory position. As Piccinini 
herself admits, her approach is not dissimilar to the cautionary tales embodied in Greek 
myths. 
 
[I]t is not really science itself that I am interested in, as much as how it impacts on 
people. I think my creatures are actually more mythological than scientific. They are 
chimeras that I construct in order to tell stories that explain the world that I live in but 
cannot totally understand or control. Like most myths they are often cautionary tales, 
but they are also often celebrations of these extraordinary beasts. You need to 
remember that the gods of the ancient myths had great power but also very human 
motivations. They followed their own interests, with very little feeling for the effects 
they might have on normal people (Orgaz & Piccinini 2007:2). 
 
 
Piccinini argues her position from an essentially anthropocentric point of view. That is, her 
work, functioning as a moral metaphor, has less to do with animals than the human 
dilemma that is caused by the ethical interface with animals. Yet, her work is not didactic 
in the way Sue Coe’s is, and simply to label her an animal or environmental activist would 
do a disservice to the complexity of her ethical stance.  
 
Equally ambiguous and problematical in an ethical sense, is Damien Hirst’s work. A large 
and significant part of his oeuvre is devoted to animals, specifically his practice of 
preserving animal bodies in formaldehyde as in his Natural History series. For example, in 
Mother and child (Divided) (1993)24 (Fig 1.5)  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Mother and Child (Divided) was first exhibited as part of the ‘Aperto 93’ Venice Biennale 
exhibition. (http://www.damienhirst.com/mother-and-child-divided-1).  
!
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Fig 1.5. Damien Hirst Mother and child (Divided) (1993). Glass, stainless steel, Perspex, 
acrylic paint, cow, calf and formaldehyde solution, 2 parts: 2086 x 3225 x 1092 mm, 2086 
x 3225 x 1092 mm, 2 parts: 1136 x 1689 x 622 mm, 1136 x 1689 x 622 mm.  
(http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/hirst-mother-and-child-divided-t12751) 
 
 
Hirst places a separated and bisected cow and calf in four vitrines of formaldehyde. Hirst 
exposes the process from living animal to meat (or an object of contemplation) and in so 
doing he lays bare the interiority of the animals for human inspection (Broglio 2011:3–8). 
He explains. 
 
It’s kind of odd to take meat and give it back a personality in some way or make it a 
metaphorical carrier or something like that. People don’t like faces on meat. But also 
for it to be dead in a tragic way. For you to have some sort of understanding or to feel 
its pain or tragedy (Hirst cited in Obrist 2008). 
 
While it appears on the surface that Hirst's primary intention is to shock, one cannot 
ignore protest implicit in statements like the one above or his claim that he has created a 
“zoo of dead animals as an alternative to having living ones pacing around in misery” 
(Hirst n.d.) Protest is also implicit in the title of the installation Out of Sight Out of Mind 
(1991)25, in which four skinned cow heads in formaldehyde solution remind the viewers 
that there was a living animal prior to the delivery of meat to their plates. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Damien Hirst Out of Sight. Out of Mind.1991. Glass, painted steel, silicone, cows’ heads and 
formaldehyde solution. Two parts, each: 406 x 838 x 457 mm | 16 x 33 x 18 
(http://www.damienhirst.com/out-of-sight-out-of-mind).  
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Fig 1.6. Damien Hirst The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living 
(1991). Glass, painted steel, silicone, monofilament, shark and formaldehyde solution, 217 
x 542 x 180 cm. (http://www.damienhirst.com/the-physical-impossibility-of) 
 
Whether Hirst is using an ironist position to draw attention to the plight of animals, 
thereby taking an animal-advocacy stance, or whether he displays an emotional 
disconnection, is questionable. As Kerstetter argues, “The animals are typically from 
slaughterhouses. They were either corpses when Hirst got them, or soon would be. Then 
there are the sharks, animals he paid to have killed solely for the purpose of artworks” 
(Kerstetter 2009:n.pag.). In The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone 
Living (1991) (Fig 1.6.) Hirst suspended a dead shark in formaldehyde.  
 
When this shark began to disintegrate due to imperfect preservation, Hirst rejected the 
alternative of sharkskin stretched over an armature (Broglio 2011:17). Instead he 
commissioned (and caused the death) of other sharks to replace the first. According to 
Broglio the integrity of the invisible interior of the shark was important to preserve not 
only for the interior of the animal but for the viewer’s own interiority as well (Broglio 
2011:17). “The animal insides… mark a unique space, a space that we will never know – a 
space that death has inhabited in this animal” (Broglio 2011:17). But did making this point 
warrant the unnecessary killing of a large, presumably sentient, animal? This places Hirst 
in a position of both drawing attention to the needless killing of animals and being 
complicit in that killing.  
 
Hirst’s use of animals in his work raises a distinction in animal art. There are those who use 
animals as their subject matter (Coe) and those that use animals as their medium (Hirst). 
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From Joseph Beuys' coyote26 (Fig 1.7) and dead hare to Marco Evaristti’s goldfish in 
blenders27 and most notably Kim Jones’s burning rats28, artists have used animals both 
dead and alive or about to be dead, as actual subjects in their art.  
 
 
Fig 1.7. Joseph Beuys. I like America and America likes me (1974). Coyote, felt blankets, 
walking stick, gloves, Wall Street Journal.  Performance at Rene Block Gallery, New York. 
Photograph by Caroline Tisdall. 
 
This raises an important ethical question about the fates of the animals. What for example 
happened to Beuys' coyote both before and after its encounter with the artist? Was the 
coyote wild to begin with and where did it go afterwards? What happened to it in the 
sixteen hours that Beuys was not in the room with it? Was it left alone without 
companionship either human or coyote? To Beuys this appeared to be irrelevant to the 
meaning of his performance, which was his role as a shaman and his connection to the 
totem animal of Native Americans. It seemed that the animal's fate was ignored in favour 
of the larger egotistical enterprise of the artist.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Joseph Beuys. I like America and America likes me. (1974). Performance, New York (Baker 
2013:8). 
27 Marco Evaristti. Helena & el Pescadore. (2000). 10 Moulinex blenders with live Goldfish. 
Trapholt Art Museum, Denmark (Baker 2013:2–13). 
28 Kim Jones. Rat Piece. (1976). Union Gallery at California State University, Los Angeles. (Baker 
2013:12–13). 
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In How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare29 his ethical stance is more ambiguous. In this 
work he adopts an advocacy position by pleading for more ecological awareness. He 
argues that the animal is an extension of the human as necessary as a lung or a liver. 
Tenderly cradling the dead hare as the representative of the animal kingdom, he 
“explains” the pictures to it – a gesture intended to close the gap between human and 
animal (Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Mo47lqk_QH0). The question is, 
was the hare killed for the purpose of the performance? And if so is this justifiable?  
 
Even more disturbing is Kim Jones’ performance in which he set three rats alight in the 
gallery and watched their extreme suffering as he poured lighter fluid on them to ensure 
their deaths as they ran around the wire cage screaming in pain and terror (Baker 2013:4–
5). By failing to interfere and stop the deaths of the rats, the audience became complicit in 
the cruelty. As one commentator noted, “We were Romans cheering on the lions. We 
were Christians torching a Salem witch. We were a southern mob lynching a black man. 
We were the Gestapo gassing Jews” (cited in Baker 2013:10-11)!  
 
In Helena & el Pescadore Marco Evaristti similarly involved the audience by suggesting 
that they could, by a flick of a switch, end the fishes lives as they swam around in the 
Moulinex blenders. However, in spite of the implied callousness, there was a moral point 
to be made, which was to demonstrate the ease with which humans are able to terminate 
animals’ lives.  
 
However, not all agree with such tactics. Yvette Watt says, “From an animal right’s point of 
view, causing an animal to suffer or die in the name of art is always unjustifiable, 
regardless of the artist’s intentions, in the same way that causing death or suffering to an 
unwilling human would also be unethical and unacceptable” (Watt 2011:66).  
 
Watt takes a clear intentioned moral position. This is in contrast to the later Baker, who in 
2013 in Artist/Animal, takes a more nuanced stance on the role of the animal in art, one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare. (1965)  
Gold leaf, honey, dead hare, felt pad, iron, fir tree, miscellaneous drawings and clothing items. 
Performance at Galerie Schmela, Dresden, Germany, 26 November 1965. 
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that reaches beyond the simple opposition of advocacy and non-advocacy, that he 
articulated in 2007. Quoting Deleuze and Guattari he says that art “has the power of 
affirming chaos” (Baker 2013:116). Citing the work of Mary Britton Clouse, as an example, 
Baker points out how her photographic portraits of herself with her rescue chickens held 
close in front of her face so that human and bird eye merge, violated her own passionately 
held view of not using live animals in art (Fig 1.8).  
 
 
Fig 1.8. Mary Britton Clouse. Nemo – Portrait/Self Portrait (2005). Digital pigment print on 
Sekishu paper. (http://www.upc-online.org/thinking/framed-clouse.html) 
 
The photographs (with live chickens) disrupted human-animal distinctions and hierarchies 
in a way other forms of representation could not achieve (Baker 2013:116). As Baker says, 
the photographs evoked an unintended “awe not remotely ‘caught’ by the language and 
the well-judged arguments of animal advocacy" (2013:116). Her images speak “on the 
other side of words” (Baker 2013:116).  
 
The danger of taking a simple moralistic position, as suggested by Watt, is illustrated in a 
work by Guillermo Vargas, a Costa Rican artist also known as “Habacuc”. In You are what 
you read (Eres lo que lees), exhibited in Managua, Nicaragua in 2007, an emaciated street 
dog was tied to the wall of the gallery with a short rope (Fig 1.9). Written in dog food on a 
gallery wall was the statement, “Eres lo que lees,” (You are what you read). It caused an 
uproar resulting in a petition that garnered four million signatures calling for the artist to 
be boycotted from the Central American Biennial, Honduras 2008 and for criminal 
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charges to be filed against the artist. But what was before the viewers’ eyes was not the 
actuality. The dog was fed daily and was free to roam other than for the three hours it was 
tied up. It later escaped the gallery and was never found! (Yanez 2010). The point of the 
artist’s exercise was not only to note the hypocrisy of the audience, who seemingly 
overlooked the plight of actual street dogs, while expressing outrage at the “starvation” of 
the gallery dog, but to observe the power of social media as a rumour mongerer. As 
Yanez noted, “Take a dog off the streets and put it into a gallery and it becomes an ethical 
phenomenon, while stray dogs and most real human suffering are ignored or given 
minimal attention” (Yanez 2010).  
 
 
 
Fig 1.9. Guillermo Habacuc Vargas. You Are What You Read (Eres lo que lees) (2007). 
Installation: dog, dog food, rope. Gallery of Managua, 
(Nicaragua.http://fractalenlightenment.com/633/artwork/you-are-what-you-read | 
FractalEnlightenment.com.)  
 
Therefore, however tempting it would be to state an unequivocal moral point like Watt, I, 
like Baker, adhere to the position that art's role is to find new potentials, to disrupt, and to 
destabilise without predetermination of the outcome. Thus, although I am unlikely to 
order the killing of a great white shark, nor tie up an emaciated homeless dog, I do not 
hold to a prescribed moral position. While keeping an eye on the principle of equal 
consideration, I still allow for the potential for new discoveries in a belief that the artist 
must negotiate her ethical stance.  This accords with my general existentialist inclinations 
in which moral decisions should be a matter of free choice, achieved without recourse to 
an ultimate authority. Sartre expressed it as follows: 
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From the moment of my emergence into being, I carry the weight of the world on my 
own, without anything or anybody being able to lighten the burden… (in  Blackham 
1961:137). 
 
This essentially atheistic position marked by the “wild grief that God is dead” (Blackham 
1961:155) leads to an existential sense of loss. “Humankind is alone in the world that is 
mute as to its meaning. Reality, which is permanently in question, provides no answers. 
The cosmos remains enigmatically silent” (Cruise 1997:41). 
 
While the advocacy versus non-advocacy debate may be a fruitful way of looking at how 
artists deal with the question of the animal, it is ultimately an oversimplification as artists 
like Guillermo Vargas demonstrate. I would prefer to return to the question of the gaze, 
not as in feminist theory, but as Derrida posed it when he asked what happened when his 
cat saw him naked. My focus thereby turns to the space between human and animal and 
the nature of the mutual gaze. It is when the animal looks back that the space-between is 
breached, where the silence is filled with meaning. 
 
The encounter with his cat is a key moment in Derrida’s exposition of The Animal That 
Therefore I Am. It is important to note that Derrida did not pose a philosophical question 
to his audience in the vacuum of abstract thought. Instead he based his query on a real 
experience. His encounter with his little cat was in the bathroom when she saw him naked. 
She was neither a generic animal nor a generic cat. Derrida’s investigation is thus not 
merely the machinations of a philosopher but a particular autobiographical experience. 
 
No, no, my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or bathroom, this cat that is 
perhaps not “my cat” my “pussycat,” does not appear here to represent, like an 
ambassador the immense symbolic responsibility with which our culture has always 
charged the feline race. If I say, “it is a real cat” that sees me naked, this is in order to 
mark its unsubstitutable singularity (Derrida 2008:9).  
 
 
Like Carroll’s upside down world in which the animals adopt a position of superiority in 
relation to Alice as the exemplar of the human race, Derrida inverts the human-centred 
position in his long inquiry. It is not what the human sees, when he or she looks, or acts, or 
decides upon the animal, but what the animal sees, or does, or acts upon. Derrida is 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
37 
scornful of advocacy positions. “Their discourses [may be] sound and profound, but 
everything in them goes on as if they themselves had never been looked at and especially 
not naked, by an animal that addressed them” (2008:14).  This willingness to engage the 
animal qua animal in its full specificity and singularity seems to be a useful way to look at 
art involving the animal. 
 
One artist who does attempt to see and return the look of the animal is the South African 
photographer Daniel Naudé. He creates images of feral dogs in a way that focuses as 
much on the animal being as on the human on the other side of the gaze. The impetus for 
his collection of animal photographs in Animal Farm (Naudé 2012) was inspired by the 
look of a feral Africanis dog, which for “a split second looked back at him” before slinking 
off leaving him “speechless and full of emotion”. The intensity of that shared glimpse 
made Naudé determined to depict the dogs in a way that captured their presence and 
their experience (Naudé 2012:7). Like Derrida’s cat, Naudé’s dog was singular and 
particular to that moment. What exactly was communicated during that fleeting exchange 
however remains “unfathomable, unexplained and yet incredibly potent…” (Naudé 
2012:9). Naudé has identified the problematic of the space-between, which implies the 
key question of what happens in this space. What is communicated? Who is this being 
doing the communicating? Broglio identifies this space as “the contact zone” (2011:xxiii). 
Echoing Naudé’s report of the unfathomability of the exchange between human and 
animal he says, “the human-animal contact zone becomes a contact without contact, a 
relation of nonrelations and communication whose language would be under erasure” 
(Broglio 2011:xxiv). 
 
I first became interested in the space-between as a place beyond language in 2003. My 
initial investigation was in the space between two human figures that is not mediated by 
language. I recognised that this is a zone weighted with the unspoken, often only 
signalled by the slightest inflection of the body. By manipulating the space between my 
sculptures I recreated situations in which the sculptures were close enough to each other 
to create a tension and to suggest that communication was taking place beyond the 
spoken word. Such were the figures that made up the life size sculptures Homo Erectus, 
Homo Robustus (Fig 1.10), Lucy and Paranthropus. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
38 
 
Fig 1.10. Wilma Cruise. Homo Erectus and Homo Robustus (1999–2000). Ceramic, 183 cm 
each. (Photographed by the artist). 
 
 
They were exhibited on RapRack at the Goodman Gallery in 200030. I wrote the following 
contemporaneously: “…there is a memory of being somewhere in the shadow area on the 
edge of consciousness” (Cruise 2000). Homo Erectus, Homo Robustus, Lucy and 
Paranthropus are armless and without facial features. They are stripped of the usual 
means of speech, mouths to articulate, and arms to gesture. It is only their bodies that 
signify a state of being that alludes to experience on the other side of appearance. It is, as 
Blackham has suggested, “a queer vestigial quiver of meaning forever out of reach” 
(1961:113). 
 
My propensity to deny my figures facial features and arms had its origin in Kendell Geers’ 
critique of my 1990 Goodman Gallery exhibition, Untitled (everlasting nothingness made 
visible). Writing in The Star newspaper with reference to a bronze bust entitled Nicholas I, 
he noted the “cliché” of the “silent gaping mouth” (Geers 1990:10) (Fig 1.11).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Homo Erectus (1999–2000), Homo Robustus (1999–2000) and Lucy and Paranthropus (1999–
2000) refer to paleo-anthropological discoveries made in Africa. They are allusions to “unearthing”, 
excavating and digging up the past, not from the buried tunnels of earth, but from the depths of 
the psyche.  
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Fig 1.11. Wilma Cruise Nicholas I (1990–1993). Bronze (edition 3), 30 x 43 x 33 cm. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp) 
 
 
His criticism stung, not only for its perceived negativity, but also for its validity. Since WWII 
we have been bombarded by visions of the awful. From graphic images of the dead 
during the Nazi holocaust to bodies flying through the air to thump audibly on the 
pavement below the twin towers in New York, we have been swamped with apocalyptic 
images of such excess that the scream is rendered superfluous. As Geers suggests, it has 
become a cliché. The only way that artists can compete with such representations is to 
retreat into silence. It is within the realm of the interior, in the place of the unspoken, that 
the battle for meaning and relevance takes place. Thus, my sculptures deny their own 
agency by withdrawing the means to express themselves. Their ability to speak or gesture 
is denied by refusing them mouths or arms. At the most elemental level, arms are not only 
unnecessary; they actively interfere with the message. They create a visual noise – a 
distraction - they are indeed impediments. Because it is the condition of muteness that I 
want to convey – a silence, an existential pause, as if hovering on the edge of the world. 
  
Working through the body with the unspoken and unsaid, is a position that concurs with 
Hélène Cixous’ écriture feminine. Cixous, the French literary theorist, suggests 
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reformulating the relationship between language and the body. She rejects what she 
terms “critiques that persist in a logocentric Cartesian discourse that posits the mind as 
the source of writing” (Dobson in Simons 2004: 130). Écriture feminine she maintains “…is 
impossible [to define] … except through subjects that break automatic functions, border 
runners never subjugated by any authority” (Dobson in Simons 2004:127). Écriture 
feminine is not to be confused with a “female language” rather it is an attempt to access 
those verities that lie beyond language. The body is the text but the message functions in 
the area of the subliminal and the pre-conscious. In order to do this I strip my figures of 
the means of speech. Thus the disjunction between a logocentric reading of my work and 
an affective one effectively drove a wedge between the word and the image that has since 
become a cipher for the non-verbal communication that occurs between animal and 
some humans – those who wish to hear “their rumbles hisses and purrs” (Cruise 2007). 
 
In 2003 I consciously articulated Descartes’ core ontological question in relation to 
animals. “Do they think?” As Derrida observed, this question has plagued philosophers 
from Aristotle and beyond to Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan (2008:27). The underlying 
assumption is that because animals are lacking the power of speech they have no capacity 
to reason. “Does a sheep know?” I asked in one of two digital prints that form part of the 
Dolly Suite (2003–2006) (Fig. 1.12).  
 
 
 
Fig 1.12. Wilma Cruise Does a Sheep Know and I Think Therefore I Am (2004). Digital 
prints 61 x 82 cm each. 
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In the second print I query whether a sheep “think” and if she does not, is the inverse of 
Cogito ergo sum true? That is, if she does not think, is she not – a negation. By this I query 
whether the sheep, Dolly or her cipher, is an absent being – a mechanomorphic object to 
be used and abused at human will?  
 
With the Dolly Suite my concerns appeared to have shifted from the animal as metaphor 
in my early works to the question of animal ethics.  It took, however, my 2007 exhibition 
Cocks Asses & … (I can’t hear) for me to become conscious of the precise locus of my 
current research, which I articulate as the “space-between”. Stimulated by the threat of 
annihilation through environmental degradation, my thesis in Cocks, Asses &… (I can’t 
hear), was that we are no longer in tune with the natural world. As the subtitle suggests we 
are no longer listening to the animals.  
 
The exhibition’s tenet was the failure of language in articulating the unspoken. Although 
this had in the past focused on the interaction between humans, in Cocks, Asses &… (I 
can’t hear) it was extrapolated to include animals such as a cat, a dog, a cockerel and the 
two eponymous asses. Chanticleer (Fig 1.13) was one of the first works I made for the 
exhibition.  
 
Fig 1.13. Wilma Cruise Chanticleer (2007). Ceramic, 150 x 170 cm. (Photographed by 
Carla Crafford). 
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It consists of a life-size autobiographical figure lying on the ground. A dog perches on her 
breast, his paws pressing into her flesh. On top of the dog stands a large cockerel. The 
title of the work alludes to the Grimm brothers’ tale, The Bremen Town Musicians, in which 
a donkey, a dog, a cat and a cockerel chase off a band of robbers from a cottage in a 
forest (Grimm 1918/2014). They do this by standing one on top of the other and creating 
a cacophony of their combined voices. When one of the robbers attempts to retake the 
cottage, the cat scratches him, the donkey kicks him, the dog bites him and the cockerel 
shrieks at him. In the perception of the robbers the animals appear variously as a witch or 
a giant. The animals in this laudable venture gain access to the cottage where they live 
happily ever after.  
 
Chanticleer is not a literal interpretation, rather it was driven by a dimly conscious memory 
of the childhood story. The idea was also inspired by the iconic image of one animal 
standing on top of the other. Most importantly it was informed by my acquaintanceship 
with a feisty Boston terrier, named Phoebe, whom I had met in New York in 2007. The 
gaze between the female form and the dog, Phoebe, suggests communication that is 
neither necessarily friendly nor affectionate. Yet, the look implies a reciprocal recognition 
of the being of the other.  
 
Central to the exhibition was the installation entitled Adam and Eve Before the Fall (see 
Fig 1.1). In this work I allude to the space between human and animal that was articulated 
in its most primal form in the Garden of Eden in the encounter between Adam and Eve 
and the serpent. Adam and Eve gaze dumbly at a small snake at their feet. Their 
incomprehension as to its significance does not so much signify their fall from grace in a 
biblical sense, but the rupture in their relationship with the animal kingdom31. The snake’s 
arrival shatters the peace and harmony of paradise and signals the rift between man and 
the natural order. The destruction of the harmonious continuum between human and 
animal created a seemingly unbridgeable chasm of difference.  This rift, “the space-
between”, is largely a gulf of incomprehension, one that is bridged, on occasion, by the 
mute gaze of the other as in Derrida's cat and Naude’s dog.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Derrida also reinterprets the genesis myth abrogating the snake for the cause of the fall (Derrida 
2002:372). 
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Language and writing was as much the focus of the exhibition as animals, and was 
foregrounded in the diary pages of The 100 Page Diary. These notes consisting of 
aphorisms, embryonic ideas and observations are an attempt to write meaning into the 
ideas underpinning the exhibition. As Schmahmann observed, “These are not, then, 
indicators of a process of arriving at a ‘resolution’ but are instead evocations of the 
impossibility of ever giving voice to the scattered and unknowable drives that underpin 
conscious thought” (Schmahmann 2007:1). The diary pages evolved from private notes 
and sketches, the kind that most artists use in their praxis. I decided to expose these 
notations in public at the exhibitions in an attempt to reveal my thought processes. 
However, the danger existed that the thought of a “finished” work would pre-empt the 
stream of consciousness that accompanies private thought. Therefore, while the diary 
pages are not finished works neither are they blueprints for the sculptures. Instead they 
often evolve from the sculptures. They are attempts to find meaning in the figures that 
emerge out of the inchoate process of working with clay. They are arguments with myself 
about the precise meaning of the works. They are also notes about the impossibility of 
finding meaning.  
 
Meaning is elusive. Eschewing a didactic message allows the artist to discover new 
concepts, ones that might float up in the act of making art. Thus, without the surety of a 
fixed moral position nor a focused message, I support Baker's view that “contemporary 
art’s distinctive contribution to understandings of human-animal relations will be 
recognized only if artists’ practices – flawed and provisional as they may be – are taken 
seriously” (Baker 2013:3). Putting ethics before art, limits the potential for new discoveries. 
“At the very least, [it] risks failing to take [art] practices seriously” (Baker 2013:3). It is the 
artist’s role to venture into terra incognito, to uncover and discover without the surety of a 
moral map. The ethical morass has to be negotiated without pre-emptive guidelines, 
using the act of making to offer new insights.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The animal – what a word! 
 
!
Fig 2.1 Wilma Cruise The Animals in Alice (2011) 
 
 
 
Since time therefore 
Since so long ago, we can say the animal has been looking at us? What animal? The 
other? (Derrida 2008:3). 
 
 
 
 
 
!  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
45 
Exhibitions 
The Animals in Alice (2011) 
Alice and the Animals (2011) 
The Alice Diaries (2012) 32 
 
In this chapter I interrogate the meaning of the word “animal” with reference to Derrida 
and Deleuze and Guattari. I also survey a range of ethical opinions in an attempt to locate 
both my ethics and praxis on a continuum of thinking on the question of the animal. In so 
doing I survey the writings of the Anglo-American philosophers such as Peter Singer, Tom 
Regan and Gary Francione, who argue for animal rights based on the application of 
practical ethics. I compare their ethical position to that of Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, 
and Cixous. In this context I consider Haraway’s critical response to Derrida and Deleuze 
and Guattari in which she introduces the concept of “companion species” (2008). I 
indicate how my investigation in the animal turn takes place through my creative practice. 
As always Alice’s tales in Wonderland provide a useful metaphor. 
 
The entrenchment of the ontotheological dualism between human and animal has been 
debated in recent years by, amongst others, Jacques Derrida who interrogates the 
concept of “animal” as an essentialised reductive category. In his long meditation, The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida investigates the nature of the being, “animal” as the 
absolute an(other) standing in an oppositional relationship to “human”. Humans, with the 
ability to speak, stand on one side of the chasm of difference, while the animal in all its 
variations and permutations stands on the other side, deprived, in the Cartesian lexicon, 
of the power of reason. But, what is animal? It appears to be a category that includes all 
living forms other than human and plants. This corralling of all creatures into a single class 
is, according to Derrida, nothing short of a crime. 
 
The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common 
category of animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or 
empirical authority, it is also a crime. Not a crime against animality, precisely, but a 
crime of the first order against the animals, against animals (Derrida 2008:48).  
 
 
Notably, Derrida does not deny the distinction between humankind and the other 
animals. Unlike philosophers such as Singer, he does not argue for Darwinian continuity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The Animals in Alice: Iart Gallery Wembley Square, Cape Town, 15 June to 13 July 2011. 
Alice and the Animals: Northwest University Gallery, Potchefstroom October 2011.  
The Alice Diaries: Circa on Jellicoe, Johannesburg 24th July to 25th August 2012. 
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between human and animals. He said it would be “asinine” to do so (Derrida 2008:30). 
Acknowledging the difference between human and animal he maintains that it is not a 
single indivisible line. “Beyond the edge of so-called human, beyond it but by no means 
on a single opposing side… there is already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living…” 
(Derrida 2008:31). Derrida’s approach to the human-animal question is based on the 
concept of difference, not just the disparity between human and animal but between 
animal and other animals. He challenges the humanist assumption of the exceptionalism 
of humankind – of humans as the rational centre of the world having “some inner core of 
subjectivity untouched by history” (Calarco 2015:30). Instead as Calarco maintains the 
human emerges from a matrix of sociohistorical and cultural relations (Calarco 2015:30). 
In this latter configuration the human being no longer has a profound essence but is 
reconfigured as “a unique node in a network of relations, an irreplaceable being-in-
becoming – a singular Other” (Calarco 2015:30). As such the other Other/s, including 
animals, are grouped “into repeatable categories thereby neutralizing their singularity 
and domesticating their strangeness” (Calarco 2015:31).  But on occasion, the uniqueness 
of the singular Other can provoke a sense of the uncanny leading to profound shifts in 
understanding (Calarco 2015:32). This is what occurred to Derrida when the gaze of his 
cat probed his naked humanity. For Derrida it is not only the gaze of the animal that 
unsettles him – it was the sense that the object and subject positions have been inverted, a 
situation that un-nerves him and causes him to query the nature of this being animal/cat. 
Later in his meditation he imports a mirror into the scene with his naked self and his 
observing cat. By evoking Lacan’s mirror phase he further complicates the encounter with 
his cat (Derrida 2008:58–59). Now the cat seeing him and he seeing the cat is reflected 
back to them both, prompting Derrida to ask, “Is there animal narcissism?”, or, and this is 
the more significant question, is the cat “deep within her eyes my primary mirror?” 
(2008:51). 
!
In 2011, I made three large mixed media drawings, The Cat, The Dog and The Hare (2011) 
(Fig 2.2), in an attempt to depict animals, not only as objects of the gaze, but as beings 
that are capable of returning the look and perhaps functioning as a primary mirror.  
!
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!
Fig 2.2 Wilma Cruise The Cat, The Dog and The Hare (2011). Beeswax, wax crayon, 
charcoal and oil stick on paper, 135 x 138 cm each. 
 
 
By returning the look of the viewer, I assumed a bridge would be created across the gulf 
of “the space-between”. In these drawings I attempted to give the animals agency, not as 
objects of the look, but as subjects in themselves, or to use Tom Regan’s phrase, a sense 
of themselves as “subjects-of-a-life” (Regan 2006:17–18).  But on revisiting the images in 
2016 I questioned the veracity of this interpretation. The Cat, The Dog and The Hare 
(2011) return the gaze but see beyond the perceiving eye. Like Derrida’s cat the look 
remains inscrutable. It would be tempting to say that by looking back at us, animals assert 
their subjecthood. But in the drawings I discovered that what I had depicted was the 
thousand-yard stare. As Berger would have it, “the animal’s gaze flickers and passes on. 
They look sideways. They look blindly beyond” (cited in Weil 2012:39). Further, by 
focusing on the gaze I prioritise the faculty of vision. By ignoring the possibilities of 
communication in other contact zones, such as, say the sense of smell in canids, I 
effectively foreclosed other possible avenues of inter-species communication. It is entirely 
possible that the animals “see" us in ways that we cannot know. My prioritising the gaze in 
these animal portraits might just be another example of anthropocentric hubris. 
 
The Pig (2011) (Fig 2.3) in this suite of four drawings lies outside of the ambit of the other 
three animal images.  
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Fig 2.3.  Wilma Cruise The Pig (2011). Beeswax, wax crayon, charcoal and oil stick on 
paper, 135 x 138 cm. 
 
 
While she does not engage (visually) with the viewer, she seems aware of his/her 
presence. She smirks as if complicit in some hidden joke. It appears as if I have accorded 
this pig special status. She is the outsider who knowingly observes. Like a trickster, she 
stands outside of events, yet seems able to control them, or, at least to predict their 
outcome. “Tricksters invariably muddy the waters of the sacred as much as they today 
push back against the boundary that separates the numinous of the supernatural from the 
'cold and dispassionate' materialities of science” (Carstens 2016). As such The Pig 
straddles opposing worlds – the human and the animal, the rational and affective, nature 
and culture, and carries her knowledge with her across the liminal space.!!
 
In 2015, the drawing of The Pig was echoed in a small dry point etching, The All-Knowing 
Pig (Fig 2.4). 
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Fig 2.4. Wilma Cruise. The All-Knowing Pig (2015). Drypoint and chine-collé (edition 15), 
43.7 x 45 cm. 
 
 
 Like the trickster pig in the larger drawing, this pig has a knowing look and a smile that 
rivals that of the Cheshire Cat in its inscrutability. Thus while the gaze is not returned, the 
pig nevertheless suggests subjecthood – she has a subjectivity – even though as Carstens 
suggests, it is a “radically decentred Deleuzogauttarian subjectivity that includes a host of 
'other' subjectivities both human and animal”!(Carstens 2016)33. 
!
Unlike Derrida, who still perceived a rupture between human and animal, albeit a 
complicating one, Deleuze and Guattari collapse the ineluctable opposition of human and 
animal into a central concept “animal-becoming”.  The binary terms merge into an 
expansive concept, which they liken to a rhizome – a complication of meanings growing in 
many directions. In their metaphorical terms a rhizome exists as a multiplicity. It is not 
classificatory or genealogical like a tree structure (Deleuze & Guattari 2004:88). That is, its 
rhizomatic equality stands opposed to “arborescence” which is Deleuze and Guattari's 
term for “philosophies that assume the primacy of and valorize identity, essence, origin, 
end, etc.” (Urpeth 2004:104). As if to compound the definition of the noun, rhizome, 
Deleuze and Guattari define it as a verb (Urpeth 2004:104), an enactment in which “[all] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Carstens implies a multiplicity of “knowing” with the further implication that we cannot access in 
any real sense the nature of that knowledge (see Chapter Six Wittgenstein’s Lion and Heidegger’s 
Hand). 
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forms come undone, as do all significations, signifiers and signifieds” (Deleuze & Guattari 
2004: 96)34. 
!
Deleuze and Guattari insist that animal-becoming is not defined by the points it connects 
(2011:91), rather that it runs perpendicular to them and is always in the middle, a point 
that has resonance with my concept of the space-between. Nevertheless, it is a concept 
that is difficult to pin down in real space or time. They explicitly maintain that 
 
[n]o art is imitative, no art can be imitative or figurative …imitation self-destructs…. The 
painter and the musician do not imitate the animal they become animal at the same 
time as the animal becomes what they willed, at the deepest level of their concord 
with Nature (Deleuze & Guattari 2004:94–95). 
 
If art is not imitative or figurative, what is the physical manifestation of animal becoming? 
Simply put, what does animal becoming look like? Who becomes and what is become? 
Steve Baker (2002) suggests that instead of a fixed representation, animal becoming lies 
within the process of creation. He notes that becoming is an act that Deleuze and Guattari 
call “writing like a rat”35. This moment of creation happens in the intensity of the creative 
moment when the artist forgets him/herself as human. It is as if she has become 
something other. “To write like a rat” then is a figure for a process of operating other-than-
in-identity (Baker 2002:67, 77). Becoming-animal is an action that sweeps us up and 
makes us something other (Baker 2002:74).  
 
Yet while acknowledging that becoming-animal is a process, a nagging question lingers: 
What is the embodiment of becoming? Baker’s question (and ours) remains largely 
unanswered. It is a conundrum that Deleuze and Guattari themselves fail to resolve. For 
example, they are not above discussing becoming-animal with reference to the 
embodiment – the actual corporeal body – of Gregor Samsa, the protagonist in Franz 
Kafka’s Metamorphosis (1996), Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning to find that 
overnight he has turned into a large insect. Without doubt, at this point he has a fixed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Ron Broglio likens the “concept of becoming-animal as a pack” as a “minor art”. By this he 
means that the centrality of the individual is replaced by the imperative of the community 
(2011:113). Minor art disrupts from the outside by “undermining metaphor [which] becomes the 
revolutionary gesture” (Broglio 2011:106). 
35 For a further description of this process in terms of my own work see Chapter 3. 
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identity, (he has become). He represents “the momentary stabilization of a set of 
structures, [which] allow[s] an image to be recognised…” (Richards 2008:134). Now a 
despised an(other) in the form of a cockroach and locked in his room out of sight of the 
lodgers, his verminous presence terrifies and horrifies his family. The tale is told from the 
perspective of Gregor, erstwhile brother and son, now a cockroach, whose perceptions of 
the world are governed by his awkward carapace and feeble insect legs. At every turn his 
attempts to communicate are foiled and misunderstood. The subjective position belongs 
entirely to the animal as he peers uncomprehendingly at the humans beyond his room. If 
subjectivity were becoming, Gregor surely is a perfect example. But, becoming is more 
than that, as Deleuze and Guattari explain in their critique of the psychoanalytical 
interpretations usually offered as explanations of Metamorphosis.  
 
Gregor becomes a cockroach not to flee his father but rather to find an escape where 
his father knows where to find one, in order to flee the director, the business, and the 
bureaucrats, to reach the region where the voice no longer does anything but hum: 
“Did you hear him? It was an animal’s voice,” said the chief clerk (Deleuze & Guattari 
2004:97). 
 
 
It was the animal's incomprehensibility, his inability to be heard that becomes the central 
motif recalling my scribbling that initiated this research: “We have shut our ears to their 
primal screams, their rumbles, hisses, purrs” (Cruise 2007). Gregor, as a metamorphosed 
insect, is deprived of the word. He cannot make himself understood – he can only hum. 
The refusal of his family to listen to, or attempt to interpret his incomprehensible 
mutterings, condemned him to isolation and certain death. With no language he 
becomes the absolute despised (wordless) Other. 
 
Donna Haraway is scornful of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of animal becoming calling 
it a “fantasy wolf-pack” theory.  
 
…here I find little but the two writers’ scorn for all that is mundane and ordinary and 
the profound absence of curiosity about or respect for and with actual animals, even as 
immeasurable references to diverse animals are invoked to figure the authors’ anti-
Oedipal and anti-capitalist project. Derrida’s actual little cat is decidedly not invited… 
(Haraway 2008:27). 
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She asks, “How is becoming with a practice of becoming worldly?” (Haraway 2008:35). 
Although she uses the term “becoming” Haraway explicitly rejects Deleuze and Guattari's 
position citing their astonishing claim that “Anyone who likes dogs or cats is a fool” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:240). It appears then, in this debate on the animal, the animal 
has got lost, especially the animal that occupies the liminal position of companion 
species. Cum panis, to break bread, is the figure that Haraway uses in her attempts to get 
down and dirty with her “messmates, to look and to look back, to have truck with…” 
(Haraway 2008:32). Haraway’s cum panis, a messy coshaping, rejects the ethical dualism 
that frames the question in either/or terms. She claims that the question is incorrectly 
framed rooted as it is in “the dualisms and the misplaced concreteness of religious and 
secular humanism” (Haraway 2008:89). In this respect Haraway’s ideas resonate 
sympathetically with those of Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, who reject “secular 
humanism” in lieu of a spiritual connection with animals (Irigaray 2004:201). Cixous’ 
critique of a patriarchal ordered system of writing implies a less structured more affective 
(and perhaps more messy) relationship with animals. Her concept of écriture féminine in 
turn echoes Deleuze and Guattari's concept of animal-becoming. Both are fluid states of 
being where identity is transcended. The concept of suspension of self, implied by 
"writing like a rat" resonates sympathetically with her “libidinal feminine writing” (Dobson 
2004:127), in which the process is a utopian ideal rather than a static state. Nevertheless, 
in spite of a certain affinity with Cixous, it appears that Haraway is more interested in the 
actuality of human animal encounters than the spiritual realm.  
 
 …we are in a knot of species coshaping one another in layers of reciprocating 
complexity all the way down. Response and respect are possible only in those knots, 
with actual animals and people looking back at each other, sticky with all their 
muddled histories (Haraway 2008:42). 
 
In this context Haraway takes Derrida to task. She says what he, and most other theorists 
on the animal question lack is a fundamental engagement with the animal. She takes issue 
with Derrida for not really engaging with his cat. In failing to take account of the semiotics 
of cat behaviour, he missed an opportunity to "meet species” with all the messy 
entanglements such a relationship implies. Prompted by Bentham's query, “Can they 
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suffer?” Derrida allowed pity not curiosity to dominate his discourse. “Shame trumped 
curiosity” (Haraway 2008:22). 
 
Even if the cat did not become a symbol for all cats, the naked man’s shame quickly 
became a figure for the shame of philosophy before all animals. The figure generated 
an important essay…. But whatever else the cat might have been doing, Derrida’s full 
human male frontal nudity before an Other, which was of such interest in his 
philosophical tradition, was of no consequence to her… (Haraway 2008: 23).  
!
!
As a result, Derrida knew no more about his cat “at the end of the morning than he knew 
at the beginning” (Haraway 2008:22). Although, Haraway concedes, Derrida did not fall 
into the trap of making “the subaltern speak”, neither did he engage with other potential 
methods of responding, “one that risked knowing something more about cats and how to 
look back, perhaps even scientifically, biologically, and therefore also philosophically and 
intimately” (Haraway 2008:20).  She says that he failed that particular cat in all her 
singularity by not engaging with her as companion species. What was she “doing, feeling, 
thinking or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that morning?” 
(Haraway 2008:20). Haraway prefers to phrase the question differently: “Whom and what 
do I touch when I touch my dog?” She is referring to the warm, living, breathing animal, 
which is neither an abstract nor abstracted entity.  
 
*** 
 
While the continental philosophers might concern themselves with the nature of language 
and the ontological significance of “animal”, utilitarian philosophers such as Peter Singer 
are concerned chiefly with the ethics of animal rights. Less interested in the philosophical 
significance of the animal in the lexicon, they focus on the practicalities of animal welfare. 
Singer’s central concept, which he labels “speciesism”, is discrimination against animals, a 
prejudice that Singer equates with racism and sexism (Singer 1989:n.pag.). “A ‘speciesist’ 
is someone who a priori (literally, ‘before experience’) prejudicially favors the interests of 
human over nonhuman animals, such that humans always count more by sheer virtue of 
their species membership as Homo sapiens” (Best n.d.). As Best phrases it, “[S]peciesists 
in effect argue that humans count more because they are humans and animals count less 
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because they are animals. From their prejudicial standpoint, they fail to ask and answer 
the real question of why a being’s species membership is valorized over its existential 
nature” (Best n.d.). 
 
Singer’s central idea, “equal consideration” (Kalof & Fitzgerald 2007:14–22), is a moral 
position that assumes that any being that is sentient has an interest in not being harmed 
and therefore should receive the same ethical attention as all other sentient beings. All 
beings that have consciousness deserve equality in protecting their interests – starkly 
phrased, “All animals are equal”. Singer’s view is based on the Darwinian idea of 
phylogenetic continuity. That is human and animal are not binarily distinct but belong on 
the same continuum. As such, animals deserve equal consideration as humans. It is 
“treating likes, alike” (Francione cited in Calarco 2015:13). However, in “identity based 
theories”, like Singer’s continuity approach, comparisons tend to be uni-directional 
comparing the animal in terms of his/her similarity to the human and not the other way 
round. In this way, it is an essentially humanist approach (Calarco 2015: 27), which still 
leaves the human at the centre of the moral universe with concentric levels of interest 
radiating out depending on the animal’s perceived similarity to the human. As Adam 
Cruise (2012) argues, a kitten would get more consideration than a rat, since the former 
has a face more in sympathy with human perceptions. This observation is borne out by the 
fact that in the USA The Animal Welfare Act, which aims to protect animals, explicitly 
excludes “…rats of the genus Rattus and mice of the genus Mus bred for use in 
research…” (Herzog 2010:224) 36. The implication is that these species do not qualify as 
“animal”. They are not only less than human; they are less than other animals.  
 
This speciesist prejudice against certain animals is illustrated in an online publication in 
which a case was made for using some primates and not others in medical research 
(Vidyasagar 2016). Vidyasagar argued that it was fundamentally wrong to use the great 
apes in research, since they have “a cognitive capacity similar to humans”, but it was 
justified to use “lesser” primates such as monkeys (Vidyasagar 2016). The assumption 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Many countries, including South Africa, do not keep statistics at all and in addition some official 
figures are likely to be underestimates (Pickover 2008:5).  
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being that the latter are sufficiently phylogenetically removed from humans to be subjects 
of incarceration and experimentation.  
!
Down the rabbit hole these questions of phylogenetic/hierarchical status do not apply. It 
seems that the Caterpillar is equal to the White Rabbit and the White Rabbit to the Mouse. 
Animals can talk, and even talk back to the human, as represented by the child, Alice. This 
is evident in Alice's encounter with the mouse whom she encounters swimming in a pool 
of her own tears. Alice, not sure of the proper way to address such a creature, remembers 
seeing a Latin declension in her sister’s schoolbook: “A mouse – of a mouse – to a 
mouse….” (Carroll 1982:29). “O Mouse!” she says, but gets no response. Wracking her 
brains, Alice remembers a French phrase from her schoolbook. “Où est ma Chatte” 
(Where is my cat?). To Alice’s distress, the poor mouse nearly levitates. “Would you like 
cats if you were me?” he squeaks. Alice, failing to understand the mouse’s point of view, 
compounds the error by saying, “…don’t be angry about it. And yet I wish I could show 
you our cat Dinah. I think you’d take a fancy to cats if only you could see her. She is such a 
dear quiet thing” (Carroll 1982:29–30). Alice shows sensitivity to the mouse even though it 
is misplaced. By understanding his feelings, if not his point of view, she acknowledges his 
sentience.  
 
However, she shows less understanding and scant sympathy to the piglet in the Pig and 
Pepper chapter of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Finding herself in a smoky kitchen, 
Alice is confronted by a bad tempered Duchess. She is nursing a baby who is screaming 
its lungs out while the cook hurls all manner of missiles around the kitchen. At a certain 
point in the conversation, the Duchess accuses Alice of not knowing much (Carroll 
1982:59), and then later, after yelling to nobody in particular to “chop off her head!” 
(Carroll 1982:60), she flings the baby at Alice. “Here you may nurse it a bit, if you like!” 
(Carroll 1982:60). Alice caught the baby, determined to care for it. “If I don’t take this child 
with me,” thought Alice, “they’re sure to kill it in a day or two. Wouldn’t it be murder to 
leave it behind?”’ (Carroll 1982:62). At which point the baby grunted and Alice discovered 
to her horror that it was turning into a pig. ‘“If you’re going to turn into a pig my dear,” 
Alice said seriously, “I’ll have nothing more to do with you”’ (Carroll 1982:62). But there 
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was no mistake the baby was a pig. Alice, now no longer concerned whether it would be 
killed or not, set it down, whereupon it trotted away. 
 
Was the baby that Alice held human or animal? This matters since it dictated Alice’s 
response to the creature. In Alice’s world the care of the one trumps the other – the child 
is more important than the pig. But should it be? Peter Singer, would label Alice’s 
discriminatory response as “speciesism”. Alice demonstrated her species prejudice by 
wanting to save the human baby, but was less interested when it turned into a pig. Alice 
knew the baby would be hurt if she did not care for it, but was quite happy for the piglet 
to run away to its certain fate. According to Singer, Alice’s (and by extension Lewis 
Carroll’s) nineteenth century species prejudice is a viewpoint still held by some 
contemporary moral philosophers. He cites Stanley Benn who maintains it would be 
“monstrous sentimentality” to grant animals equal consideration. Benn says if one had to 
feed a hungry baby or a hungry dog (or in the case of Alice, a pig), choosing the latter 
would be “morally defective” (cited in Singer 1989). 
 
In 2011 I created a sculpture based on this scene in the Pig and Pepper chapter (Carroll 
1982:56–65). Derived from Alice's exhortation to the pig it is entitled, If you turn into a pig 
I will have nothing more to do with you (2011) (Fig 2.5). In this sculpture, an armless baby 
balances precariously on top of a larger armless figure. The connection of the figures to 
each other is tenuous. It appears that if the standing figure moves, or takes a step, the 
baby will fall. It cannot be caught because the larger figure has no arms. The suggestion is 
that care of an(other) is a moral balancing act. One step either way, and the smaller being 
will tumble to the ground. Curiously, there is no pig in the sculpture nor does the larger 
figure depict the little girl, Alice. Neither is there a distinction between human and animal. 
In keeping with my position of avoiding a proselytising stance, the title is the only thing 
that hints towards a (moral) interpretation.  
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Fig. 2.5. Wilma Cruise If you turn into a pig I will have nothing more to do with you (2012). 
Ceramic on steel base, 112 x 44 x 44 cm. (Photographed by Ant Strack). 
 
!
One of the key features of utilitarianism is that moral choices are guided by the principle 
of the greater good. In these terms the killing of animals is sometimes justified. The animal 
rights activist, Tom Regan takes issue with this view.  
 
…Utilitarianism may seem to be a congenial theory for those who utilize nonhuman 
animals in animal-model research. The most common justification of such research 
consists in appealing to the improvements in human health and longevity to which this 
research allegedly has led, and while researchers may recognize the need to look for 
alternatives to the animal model, lest these animals be used unnecessarily, it seems 
clear the moral justification they offer is Utilitarian (Regan 2006:15). 
 
Utilitarianism balances human needs against the welfare of the animal. It is a question of 
weighing the costs to the animal against the benefits to the human. However, Gary 
Francione, arguing from an animal rights position, offers a critique of what he terms the 
“humane principle” encoded in this kind of utilitarian welfarist balancing act. The humane 
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principle aims to reduce the misery of animals and to manage their welfare in situations in 
which they sometimes, of necessity, have to be used for the greater good, as for example 
in medical research. In contrast to the welfare approach, animal rights activists such as 
Regan and Francione, argue for the total abolition of medical experimentation and factory 
farming.  
 
It is not just refinement or reduction that is called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not 
just more generous use of anaesthetic or the elimination of multiple surgery, not just 
tidying up the system. It is complete replacement. The best we can do when it comes 
to using animals in science is – not to use them. That is where our duty lies, according 
to the rights view (Regan 1985). 
 
Regan makes a case for the rights of animals derived from Kantian principles. Immanuel 
Kant’s position is fundamental. He argued that humanity exists as an “end in itself” (Regan 
2006:12). Extrapolating this view to animals, Regan maintains that animals are “subjects of 
a life” and exist not as possible means towards the greater good, as the utilitarians 
maintain, but simply because it is morally right to do so (Regan 2006:17–18). Like Kant’s 
“end in itself” the respect due to animals is a basic postulate in Regan’s ethic what he calls 
a “reflective sense”. There is no need to appeal to any other concept other than the 
intuitive knowing that harming animals is wrong. Regan argues his case from a rational 
point of view, as would Kant. But, he says, and this is significant, reason is not enough to 
motivate an ethic of animal rights. 
 
It is our hearts, not just our heads, that call for an end to it all, that demand of us that 
we overcome, for them, the habits and forces behind their systematic oppression 
(Regan 1985). 
 
Regan proposes the concept of care, an emotion beyond reason and a necessary 
prerequisite for an ethic of animal rights. He argues that in the (inevitably rational) 
utilitarian calculation, it is the animal that comes off the worst. Since humans take the 
decisions, human needs trump animal needs. That is, since animals are the property of 
humans, the owner is legally entitled to use the animal at will, albeit within the constraints 
of the welfare laws. Drawing an analogy with the ownership of humans during the chattel 
slave period, when owners could do what they liked with their human property, (and 
sometimes could be kind within the system), Francione maintains that the ownership of 
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animals undermines any equality of consideration (2000:129). In other words, the humane 
principle does not do what it is set out to do – viz. to protect animals from exploitation 
(Francione 2000:129). Badiou sums it up: “[A]t the core of the mastery internal to ethics is 
always the power to decide who dies and who does not” (cited in Baker 2013:6). His 
contention is illustrated in a furore that arose in the social media in 2016 over the killing of 
a gorilla in the Cincinnati Zoo. Harambe, a 17-year-old silverback, was shot ostensibly to 
save the life of a child, who had fallen into his cage. This event raised the old conundrum 
of the “burning house dilemma”. The dilemma is phrased thus: “If you were caught in a 
burning house, were running out the door to save your life, and only had time enough to 
save a dog in one room and a human being in another, which would you choose?” (Best 
n.d.). As Best phrased it, “damned if you do and damned if you don't” – that is, if you 
chose the human above the dog you were speciesist and/or hypocritical and if you chose 
the dog above the human you were “vilified as a miscreant and deviant misanthrope with 
warped values” (Best n.d). However, as Best points out, the “burning house dilemma” is 
something of a red herring. In such a (real) situation one's choice would be governed by 
other factors such as “existential proximity and personhood” (Best n.d). However, 
“personhood” as a basis for moral decisions is inherently flawed. It depends on the 
definition of  the term  and whether “personhood” is confined exclusively to Homo 
Sapiens, a view that is being challenged recently with ethological studies of the great 
apes. Clearly views are polarized: “[W]hen there is human suffering on a scale as large as 
we currently experience, I have no tears left to cry over a gorilla’s life lost” (Kolhatkar 
2016). The opposing view was equally vehement: “I would also choose a member of an 
endangered species (such as a Florida Panther, Black Rhino, or silverback Gorilla) over 
any human stranger(s), unless, again, this person was so important to the planet s/he 
could do dramatic things to help it. For anyone quick to uncover more evidence of 
“egocentric masquerading” here, I would gladly give my own life to save an endangered 
species” (Best n.d). Either way, for or against, it is the human who has that power to 
decide who lives and who dies. In the Harambe incident it was the human life that was 
chosen above the animal one. That is, having dominion and ownership of animals still 
enables modern humans to (legally) use animals at their will while paying lip service to 
humanitarian principles. In this sense modern animals, exploited as bio-commodities, are 
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not too different from Descartes’ unreasoning, unthinking, animal machines. They are 
instrumentalised beings to be used and desposed of as necessity dictates. 
 
Roger Scruton, however, takes issue with the ethical position of the animal rights 
perspective with its implication of personhood. Based on, the possibly erroneous 
assumption, that granting animals rights assumes that they then have obligations and 
duties, he says animals are not moral beings who can exercise these duties and 
obligations. He argues that if all animals were accorded the same rights as humans, the 
fox would have the moral obligation to respect the rights of the chicken (2011:25), a view 
that is patently absurd. 
 
By ascribing rights to animals, and so promoting them to full membership of the moral 
community, we tie them in obligations that they can neither fulfil nor comprehend. Not 
only is this senseless cruelty in itself, it effectively destroys all possibility of cordial and 
beneficial relations between us and them (Scruton 2011:25).  
 
He justifies his position by saying that animals “lack the distinguishing features of the 
moral being – rationality, self-consciousness, personality, [personhood] and so on” 
(2011:25). It seems as if Scruton’s position is the traditional Cartesian one in which animals 
lack reason and subjectivity – a position that ensures the insuperable divide between 
human and other animals. Yet, he is not indifferent to the plight of animals as his appeal to 
moral emotion rather than moral law demonstrates.  
 
Sympathy and piety are indispensable motives in the moral being, and their voices 
cannot be silenced by a mere calculation. Someone who was indifferent to the sight of 
pigs confined in batteries, who did not feel some instinctive need to pull down these 
walls and barriers and let in light and air, would have lost sight of what it is to be a 
living animal (Scruton 2011:31). 
!
Scruton distinguishes between different kinds of (human) moral obligations to different 
classes of animals, pets, animals bred for food, those kept in zoos, used for sport and 
entertainment and the animals in the wild. It appears that his moral position is a 
negotiated one rather than absolutist. He maintains that this is necessary to reflect “not 
only the social function of moral judgment, but also the mental reality of the animals 
themselves” (Scruton 2011:37). His position is based on a solid foundation of moral 
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emotion. He appeals to three bases of moral feeling – sympathy, piety and virtue (Scruton 
2011:37). In this sense he echoes Regan's appeal to the concept of care – an ethic that 
reaches beyond reason and appeals to an emotional sense of what is right. 
!
The animal as an instrumentalised being informed the sculpture, Poor Horace: Watching 
The Hours (2009) (Fig 2.6).  
 
 
Fig. 2.6. Wilma Cruise Poor Horace: Watching The Hours (2009). Acrylic resin and mixed 
media, 267 x 155 x 80 cm. (Photographed by Anne-Marie Tully). 
 
 
Poor Horace was originally made from clay. The forms provided the model for casts in 
synthetic fibre and bronze. Like many of my equine sculptures, Poor Horace subverts the 
artistic equine tradition in which the nobility and grace of the animal is celebrated. Poor 
Horace is lumpen and anchored. The materiality of the clay in its wet, inert form is  
retained in the finished sculpture. Horace is depicted twice: his doppelganger is 
suspended and hung upside down besides his standing form. Transporting a horse into a 
ship necessitates it being slung under the torso and hoisted by a crane as if it were an 
inanimate object. In the sculpture, the inverse of this image overturns Horace and depicts 
another method of transportation; that of an anaesthetised horse being hauled into 
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surgery suspended by the fetlocks. Up or down, Horace is rendered immobile. This effect 
is enhanced by his placement on a wheeled trolley, implying that his movement is 
dependent on an outside agency. His defining equine characteristic, movement, has been 
stolen. He neither bellows nor protests his condition of immobility. Thus, while his body is 
whole, the essence of his equine being is truncated and fragmented. He is silenced. 
 
There is a sense of irony in the use of the (literal) inversion of the equine image. In the 
traditional equestrian monument, the power and beauty of the horse is foregrounded 
usually in the service of man's aggrandisement. The horse and rider are usually placed 
above the viewers’ heads (to remind the viewers of their insignificance?). The monuments 
are patriarchal, colonial and phallic. In this genre the horse is both literally and 
metaphorically an instrument for humankind’s ambitions.  Further, in the contemporary 
sports of racing, showjumping and eventing the horse is used as a vehicle for their 
owners’ competitive ambitions.  In these scenarios little attention seems to be paid to 
each animal’s uniqueness – its personality or emotional needs. Humankind has appeared 
to have lost the potential relationship with the horse-as-a-being in itself.  
 
While Derrida is not an activist like Singer and Regan et al., he nevertheless appears to 
occupy an ideological position similar to that of the animal welfare and animal rights 
proponents. He maintains that it is our duty and obligation to declare a war against those 
who not only violate animal life, but those who challenge the sentiment of compassion 
(Derrida 2008:29). Moving beyond the debate on the logos, towards an ethical stance he 
refers to the famous Bentham question of whether animals can suffer. “’Can they suffer?’ 
leaves no room for doubt” (Derrida 2008:28). There is also no reservation about his 
attitude to the modern subjection of the animal as he evokes the spectre of genocide37. 
“Such a subjection…can be called violence in the most morally neutral sense of the 
term…” (Derrida 2008:25).  
 
One should neither abuse the figure of genocide nor consider it explained away. For it 
gets more complicated here: the annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Others have used the figure of genocide. Elizabeth Costello in JM Coetzee’s eponymous book 
compares the abattoir to the gas chambers of WWII and the death of the animals to the genocide 
of the Jews (Coetzee 2004:63). 
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but it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, 
virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous generations would have 
judged monstrous, outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are 
thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even their overpopulation. 
As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let's say 
Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and 
overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, 
so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always 
increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic 
experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire (Derrida 2008:26).  
 
 
Having aligned himself ideologically with the animal rights proponents Derrida is 
nevertheless critical of them calling their protest “minority, weak, marginalised” (2008:26). 
Further he questions their “unstated” assumption of a “biologistic continuism” (Derrida 
2008:30) between the human and the non-human animal. He argues instead that the 
evidence of an abyssal rupture between man and animal is overwhelming. Moreover, he 
says that since his whole philosophical position is to reject the “homogenous and the 
continuous” he cannot support the continuity theory (Derrida 2008:30). In this respect he 
departs not only from the likes of Singer but also Deleuze and Guattari. While Deleuze 
and Guattari do not argue for Darwinian continuism, their analogy of the rhizome does 
imply equality between the terms, human and animal38. By emphasising animal-becoming 
as a point between, Deleuze and Guattari forgo the privileged humanist position of 
seeing things from the top39. By emphasising the middle point, questions of hierarchy fall 
away. “It’s not easy to see things from the middle, rather than looking down at them from 
above or up at or from left to right and right to left: try it you’ll see that everything 
changes” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:23). Lost in the midst of an assemblage with no 
beginning or end, the human as superior being is lost. In the middle, all is of equal value 
and meaning. The point in the middle thus implies an ethical stance, one in which the 
distinction between subject and object, human and animal, become irrelevant.   
!
Calarco identifies approaches such as Deleuze and Guattari's as an example of 
“indistinction theory”. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 In contrast to the animal rights and animal welfare continuity theorists Deleuze and Guattari do 
not use the human as the measure of all things. 
39 “A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in between...” (Deleuze 
& Guattari in Atterton & Calarco 2004:94). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
64 
[I]ndistinction theorists attempt to develop ways of thinking about human beings, 
animals, and ethics in a manner that radically displaces human beings from the centre 
of ethical reflection and that avoids many of the exclusions associated with the 
lingering forms of anthropocentrism (2015:50). 
 
Calarco maintains that the trouble with indistinction theories is that in breaking down the 
human/animal distinction, the field of beings collapses into “an undifferentiated mass 
beyond conceptual understanding” (2015:54). It is a “night…. in which all cows are black”! 
(Calarco 2015:55). When there is no categorisation and no differentiation are we not 
reduced to silence? But perhaps this is the point. The animal world is not dependent on 
the word. Our task as humans is to deal with the animal question on the edge of 
language.  
 
Yet whatever the message, the ethical categories and preferences, the underpinning 
question on the animal is the final reductive one; the point at which all discussions on the 
animal seem to stall: “Should we kill them to eat them?” Is this not an example of 
argumentum ad absurdum? Not according to Singer. 
!
For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized societies, 
the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at mealtimes: we eat 
them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our ends. We regard their life and 
well being as subordinate to our taste for a particular kind of delicacy. Let us say 
"taste" deliberately — this is purely a matter of pleasing our palate. There can be no 
defence of eating flesh in terms of satisfying nutritional needs… (Singer 1989). 
 
Eating the flesh of animals is an issue that I explored in a number of diary pages that 
accompanied the exhibition, The Alice Diaries at Circa Gallery in Johannesburg in 2012 
(Fig 2.7). The diary acted as a parallel text to the visual information provided by the 
sculptures and paintings. I devoted several pages to the eating of animals including 
numerous drawings of pigs onto which I scrawled the following excerpt from Dissertation 
upon a Roast Pig by Charles Lamb (1775–1834). 
 
I remember an hypothesis, argued upon by the young students, when I was at St. 
Omer's, and maintained with much learning and pleasantry on both sides, "Whether, 
supposing that the flavour of a pig who obtained his death by whipping (per 
flagellationem extremam) superadded a pleasure upon the palate of a man more 
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intense than any possible suffering we can conceive in the animal, is man justified in 
using that method of putting the animal to death?" I forget the decision (Lamb 2011). 
 
The horror implicit in this tale seems to be ignored by the amusing tone and the lack of 
interest in the torture of the living creature. Although this was written in the eighteenth 
century, an internet search shows that a contemporary publication of Dissertation upon a 
Roast Pig is to be found in Penguin’s Great Food Series in which Charles Lamb’s rapturous 
prose on the taste and aroma of pork crackling is emphasised, while, as always, the pig 
(arguably a sentient being) is the “absent referent” (Adams 2015). His/her life is ignored in 
the pursuit of human pleasure.  
 
 
!
Fig 2.7. Wilma Cruise The Alice Diaries (2013). A3 folios, mixed media on paper,  
42 x 30 cm. 
!
 
While I do not adopt an activist’s approach like Regan’s and Singer’s and am not (yet) 
vegan or vegetarian, the issue of killing and eating sentient animals does worry me and I 
pursue it, albeit obliquely, in sculptural form. In a painted, ceramic sculpture entitled The 
Caucus Pig (Fig 2.8) I depict a smiling pig.  
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Fig 2.8. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Pig (2012). Painted ceramic, 44 x 45 x 30 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). 
 
Her eyes are squeezed closed in mirth. Like the pig in the suite of drawings discussed 
above, I appear to have accorded this pig special status. It is as if she is smiling at a 
hidden joke. I suggest that she “knows”.  But what is it that she knows? Might it be that the 
flesh of the pig provides the site of the greatest contestation and she realizes that in the 
end the tables will be turned and the joke will be on those of us who wrestle with the 
killing and eating of roast pig? Ours will be a moral pain.  
 
Pigs are possibly the most cruelly exploited animals in factory farming (Lockwood 2016). 
The industry notoriously refuses to accord sentience to the animals that they breed and 
slaughter. As Regan would phrase it, factory farming methods deny the pigs a “subject of 
a life”. In the process from slaughter to packaged meat, pigs have become de-animalised. 
They have become things. Their moment of being as living creatures is unknown, as is 
their deaths, which are hidden from sight in abattoirs on the fringes of cities.  The pig is 
not seeable (Lockwood 2016) except as a product on the plate. It has been denied an 
opportunity to look back at us – it has no occasion to be seen, and to be seen looking 
back. Regan says, “…the undeserved pain animals feel is not the only morally relevant 
consideration; that they are killed must also be taken into account. So, yes, Pain [and] 
suffering are important; but so are death [and] destruction” (Regan cited in Gigliotti 
2011:44).  
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A sculpture entitled, Hybrid Piglet (Fig 2.9) continued the theme of pig agency. 
 
 
 
Fig 2.9. Wilma Cruise Hybrid Piglet (2011). Ceramic on steel base, 105 cm. 
(Photographed by the artist). 
 
 
 Hybrid Piglet featured in most of the exhibitions in The Alice Sequence in which she was 
always positioned outside the group of figures looking in. Unlike most of my sculptures 
she has arms and a mouth opened in laughter. In this manifestation Hybrid Piglet is not 
just a creature destined for slaughter, she is a living being, a particular and particularised 
personality, who laughs and engages with the comic tragedy that unfolds before her in 
the exhibition space. I have not only given her the agency of arms, but also put her in a 
bipedal position suggesting her closeness to the human animal. Thus, while she belongs 
to the generalised category “pig” she transcends it by asserting her individuality. She is, 
like Derrida’s (real) cat, a singular, unsubstitutable being – one that needs to be seen 
seeing. 
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As I wrestled with these ideas of an ethical nature I proceeded with the creation of works 
for The Alice Diaries, the third exhibition in The Alice Sequence. Gavin Younge in his essay 
that accompanied the exhibition summed up the core idea of the exhibition. The Alice 
Diaries “underline the rawness of human incomprehension, both between ourselves and 
between humanity and the sentient beings which [sic] share our planet” (Younge 
2012:11). The gulf of silence between human and animal is what Derrida calls “the abyssal 
rupture” (Derrida 2008:12) and what I refer to more prosaically as “the space-between”. In 
trying to bridge the gap between human and animal I attempt to “talk” to the animals 
through the act of making art.  This is possibly a ludicrous wish but, as Alice said when she 
found herself swimming in the pool of her own tears with a mouse, “Would it be of any 
use now … to speak to this mouse? Everything is out-of-the-way down here, that I should 
think very likely it can talk: at any rate, there is no harm in trying” (Carroll 1982:28 
Emphasis mine). Taking a cue from Alice's optimism and from the Dodo who said, “the 
best way to explain it is to do it” (Carroll 1982:32) I investigate the human animal 
connection through the sculptures, prints and drawings.  
 
Alice’s conversation with the mouse provides the key to reading the exhibition, The Alice 
Diaries (2012). The creatures in Wonderland are on equal terms with the girl child. They 
are thinking speaking beings with distinct personalities. They do not masquerade as 
figures for human attributes. Neither are they moral metaphors, nor cute creations 
intended to evoke sentimental feedings. They are not therianthropic figures representing 
the beast in man or the man in beast. They might be human and they might be animal or 
they might be half way between – their categorisation is not important – their equality is. 
Neither are the works illustrations of an idea nor a didactic manifesto. They do not invite a 
simplified reading. As Anne-Marie Tully suggested, the viewer should approach the work 
in The Alice Diaries “playfully, with childish belief, stumbling on ‘truths’ along the way” 
(Tully 2012:15). This is how readers usually engage with the texts, Alice in Wonderland 
and Through the Looking Glass40. It is possible that my visual texts can be read in the same 
way, uncovering truths of a more logical and analytical nature.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 It is well known that Lewis Carroll’s tales can also be read, (by their adult readers), 
philosophically, mathematically and logically, adding another dimension to their playfulness. 
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 The use of text was not only confined to the diary pages like those used to explore the 
eating of pork/pig. It continued in the form of excerpts from the Lewis Carroll tales 
scrawled in charcoal on the walls of the gallery. These decontextualised phrases and 
aphorisms serve the purpose of metonymically drawing attention to the failure of 
language in addressing the animal turn. Relying on the visual text to provide a parallel 
language that does not necessarily correspond with a logocentric one and, further 
preferring the tools of metaphor and metonymy, I am not always able to access “truths” 
buried in the visual text. It is a point that Anne-Marie Tully highlights with reference to 
Alice: Self-portrait II (Fig 2.10) in which a pair of cats is attached to the chest of the puzzled 
Alice.  
Most important to note in this scenario is that the notion of inter-species dialogue is 
heralded as inherently physical and non-linguistic. This is a distinctly anti-Cartesian 
figure that undermines the human conceit of symbolic language by stressing the 
physical interactivity of human and animal bodily forms and gestures (Tully 2012:28).  
 
That is, the phrases do not describe, explain or illustrate the works in the middle of the 
gallery.  Instead they emphasise the nonsensical nature of dream and nightmare. “I ca’n't 
explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.” says Alice to 
the caterpillar (Carroll 1982:47). Is it that we as humankind are not ourselves? Could we 
be something other? In the exhibition I do not necessarily provide the answer to these 
existential questions. 
 
Although the “diary” stretched over all rooms, the main installation took place in the 
larger oval-shaped space of the gallery upstairs. The installation, Cradle (Fig 2.11), 
consisted of a number of ceramic forms including over one thousand armless doll-like 
forms spread across the floor of the gallery. The conceptual underpinning of Cradle was 
informed by the awareness of overpopulation by the human species over which we have 
no control. Each doll was cast from a mother mould and each was particularised by the 
placement of head and legs. The heads were tilted at different angles. The legs, freely 
modelled, take on attitudes of repose or activity. The surfaces of the babies were variously 
treated with non-fired coloured oxides, sand, paint, sealant or cementatious materials, 
giving a range of hues from the deepest black to white and all ranges of pink, brown and 
yellow in between. 
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Fig 2.10. Wilma Cruise Alice: Self Portrait II (2011), mixed media on paper, 200 x 100 cm. 
 
 
Fig 2.11 Wilma Cruise Cradle (2011–2012). 1000+ ceramic forms, approximately 30 cm 
each. (Photographed by Ant Strack). 
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The babies share a common origin, but much like in real life, each is individualised. All the 
babies are armless, signifying a universal helplessness. They have no control over their 
existence. Having arrived each is nevertheless entitled to be subject of a life even though 
each human adds to the unbearable weight on the planet. Strangely, and perhaps 
significantly, some of the babies’ pert, doll-like mouths morph into snouts and other 
animal-like features giving an Orwellian sense of dislocation – but also suggesting the 
closeness of the human species to the animal (Fig. 2.12). 
 
 
Fig 2.12. Wilma Cruise Cradle (2011–2012) detail. (Photographed by the artist). 
 
god and the absence of god 
light and the absence of light 
a dialectic 
like silence and  
a scream 
if there is hell must heaven exist? (Cruise 2000). 
 
Surrounding the river of babies in the upstairs gallery, were a number of animal-like 
figures (Fig 2.13). I refer to these onlookers as The Caucus. This is a reference to the 
caucus race in Alice in Wonderland, in which the animals run round and round the pool of 
tears with no apparent purpose. There is no beginning and no end to the race; no winners 
and no prizes other than what Alice had in her pocket – some “comfits” and a thimble. No 
doubt Lewis Carroll intended this as a gentle satire on the purposelessness of meetings 
and conferences. My focus on the other hand was to have the animals sit in judgment. 
Precisely on who and why the creatures are adjudicating, like the caucus race in Alice, I 
deliberately leave for the viewer to decide.  
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Fig 2.13. Wilma Cruise The Alice Diaries (2012). Installation view. (Photographed by 
Anthea Pokroy). 
!
The main body of The Caucus was made up of a number of ceramic figures. Like the 
babies making up Cradle these were cast from a mother mould. The original not 
unsurprisingly was entitled The Mother (Fig 2.14).  
 
 
Fig 2.14. Wilma Cruise The Mother (2011).  Ceramic on steel base, 120 x 50 x 50 cm. 
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). 
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These figures, although amorphous in shape and without features, are undoubtedly 
human. The second figure in the Caucus series was called Mother Other (Fig 2.15). 
Although formally the same shape as The Mother, this figure had, as an addition, a steel 
structure that masked her face. A cone-shaped beak was added to the next one in the 
series to create The Bird (Fig 2.16). The human figure was thus transmogrified through the 
series into animal form. From the additions of the steel mask and the inverted cone 
covering the faces of the figures, the forms became other than human41. The lack of 
features and the addition of masks emphasised the silence of the animals (and human 
beings) in the face the complication of the animal/human interface. These figures were 
joined in the installation by a number of animal forms – a couple of baboons, a giant 
rabbit (The Caucus – Rabbit) (Fig. 2.17) and a laughing piglet, (Hybrid Piglet), thereby 
creating “an autarky that guards the cradle” (Younge 2012:9).  
 
  
Fig 2.15. Wilma Cruise Mother Other (2011). Ceramic on steel base, 108 cm.  
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). 
Fig 2.16. Wilma Cruise The Bird (2012). Ceramic and steel on steel base, 105 x 101 x 50 
cm. (Photographed by Ant Strack). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 The final figure in the caucus was made out to friable terra-cotta clay. In the process of making 
the figure disintegrated leaving a partial torso.  This figure fittingly marked the end of the caucus. 
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The Caucus – Rabbit is in the words of Gavin Younge, “self-inscribed with an ill-fitting robe 
of verisimilitude” (Younge 2012:9). As he argues, we all “know” the idea of “rabbit” not 
only through lived experience, but also through childhood tales like Alice in Wonderland. 
“Seeing Cruise’s re-envisioned rabbit entails a loss of the real and a correlative 
augmentation of our sense of body, since it is the body that renders perception possible” 
(Younge 2012:9–11). The sense of bodily dislocation is emphasised by the nearly human 
life-size form of the rabbit. As Alice finds in dreamland, size and scale are illogical 
contributing to a sense of unreality.  
 
 
 
Fig 2.17. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Rabbit  (2012). Ceramic, 105 x 45 x 55 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). 
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Scale also informed the three figures that were central to the installation entitled Big, 
Bigger, Biggest (Alice) (Fig 2.18).  
 
 
 
Fig 2.18. Wilma Cruise Big, Bigger, Biggest (Alice) 2012). Ceramic on steel base, Biggest 
(Alice) 180 x 60 x 80 cm, Bigger (Alice) 121 x 32 x 32 cm, Big (Alice) 90 x 20 x 28 cm. 
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). 
 
 
 
These three armless forms allude to Alice's confusion as to her real size. The elongation of 
her disproportionately long neck confused the poor pigeon who thought she might just 
be a serpent, prompting Alice to question her identity. In this manifestation, Alice, as an 
exemplar of the human species, is an unstable referent. She is neither large nor small; 
human nor serpent. Her place, and ours, in the moral universe, is no longer ensured. In 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
76 
the inverted dream world of Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, 
humankind's position on top of the Cartesian pile is questioned.  
 
The exhibition, The Alice Diaries was an inchoate, pre-linguistic exploration on the 
question of the animal. Through material means of clay, paint and charcoal I felt my way 
through the morass of ideas on the animal turn. The resultant objects and images are less 
illustrations than markers of this process. The decoding of the works only suggests rather 
than explains. Nevertheless, as I moved through the process of making towards 
articulating my moral position, I was attracted towards an affective approach – one not 
directed by reason, nor the calculus of the utilitarian approach, but one of an appeal to 
pity (Derrida), an ingrained piety (Scruton) or care (Regan)42. Further, I agree with Donna 
Haraway, that emotion does not exist in a vacuum. One has to get down and dirty in 
messy co-entanglements with the animal and not only rely on theoretical abstractions. 
One has to break bread with the Other. Questions have to be asked, not in the abstract 
realm of reason, but in the knotty personal specificity of the problem posed by a particular 
animal. Further as I argue, it is in the entanglements with the materials of art that the main 
battle with meaning takes place. It is in the messy confines of the studio, and through the 
process of making, that thinking occurs. In the next chapter I consider my art making in 
terms of the preconscious drives, shamanistic influences and the metaphor provided by 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of writing like a rat and animal-becoming.  
!  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 This will be explored more fully in Chapter Five when I discuss the concept of imaginative 
empathy. 
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CHAPTER 3  
We’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad. 
 
!
Fig 3.1. Wilma Cruise The Queen (2015). Drypoint and chine collé (Edition 15), 43 x 43.7 
cm. 
!
!
!
[I]f reason is what sets me apart from the veal calf, then thank you but no thank you, I’ll 
talk to someone else (Coetzee 2004:112).  
!
!  
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Exhibitions 
Advice from a Caterpillar (2015) 
Red Queen to Play (2015) 43 
  
In this chapter I argue that the reconnection with the animal other is made possible 
through means other than rational discourse. I suggest that this role falls on artists, 
shamans and sorcerers – those who work on the interface of the physical and the 
metaphysical. Using inchoate and not fully understood means, they find themselves in a 
position to make Berger’s lost sacred connection with the animal. Making thereby implies 
that rational thought is bypassed and the unconscious or pre-conscious dominates. In this 
chapter, I invoke the metaphor of “madness” as Lewis Carroll articulated in Alice’s 
conversation with the Cheshire Cat. I briefly discuss various models of the unconscious 
including the Freudian and shamanistic. I consider Cixous’ écriture feminine and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts of animal-becoming and writing like a rat as useful metaphors for 
the creative process. In this context I investigate the work of Elizabeth Gunter, Joseph 
Beuys and Nicolene Swanepoel as well as my own works from Advice from a Caterpillar 
and Red Queen to Play. 
!
!
!
Elizabeth Costello says that it is via poetics that understanding with the animals might be 
reached (Coetzee 2004:111). Costello’s implication is that it is through affect rather than 
reason that we get closer to the animal other. It is through such means that modern 
humankind can regain “the sacred connection to the animal” (Berger 2007:253–255). 
Taking my lead from her, I argue that since the artist works on the interface of the physical 
and metaphysical, she is one, amongst others, who has a conduit to the animal world. 
Thinking with animals, through art, allows one to access truths that are closed to rational 
discourse.  
 
That the artist is one who has the means to strike a blow for meaning in a meaningless 
world is signalled by an early work in my oeuvre, Self Portrait (1992) (Fig 3.2).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Advice From a Caterpillar David Krut, Maboneng Gallery, Johannesburg, May and June 2015. 
Red Queen to Play Rust en Vrede Gallery, Durbanville, August to September 2015. 
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!
Fig 3.2. Wilma Cruise Self Portrait (1992), Ceramic on concrete base. 173 x 62 x 45 cm. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp) 
 
 
Since most of my sculptures are armless, this self-portrait with arms suggests a particular 
agency. A short poem written contemporaneously suggests a reading. 
 
the artist has power 
she has arms 
she controls 
she is god  
(for a small while) 
but like god 
she confronts evil 
only in a place where  
chaos reigns  
(Cruise 2000). 
  
 
The implication is that the artist has powers to act upon the world in a way that is not of 
the usual order of things. These involve procedures that bypass cerebral control. They are 
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neither philosophical nor scientific, practical nor necessarily rational. That is, the artistic 
journey has no clear end in sight. What insights are gained en route are as mute as the 
slippages of language and (non)communication between animals and humans. The 
resultant findings of the artistic process are a priori unknown. What lies beyond is a terra 
incognito. 
!!
This conundrum of having no definite end point to the artistic journey was captured in a 
scene in Alice in Wonderland. In conversation with the Cheshire Cat Alice asked,  
 
“Would you tell me, please, which way I want to go from here?”  
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. 
“I don't much care where —“ said Alice. 
“Then it doesn't matter which way you go,” said the Cat.  
“— so long as I get somewhere” Alice added as an explanation. 
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat. “If you only walk long enough” (Carroll 
1982:62-64). 
!
The voyage of creativity is justified by the journey itself; an elusive destination is of not 
much concern as long as it is somewhere and that the journey continues. The markers of 
the journey are governed by preconscious/unconscious impulses44 – inchoate directions 
governed as much by the imperative of the hand as of the head. Not knowing where one 
is going, but going nevertheless, is an irrational action. I propose a metaphor of 
“madness”. This is not insanity of the clinical order, but of the knowing kind suggested by 
the Cheshire Cat when he said to Alice from his lofty perch, “we’re all mad here. I’m mad. 
You’re mad” (Carroll 1982:64). It is a kind of madness that alludes to the unhinging of 
words and things from their normal contexts. As Alice found in her dream world, the 
inversion of the normal order allows access to new territories and permits new insights 
and new knowledges.  
 
When Derrida encountered his little cat in the bathroom in the scene of non-knowing, his 
exposure to the gaze of the other animal is according to Calarco, “somewhat akin to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Burgin (1991:215) suggests term “preconscious” instead of “unconscious”, since unconscious 
denotes that which is unavailable to conscious thought except in coded form. In this exposition the 
terms “preconscious” and “unconscious" are used relatively interchangeably. Due note has been 
taken of their more precise definition. 
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madness, which is why Derrida calls it ‘a deranged theatrics’” (2008:125). Approaching 
the question of the animal in a similar “deranged” way and without precise analytical 
intent, allows the artist to find and to make semiotic changes of signification that may lead 
in many directions. Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of the rhizome is apt here (1987:7). 
The rhizomatic idea allows for a multiplication of meanings with not one being prioritised 
above the other (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:7). This clearly opens the door for the 
possibility of “languages” that are non-linguistic, mimetic, gestural and affective. In other 
words, it permits the argument for animal languages that do not mimic the human 
logocentric one. 
!
In their meditation, Memories of a Sorcerer (1987:239–252) Deleuze and Guattari liken the 
writer and philosopher (and presumably the artist) to a sorcerer. One who occupies a 
liminal position as contradictorily, being both part of the pack and having an anomalous 
position in the pack (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:239 & 243).  “Sorcerers have always held 
the anomalous position, at the edge of fields or woods. They haunt the fringes. They are 
at the borderline of the village, or between villages” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:246). In 
pure Deleuzian rhetoric, Deleuze and Guattari list what the anomalous individual is not – it 
[sic] is not a unique specimen, nor a perfection of a type, nor the eminent term of a series, 
nor an individual, nor a species. It only has affects that teem, swell and seethe! (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987:244–245).  A sorcerer is a “phenomenon of bordering” (1987:245) with 
becoming-animal being “an affair of sorcery” (1987:247). Further a sorcerer is one who 
responds to the injunction to “write like a rat”. The imperative is to either stop writing, or 
write like rat in which case writing becomes an act of becoming and “all becomings are 
written like sorcerer’s drawings” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:251).  
!
In spite of a certain circularity in the argument, this description has merits since the role of 
the sorcerer is not one of fixed identity, rather it is a series of becomings never reaching 
an end point. Nevertheless, Steve Baker suggests that Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the 
word “sorcerer" is metaphoric.  
 
Yes, the sorcerer. It does seem to be an extraordinary word to introduce. But I think it's 
partly used tongue-in-cheek—"we sorcerers," they call themselves—and partly a means 
of avoiding or minimizing the use of other more contemporary but equally loaded 
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terms, such as "artist." Language does a peculiar but particular kind of work for them. 
It's to be taken seriously but not always literally, addressing a "reality" but often in 
deliberately arcane terms (Baker cited in Williams 2001). 
 
It seems as if Deleuze and Guattari dig below the surface meaning of the words to access 
another kind of truth hidden by factual interpretations.  It is a useful approach since if one 
were to interpret “sorcerer” literally, one would come to an impasse. “Shaman/sorcerer” 
means one who enters a state of trance during ritual ceremonies45 and since making art 
involves considered, rational actions, trance conditions are inimical to the act of creation. 
Yet, and in spite of, the need for rational action, the artist works in an area of the unknown, 
a place close to madness, acting as a conduit between the world known and the world yet 
to be known. As Deleuze and Guattari articulate it, “you don’t know what you can make a 
rhizome with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is effectively going to make a 
rhizome, or enter a becoming” (1987:251). In my case, theorising the space between 
human and animal and rejecting Cartesian dualism does bring me close to an shamanistic 
or animist position46 in which no differentiation is made between the physical and 
metaphysical. I do attempt to “breathe life” into the animals l make from inert material. 
 
Bruce Chatwin, in his essay, The Nomadic Alternative surveys shamanistic practice and 
history throughout the world finding commonalities in the practice of shamanism. The 
shaman is perceived as an outsider. He [sic] is, “set aside from the ‘normal’ life of the tribe, 
he remains the hub of its creative activity, its culture hero” (Chatwin 1997:96). The shaman 
forsakes his human condition and frequently identifies himself with a helping spirit usually 
an animal or bird. Notably Hélène Cixous and her compatriot, Luce Irigaray claim a 
spiritual connection with animals, one that is akin to that of “angels and of gods who 
agree to accompany us in a course towards the accomplishment of our humanity” 
(Irigaray 2004:201). In Atterton and Calarco's collection of essays on animal philosophy, 
both Cixous and Irigaray chose to write poetically preferring this mode to analytical and 
deductive reasoning. Both philosophers chose the figure of birds as the means by which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Sorcerers emerge “with the power real or assumed of passing at will into a state of mental 
disassociation” (Chatwin 1997:96) 
46 Animism – a doctrine that the vital principle of organic development is immaterial spirit; 
attribution of conscious life to objects in and phenomena of nature or to inanimate objects; belief 
in the existence of spirits separable from bodies (Merriman-Webster. Sv. ‘animism’.) 
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to articulate their thoughts. Cixous used birds as a synonym for women and writing, while 
for Irigaray birds, as well as rabbits and cats, act as divine and mysterious assistants who 
“intervene with mediations other than those we use as means of communication 
considered appropriate for human beings” (Irigaray 2004:199). 
 
Cixous’ écriture féminine, was a response to the perceived dominance of patriarchal, 
“phallogocentric”47 writing with its rational mode of discourse. Écriture féminine became 
the site of a political struggle of resistance to “the restricted and marginalized position of 
the female subject” (Dobson 2004:125). It also became an affirmative mode that is 
“inherently suited to the embrace of the other” (Dobson 2004:125) including that of 
animals. Cixous’ female writing echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s affective feeling of writing 
like a rat.  
 
Writing is the passage way, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling of the other in me – the 
other that I am and am not, that I don’t know how to be, but that I feel passing, that 
makes me live, that tears me apart, disturbs me, changes me…. (Cixous cited in Sellers 
1994:42). 
 
Writing affectively, playing with words, inventing new ones and approaching topics 
indirectly, Cixous aims to obliquely access a kind of truth. As Derrida would have it, her 
writing “is a place crawling with secrets which give way to thought” (Derrida cited in 
Sellers 1994:15). Significantly, for the purposes of the argument here put forward, she 
appears interested in the gap between the “I” and “the other” as the raison d’être of her 
writing.  
 
There is, “No I without you ever or more precisely no I’s without-you’s” (Cixous cited in 
Sellers 1994)48. Like Cixous, I focus on the space between the “I” and the other animal 
“you’s”.  My aim is to make communication in the “space-between” in some way visible. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 “Phallogocentrism” is a word coined by Derrida “to describe how Lacan perpetuates the 
traditional philosophical view that the word or logos is the site of truth making the phallus the key 
signifier that both governs access to the Symbolic, or language, and determines sexual difference” 
(Macey 2000:296). 
48 Derrida in his preface to Seller's collection of Cixous' writings opens his discourse with 
reference to Cixous’ “First Days of the Year” by referring to the in-between – the space between the 
two protagonists and the space created by the tension between Separation and Reparation 
(Derrida cited in Sellers 1994:15). 
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Using a visual text that is neither direct, logocentric, nor phallogocentric, (to borrow 
Derrida’s neologism), I create an indirect parallel reality. I reach beyond words. 
 
The South African artist, Elizabeth Gunter, is known for her large-scale detailed animal 
drawings – dogs, but also more unusual representations, such as rhino fetuses and horse 
foals about to be born, or already dead (Fig 3.3).  
 
 
 
Fig 3.3 Elizabeth Gunter Last, last One (2015). Charcoal dust on paper, 180 x 140 cm. 
 
 
Her animals seem to occupy the liminal position between life and death.  They hang in 
space between two states of being. Contradictorily, considering the darkness of this 
liminal place, the images elicit a great tenderness. I am loathe to use the word “hyper 
realism” to describe the almost photographic detail of the charcoal dust drawings. Her 
works go beyond realism reaching into the realm of the metaphysical. Surprisingly, given 
the detail in the works, the artist does not rely on a model, neither a physical one nor a 
photographic representation (E Gunter, personal correspondence, June 2016). She says, 
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I am fascinated by ideas of realism, realist, real, and reality. None of the animals that I 
have drawn exist in reality or ever had existed in reality before. They were never alive 
and also never dead – they are inventions, new animals in another sphere of existence 
– that of illusion, of imagery – yet interfacing between audience and artist. The 
drawings seem realist, in some places even dense with detail, in others not, but what 
reality dictated their tenets and from what reality do the animals hail? What then, is 
real and what is realism? Could it be that both reality and realism are mere constructs 
in equal measure? (E Gunter, personal correspondence, June 2016). 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.4 Elizabeth Gunter #4000 (2015). Charcoal dust on paper,190 x 145 cm. 
 
 
Gunter recalls a childhood memory of imagining herself as a small animal without 
knowledge of self.  She had been told by her father that animals were without speech, 
reason or self awareness. Imagining herself as animal lost in the world, and lost to the 
world, was strangely comforting.  
 
“I … became aware of a wordless centre, a muteness that is not without meaning. It is 
that muteness that I try to mark, because to my mind it is where I find mutuality with 
animals, or where I feel my own animality. Some idea of what non-human animals feel 
like – the same as what I feel/experience when I draw: mute meaning.” (E Gunter, 
personal correspondence, June 2016). 
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Her animal images appear as if unbidden on the paper during the act of drawing. She is in 
a place beyond words. In that moment she “becomes animal!” (E Gunter, personal 
interview, Cape Town, June 2016). Like Cixous and Irigaray, her “realism” is an affective 
one depending on emotional resonances of the images. In becoming-animal, Gunter 
paradoxically leads us to the heart of the animal-human question, letting us “...experience 
the animals as the only population to which [we] are responsible in principle” (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987:240). 
 
Joseph Beuys’ performances are familiar examples of shamanic art practices in which he 
uses materials such as felt, fat and honey, which have been imbued with mythical 
properties. He has evolved a system of complex ideas including the notion of “Anti-Art”, a 
concept directed against “the stagnation of the mind” (Meyer 1970). Anti-Art involves an 
expansion of consciousness that transcends humankind's physical nature. “His 
unorthodox techniques yield a symbol rather than a drawing; not abstractions, but 
revelations of a private mythology” (Meyer 1970). In How to Explain Pictures to a Dead 
Hare" (Fig 3.5), Beuys covered his head with honey and gold-leaf and cradled the dead 
hare in his arms. 
 
!
Fig 3.5. Joseph Beuys!How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare. (1965). Gold leaf, honey, 
dead hare, felt pad, iron, fir tree, miscellaneous drawings and clothing items, Galerie 
Schmela, Dresden, Germany.!
(http://uk.phaidon.com/agenda/art/articles/2014/march/03/why-joseph-beuys-and-his-
dead-hare-live-on/) 
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[I] took it to the pictures and I explained to him everything that was to be seen. I let 
him touch pictures with his paws and meanwhile talked to him about them… . I 
explained them to him because I do not really like explaining them to people. Of 
course there is a shadow of truth in this. A hare comprehends more than many human 
beings with their stubborn rationalism... . I told him that he needed only to scan the 
picture to understand what is really important about it. The hare probably knows 
better than man that directions are important (Beuys cited in Meyer 1970). 
 
By rejecting “stubborn rationalism” it is feasible to perceive the role of other artists in a 
similar Beuysian way. For example, Baker, citing Tucker, uses the example of Antoni 
Tàpies who wished to breathe “life back into humble but essential things of the world…. 
Tàpies functions like a shaman … redirecting attention… to an animistic integration of self 
and world” (Tucker cited in Baker 2013). The idea of giving life to inert material is 
precisely what artists do.  
!
Ceramic sculptor, Nicolene Swanepoel, is an artist that can fruitfully be discussed in terms 
of shamanistic practices. As a white African, Swanepoel became interested in indigenous 
knowledges. Since cattle are significant cultural markers in South Africa, it was natural for 
her to turn to the study of their importance, not only in terms of native cosmologies, but 
also in terms of colonial and postcolonial interpretations49. In her master’s dissertation at 
the University of Johannesburg, she examined the topic through word and object. 
Entitled Representations of Cattle as Cultural Markers: Towards South African Identities, it 
explored both the historical and contemporary role of cattle in the spiritual and 
metaphoric life of the nation. 
!
Cattle have been a crucial axis in African history. From the first gingerly steps of 
colonial feet on southern African shores, locals relented and exchanged a beast or two 
for exotic objects. Transactions soon soured and cattle then became the steeds on 
which to chase the invaders back to their ships... . As cattle provided sustenance, 
transport, symbolic wealth and to many provided a channel of communication with 
revered ancestors, understandably, they were highly valued. Sometimes traded, but 
mostly battled over, they are so interwoven in our culture that they have become 
powerful symbols of South African identity. Ever popular in contemporary culture, 
depictions of and objects relating to cattle abound (Swanepoel cited in Cruise 
2011:50-53).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 The following discussion is extracted from my article Hybrid Herds published in Ceramics: Art 
and Perception No. 86, 2011.  
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Fig 3.6.!Nicolene!Swanepoel,!ceramic,!data!unknown.!!
 
 
Her argument centred on the concept of hybridity using the indigenous breed of cattle as 
symbolic reference. In 2007, the first ceramic sculptures of Swanepoel’s hybrid herd 
manifested themselves (Fig 3.6). She exhibited seventy head of cattle on her degree 
exhibition. Subsequently, the “herd” grew as Swanepoel continued to explore the rich 
topic of cattle in South African life.  Since “cattle” have been central to the traditional 
cosmology of Sub-Saharan African peoples, they  have been entwined with South African 
history since the first arrival of the Bantu-speaking tribes from northeast Africa around 
590–700 AD. It has also been an area of contestation. From the first encounters of 
colonisers and Khoi c.1652 to the 19th century “border” wars and into the apartheid years, 
cattle and their significance have been fought over. But there has been a change in 
attitude since the liberation of South Africa. It has resulted in a multi-faceted view of the 
cultural complexities of South Africa, where hybridity is the hallmark. But, in spite of a 
recent willingness to embrace the beauty of the indigenous Nguni hides, “cattle” remains 
an area of contestation. The ritual killing of bulls by bare-handed young men still takes 
place, often in sophisticated urban areas where the loud bellows of the suffering bulls, (a 
requirement of the practice), disturb finer sensibilities and divide the population along 
lines of cultural rights versus cruelty to animals (Woodward 2008:9–10). As Woodward has 
pointed out, differences in cultural practices as to the slaughter of animals, provoked 
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heated arguments. “Tradition became a pugilistic adversarial identity…” (Woodward 
2008:11). In this scenario the subjectivity (and suffering) of the animal was lost in the 
debate. 
 
After her degree Swanepoel pursued the ever-growing expansion of her hybrid herd. 
Using a plaster mould she press-moulded the cattle heads. The head was formed, joined 
while leather hard, and the mould was used over and over again. While the skull of the 
animal was a constant, the placement and size of the horns was not. Varying from large to 
small and angled differently, the horns individualised each head, as did the placement of 
the ears and the details of the eyes in their sockets. Like a real herd of cows, genetic 
similarities were marked by individual characteristics that allowed for infinite variations. 
But it was in the surface treatment of the cow heads that Swanepoel most fully explored 
her concept of hybridity. Like the hides of the native Nguni cattle, the variations of colour, 
pattern and texture on the ceramic heads allow for a symbolic reading. In images, 
drawings and transfers, Swanepoel intertwined history and nature, the natural and artifice, 
animal and culture. By so doing she resurrected valuable but forgotten and displaced 
animal symbols. She wished to redirect awareness and re-establish a sense of meaning, 
belonging, and agency in a world that is increasingly alienated and dehumanised 
(Swanepoel in Cruise 2011:50-53).  
 
Her interest in other cosmologies extended beyond cattle to include other symbolic 
objects such as dogs. A case in point are the spirit guardians, a group of small ceramic 
dogs inspired by canine Nkisi or power figures from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
She playfully called her figures my NikkiNkisi (Fig 3.7). She saw the Nkisi as “symbolic 
protectors of our souls, not against actual malevolence, but the terror of living with fear 
about something which might happen… Ultimately, the spirit guards symbolised the 
common desire for a peaceful and spiritually prosperous life.  In bearing tokens of 
protection, hope and healing, they are vessels of meaning, vehicles to celebrate the 
universal bond between human and dog, the instinctive friendship between dog and dog, 
and the original kinship between human and human…” (Swanepoel 2005:66–69). 
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Fig 3.7. Nicolene Swanepoel NikkiNkisi (n.d.) ceramic, size unknown. 
 
 
In making these works Swanepoel had to suspend conscious control over the process. 
This was dictated by the necessity of having to produce hundreds of versions of the same 
form. Invoking the notion of Yanagi’s “unknown craftsman” she set about rapidly 
producing the forms in an unthinking, repetitive and ultimately meditative process. 
 
Completing one hundred sculptures in a relatively short period of time forced me to 
work fast. This reminded me of the “unknown craftsman” of Yanagi, who, by throwing 
hundreds of tea bowls in rapid succession, developed an economy of work, which in 
turn developed an unparalleled fluency of expression. Though I hardly aspire to be 
such a master, I did enter a compulsive, trance-like state, almost automatically 
moulding then modelling another and yet another piece.  The clay expressed an 
internal force of its own. The spontaneous gestures of the clay gave birth to expressive 
qualities impossible to achieve by slow, conscious, meticulous labour (Swanepoel 
2005:66–69). 
 
Like a sorcerer, her studio practice appears to bypass rational control, a process that also 
finds resonance with Cixous’ écriture feminine. By breaking “borders subjugated by 
authority” (Dobson cited in Simons 2004:127), Swanepoel becomes something other 
(than human). In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, she becomes animal.  
!
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Although Swanepoel said that she was not familiar with the writings of Deleuze and 
Guattari, this focus appeared to inform her 2014 exhibition at the Irma Stern Museum in 
Cape Town, South Africa entitled, Little Creatures/Without Pedestals Another Time, Same 
Place: The Re-Evolution of Animals. In this exhibition, she seemed to have evoked the 
central concept of animal–becoming in which the ineluctable opposition of human and 
animal is collapsed. She described her process of creation thus.  
 
Lumps of clay have transmogrified into animals of various kinds. They are not made to 
comply with a planned design, but grow according to the whim of the clay. Each little 
figurine emerges into its own individual being. Most look different to anything we have 
yet encountered, neither animal nor human. A few may suggest (but do not represent) 
existing animals – equine, feline, bovine, hominid, not only the latter, but all uniquely 
sapient [meaning wise]” (N Swanepoel, personal correspondence, 2014) (Fig 3.8). 
!
 
Fig 3.8. Nicolene Swanepoel Little Creature (2014). Ceramic, size unknown. 
 
Following Deleuze and Guattari, Ron Broglio likens the “concept of becoming-animal as a 
pack” to a “minor art”. By this he means that the centrality of the individual is replaced by 
the imperative of the community (2011:113). Minor art disrupts from the outside by 
“undermining metaphor [which] becomes the revolutionary gesture” (Broglio 2011:106). 
Swanepoel’s praxis fits neatly into this interpretation.  Not only are her metaphoric animals 
revolutionary gestures, but her choice of material challenges hegemonic practices in 
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contemporary art. Ceramics is traditionally regarded as a decorative art/craft50. Attacking 
from a position of left of field as it were, Swanepoel disrupts expectations of the 
ornamental object by using it to subversively address the question of the animal and 
humankind’s ethical relationship to it. 
!
“Writing like a rat” is an apt metaphor for Swanepoel’s praxis. In the artist’s words a 
cornucopia of creatures emerged from “the primeval mess” of her studio. Her creatures 
poured forth from a creative well almost of their own volition. They are neither animal with 
human features nor human with animal features, nor a hybrid, but a newly developed 
animal, a hypothetical being that evolved according to circumstantial conditions. With an  
intensity bordering on the obsessive these creatures sprung seemingly unbidden from 
their creator's fingers. They were modelled with urgency. The artist used the tip of her 
(supposedly uniquely and superiorly human) opposable thumbs to make marks for eyes, 
mouths, and ears and, although she never explicitly said so, it appears her hands did the 
thinking. It is as if that very entity that defines us as human – the upper cortex, the rational 
brain was in suspension. The final form of the clay animal embodied the urgency of the 
unconscious impulse, which achieved its physical form through the malleable clay. The 
sculpted forms are not only visual manifestations of the process, but they are also tactile. 
The desire is to lift the figures, fingers are lured to handle the forms, even to lift and touch 
them with lips. 
!
Swanepoel heightened our awareness of the uniqueness of all sentient creatures. She 
drew attention to each one’s own set of well-developed abilities. A superior sense of smell 
is suggested, for instance, by an elongated “head”, abstracted into a long multi-tubed 
appendage (neck-head-snout, perhaps reminiscent of the nose of an aardvark). Prominent 
ears have superior hearing. A domed head might indicate a more developed sense of 
intellect. But not one of these qualities elevates one creature above the other – they are all 
uniquely specified. These creatures stand or sit, lie in dorsal or sternal recumbence, crawl 
or stand. They stand apart or interlock, they play alone or dance with each other. They 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 The practice of ceramics in South Africa has largely been influenced by a studio pottery 
tradition that has emphasised technique above concept and truth to material above 
experimentation. 
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display all the behaviours of sentient social beings, including humans (N Swanepoel, 
personal correspondence, 2014). 
!
The same sense of urgency that informed the creation of these beings, governed the 
selection of pedestals (Fig 3.9).  
 
!
Fig 3.9. Nicolene Swanepoel Little Creature (2014). Ceramic and found objects, size 
unknown. 
 
 
Like much of her praxis the choice of pedestals was a planned strategy and driven by a 
contradictory urgency governed by pre-rational impulses. The pedestals were not 
manufactured nor designed. They are found objects that came mostly from the farming 
environment of Swanepoel’s hometown, Grabouw. Many are from her small farm – a 
rusted table, a log of wood or a discarded chair. These quotidian objects indicate that no 
creature is special (or “specie-al”) in any hierarchical sense. None is to be placed above 
another. It is exactly this that makes them approachable, touchable, sense-able and 
intimate. 
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This democratising impulse is what informed the exhibition. If all creatures are equal 
surely humans as (other) animals are to be included. Swanepoel said,  
 
... perhaps we can step back and evaluate the damage we have wreaked on our 
environment and the creatures dependant on it due to our assumed ‘superiority’ and 
attempted control of power over everything on earth. Once we appreciate that we are 
but a small part of our universe ... and respect all other elements in it, we might begin 
to try to undo and repair our destructions (N Swanepoel, personal correspondence, 
2014). 
!
***!
 
Raised in the mid-20th century and cognisant of the Freudian psychoanalytical ethos, I 
have long been aware of the function of the unconscious in my work, which can be said to 
operate in “the space-between”. This gap can be articulated as a Lacanian rupture 
between word and image. It is a place where the unconscious is made manifest51. It is also 
arguably the place where non-verbal communication between human and animal takes 
place. The dominant model for the unconscious lies in the psychoanalysis of Jung and 
Freud. It is a concept with which I engaged in my research in 1997, Artist as Subject: 
Subject as Object (Cruise 1997).  As I then argued, art and dreams share similar 
properties, which allow unconscious, barely felt ideas to find form within images that 
permit decoding of their manifest content. 
 
The connection between the creative process and dreams has, in terms of my 
experience, a sense of “fit”. I may start the sculpture with a formal problem as its initial 
premise. At that stage, the content of the work is only apprehended subliminally, if at 
all. But during the working process I allow barely apprehended ideas to dictate form 
and content. The preconscious is allowed reign… The sculpture reveals its meaning 
only after completion, a process which may take months or years. Its content is that not 
only made visible to that abstract entity, the viewer, but most importantly, to me the 
artist. The work, like dream, provides encoded information that informs me of my 
subconscious fears, thoughts and desires. That is, using similar tools of metaphor, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, reformulated Freudian doctrine in the terms of 
Saussurian linguistics (Selden in Selden and Widdowson 1993:139). Lacan broke the link between 
the signifier and the signified; a link, which De Saussure had suggested, was immutable (Wright 
1984:109). Into this break he inserted the functioning of the unconscious.  The result was that 
words are no longer secure in their meaning; things are not as they appear and meaning shifts 
according to sub-conscious precepts.  This is a received wisdom in psychoanalysis.  By linking this 
knowledge to language, Lacan shifted the emphasis from a neurosis-based theory to one of 
normative functioning (Cruise 1997:8).   
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metonymy and displacement both art and dream work permit access to the 
unconscious. However, the earliest Freudian model, viewed art and dream as a 
manifestation of neurosis52. This view was modified by Rycroft who maintained that art 
making is not only the function of the unconscious but works in conjunction with the 
secondary processes of the ego (1975:304). Since the actual act of making art requires 
conscious gestures such as mixing pigment, cleaning brushes or sharpening sticks it 
requires a conscious functioning individual to perform these actions. The two, id and 
ego, madness and sanity, work hand in hand in the creation of art. In this sense art 
making moves for the Freudian understanding of art as the outpourings of a neurotic 
to one of normative functioning (Cruise 1997:65).                                            
!
In spite of this shift from a pathogenic interpretation to one of healthy function, the 
concept of the unconscious in its Freudian interpretation became, in 2015, one with which 
I was increasingly loath to engage. I found theoretical support for my instinctual rejection 
within the pages of A Thousand Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari explicitly 
question the arborescent structure of the unconscious, what they call the “dictatorial 
conception” (1987:17) of the hierarchy of superego, ego and id.  
 
Rather than thinking in terms of some kind of utopia where one got away from the 
worst effects of identity thinking and its political consequences, [Deleuze and 
Guattari] are looking instead to the ways in which creative activity—which in their 
view is prompted by a thinking about, or an interaction with, animals—can serve to 
open up a model of experience that is quite other than that which the 
psychoanalytic model of the individual human subject would ordinarily allow. A lot 
of what they're doing in their exploration of becoming-animal is concerned to see 
how one can get at those instances, how one can prolong them, inhabit them as 
artist or "sorcerer," how one can in a very sober and cautious manner—and those 
are their words—seek to elaborate an alternative to the psychoanalytic account of 
what it is to be human (Baker in Williams 2001). 
 
Preferring the centeredness of the rhizome figure, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the 
issue is to “produce the unconscious, with its new statements, different desires…” 
(1987:18). As I understand it, art making is not then an oneiric function serving the 
purpose like dreams of making unconscious suppressed thought and desires manifest 
(albeit in coded form). Instead the act of art creates thoughts, not excavated from the 
suppressed id as Freud would have it, but produced and enacted at the moment of 
creation. In my experience and studio praxis I work with an alertness to instances beyond 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Freud suggests that creating art is an act of sublimation; a defence mechanism which deals with 
suppressed subject matter too painful to handle in conscious thought (Cruise 1997:8). 
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the quotidian to “produce the unconscious”. Reason suspended, it is as if the hand does 
the thinking. I have learned to trust its imperative as it reaches for the brush or clay. 
Heidegger gives prominence to the (human) hand distinguishing it from the animals’ paw 
or claw. The hand gives, the paw grasps. Without asserting the human exceptionalism 
implied by Heidegger’s observation, experientially I support the Heideggerian claim of 
the “hand’s complex relation to thought” (Baker 2003:152). There is thinking that is 
achieved by the hand, a type of pre-cognitive action that slowly reveals thought processes 
in the material results of its actions. 
 
Throughout the series of “Alice” exhibitions, Alice functioned not only as an exemplar of 
the human but she can also be regarded as my alter ego – that part that delves into the 
dark hole of the unconscious.!Like Swanepoel, I make art with a sense of urgency driven 
by the need to express myself materially. I am seldom conscious of where the journey is 
going to take me. It has been suggested (W Woodward, personal correspondence, 2015) 
that my praxis has shamanistic53 elements. This term I might have in the past rejected 
because of the implication of free form mysticism and a neo pagan cosmology54. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of the sorcerer as the anomalous being part of the 
pack and yet beyond it, is one with which I am more comfortable since it implies a process 
rather than a being with a fixed identity. I read their meditation, Memories of a Sorcerer 
(1987: 239–252), as an elaborate metaphor of the creative process, a concept that usefully 
describes the progress of artistic labour by encapsulating its wild imperative, its 
unknowability and its occasional surprising sorcery, without having to appeal to “the 
arborescent structure" of the Freudian model. The inchoate thinking of the hand also finds 
resonance with their concept of becoming. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 In this context I interpret “shaman” metaphorically, since literally the term means one who 
enters a state of trance during ritual ceremonies. As Chatwin notes, shamans enter a state of trance 
from which they emerge “with the power real or assumed of passing at will into a state of mental 
disassociation” (Chatwin 1997:96).  
54 Neo-shamanism is a general term “for a modern Western interpretation of the spiritual and 
medical tradition of shamanism, which draws on the use of rituals and ‘tribal’ psychology for 
therapy. In addition to the shamanic state of altered consciousness through rituals and 
psychotherapy, neo-shamanism uses such tools as flotation tanks, strobe lights, active-alert 
hypnosis and other devices or practices intended to alter a person’s reality sense”  
(medical dictionary.thefreedictionary.com: n.d: http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/neo-shamanism.). 
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A suite of drypoint etchings made in January 2015 illustrates the role of the hand in the 
process and is literally depicted in the images. I collaborated with the master print-maker, 
Jillian Ross at David Krut Projects at Arts on Main in Johannesburg, to produce the suite. 
The exhibition, Advice from a Caterpillar, was the result of that collaboration. The precise 
images were not preconceived, other than the notion of imagining baboons combining it 
with the idea of “the end game”. The idea of the chess game was prompted by the 
enigmatic game of chess that underpins Lewis Carroll's tale of Alice Through the Looking 
Glass. It seemed logical, if illogical [sic] to pair the two concepts.   
 
In the print, The End Game" (Fig 3.10), I depict a pair of baboons poring over a game of 
chess.  
 
!
Fig 3.10. Wilma Cruise The End Game (2015). Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15), 45 x 
43,7 cm. 
 
 
Their hands lie on their knees inert and heavy. They are frozen in inactivity as they 
contemplate the board, seemingly unable to make their moves. Metaphorically, and post 
hoc, I suggest that they are considering the end as they know it. As real baboons are 
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being squeezed out of their natural habitat by the encroaching humans, their way of life is 
threatened – they are without agency to change events – their endgame has been 
reached.  
 
Thus with little preparation or pre-thought, rabbits, cats, pigs, dogs, puppies, baboons 
and armless infants in their hundreds emerge from the studio in both three dimensional 
and two dimensional form during the years of The Alice Sequence. The two drawings 
made early on in The Alice Sequence, Alice: Self Portrait I (Fig 3.11) and II (Fig 2.12, 
Chapter 2), illustrate the intuitive process of creation. 
 
 
 
Fig 3.11. Wilma Cruise Alice: Self Portrait I & II (2011), mixed media drawing on paper, 
200 x 100 cm. 
!
!
In making these works thought was suspended and intuition or the intelligence of the 
hand came into being. Even though the works were made over almost a year, there was 
never a vision of what the final work would look like. There was much erasure, cutting out 
and pasting with no clear thought of the end point. Action preceded thought and became 
a non-linguistic knowing embedded in the act. It was only after the work was complete 
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that decoding was possible. Like secondary revision in the analysis of dreams, scrutiny of 
the meaning of the work was then made possible. It was as if images floated up from my 
subconscious and, like a dream that haunts one long after passing, these images 
eventually allowed for deciphering. However, instead of depending on a Freudian 
analysis, I relied upon Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of the rhizome, a figure which 
permits for a multiplication of meanings, mine as well as that of the viewers. Thus, only 
one possibility of interpretation is that of the artist’s, which should not be prioritised above 
any others. Therefore, in my reading of the two self-portraits, I suggest that the failure of 
spoken language is implied by the pursed mouths of the two Alices and the bemused, but 
affectionate looks they give to the animals attached to their chests. Some form of 
communication is taking place between the humans and the animals, the meaning of 
which is essentially unknown. Like Derrida’s cat the animals’ looks remain inscrutable.  
 
This meditative state is also the subject of the large carborundum etching, an Edition 
Varie of Harrismith (Fig 3.12), a print originally created with print master, Jillian Ross, in 
2007 and editioned in 2015.  
 
 
Fig 3.12. Wilma Cruise Harrismith (2007–2015). Etching on carborudum (Edition E.V.) 
paper size: 160 x 80 cm. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
100 
Harrismith is a large carborundum etching depicting a human female figure around 
whose neck is draped a large cat. This is not so much a self-portrait as an 
autobiographical image. The cat both presses into the head of the figure and appears to 
grow out of it. The figure bows her head submitting both to the burden and the comfort 
of the animal. The landscape in the background refers to the Free State landscape where 
my maternal grandparents lived. The figure stands like a colossus in the landscape. Out of 
her hands sprout/pour linear forms. 
 
In 2007, when I was working on the original plates, I was at the same time working on a 
life-size sculpture which similarly depicted a female figure with a cat draped round her 
shoulders (Fig 3.13). Both sculpture and print depict a box-like shape around the figures’ 
heads. The addition of this form was not an iconographic decision; rather it was a solution 
to a formal problem. In both sculpture and print, and much at the same time, the figure 
and cat “looked out of balance”. The decision to add the box-like forms was to add visual 
weight. This is not to say that an iconographic reading became superfluous, but rather it 
was post hoc – after the action. The box focuses the viewer’s attention on the interchange 
between human and cat – the space-between became the point of contention.  
 
 
 
Fig 3.13. Wilma Cruise Installation view Cocks Asses &… (I can’t hear). 2007. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp). 
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When considering the significance of the linear shapes that seem to pour out of 
“Harrismith’s” hands in the print, I immediately thought of water. In terms of Sigmund 
Freud’s free association principles, the first response is considered correct – its 
spontaneity not controlled by the forces of the superego. So it was with some surprise, 
that I came across an image in a rock painting in Australia in which the figures similarly 
sprouted linear shapes from their hands (Fig 3.14.).   
 
 
 
Fig 3.14. Bradshawian rock painting, The Kimberley, North-west Australia. (Photographed 
by the artist 2015) 
 
 
Followers of Jung would argue that this is not surprising. They would refer to the 
collective unconscious and the universal archetypes. The implication is that there is a well 
of universal knowledge that stretches across cultures and time. Jung describes the 
collective unconscious as a  
 
boundless expanse, a place of unprecedented uncertainty, with apparently no inside 
and no outside, no above and no below, no here and no there, no mine and no thine, 
no good and no bad. It is the world of water, where all life floats in suspension, where 
the realm of the sympathetic nervous system, the soul of everything living, begins, 
where I am indivisibly this and that, where I experience the other in myself and the 
other-than-myself experiences me (Jung cited in Coward 1985:152).  
 
While this description appropriately describes the creative process, Jung’s tendency to 
see animals as symbols for human foibles – metaphors for the human condition – leads me 
to the position of rejecting Jungian analysis. His idea that animals can act as guides in 
unconscious thought remains essentially anthropocentric. That is, in Jungian lexicon, 
animals are the signifiers not the signified. Instead, taking heed of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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critique of the psychoanalytical model in which the animal as a signifier of human drives 
has “killed becoming animal” (2004:96) and preferring the particularity of the singular 
human-animal encounter like Derrida had with his cat and which Haraway describes as a 
messy co-entanglement – I reject the universalising impulse provided by the Jungian 
model.  
 
In September 2015 the sixth exhibition in The Alice Sequence opened at The Clay 
Museum at the Rust-en-Vrede Gallery in Durbanville, Cape Town. Entitled Red Queen to 
Play it coincided with the fifth exhibition in the series, Advice From a Caterpillar, which was 
showing concurrently at the David Krut Project Space at the AVA Gallery in downtown 
Cape Town55. For the exhibition, Red Queen to Play, I created twenty-four figures 
informed by the shape of chess pieces (Fig 3.15.).  
 
 
!
Fig 3.15.!Wilma Cruise Chess Pieces detail (2015). Ceramic, 20–30 cm. (Photographed by 
Pierre van der Spuy). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 This exhibition was previously shown at the David Krut, Maboneng Gallery in Johannesburg in 
May and June 2015. 
!
!
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These are not literal depictions of chess pieces, neither are they anthropomorphised 
animals but a mixture of animal and human. The heads are balanced on black and red 
coiled clay “bodies”. As usual in my sculpted images, and like normal chess pieces, these 
figures are without arms and thus without agency. As one viewer noted, the figures 
appear puzzled as to where they are, where they are going or how they fit into the game.  
!
Red Queen to Play was inspired by the chess game that underpins the narrative of 
Through the Looking Glass. In this tale Alice steps through a mirror to find a new 
wonderland populated by anthropomorphic red and white chessmen.  
 
For some minutes Alice stood without speaking, looking out in all directions over the 
country – and a most curious country it was. There were a number of tiny little brooks 
running straight across it from side to side, and the ground between was divided up 
into squares by a number of little green hedges, that reached from brook to brook. “I 
declare it's marked out just like a large chess-board!” Alice said at last… . It’s a great 
huge game of chess that’s being played all over the world – if this is the world at all, 
you know. Oh, what fun it is! How I wish I was one of them! I wouldn't mind being a 
Pawn, if only I might join – though of course I should like to be a Queen, best.” (Carroll 
1982:142–143). 
!
!
As Stamp points out, “chess wasn’t just a recurring motif or symbol in Carroll’s story, it 
was, in fact, the basis for the novel’s structure” (Stamp 2013). This is clear from the 
beginning of the book, when the reader is confronted with a visual chess problem and the 
following injunction: “White Pawn (Alice) to play, and win in eleven moves” (Carroll 1982: 
Preface to 1896 Edition). Chess players trying to solve Carroll’s chess problem soon find 
themselves in an impasse that perplexes them “more than the frumious language of 
‘Jabberwocky’” (Stamp 2013). What transpires on the other side of the looking glass does 
not follow the logic of chess. Lewis Carroll's problem is in fact unsolvable. Stamp 
maintains that it “is a sort of funhouse mirror distortion of the novel (or vice versa), with 
eleven moves roughly corresponding to the book’s twelve chapters, Carroll’s notation 
displays a flagrant disregard for the basic rules of chess” (Stamp 2013). Yet, in the context 
of the story, it has its own internal logic. 
!
The choice of the game of chess as a motif in Through the Looking Glass is on the face of 
it contradictory. In contrast to the nonsensical world of Alice’s dream, the game of chess is 
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logical and structured, depending on strategy and rational planned moves. The pieces 
move according to prescribed patterns that allow for no deviation. They are given life by 
either being personified, as in the case of the King, Queen and Bishop or animalised as in 
the case of the knight, who in the classic Staunton design, is represented by a horse. The 
pieces are manipulated, promoted or sacrificed in the name of winning, which is achieved 
by capturing the opponent's king. The only hope for “redemption” is to arrive as a pawn 
at the eighth and final square (rank), at which stage the promotion to queen is assured 
with all the (relative) freedom of movement that that implies. In Alice’s dream she is a 
white pawn, but as she so plaintively articulates, “I should like to be a Queen” (Carroll 
1982:142-143). In order to achieve this, her task in Through the Looking Glass is to 
negotiate the ranks.  She has to go forward in order to reach the eighth square where she 
will be crowned queen. Crossing six brooks, Alice encounters a variety of characters 
including the bad tempered Red Queen!and the gentle White Knight, who keeps falling 
off his horse – surely unsurprising giving the complicated moves assigned to the knight! 
The Red Queen is a recurring figure on Alice’s journey. In her Queen of Hearts guise in 
Wonderland she is prone to shout, “Off with his/her/its head!” at the slightest provocation. 
As the Red Queen in Through the Looking Glass she is equally as haughty and imperious. 
!
 If one were to expand the metaphor that life is, as Alice said, “a great huge game of chess 
that’s being played all over the world”, the animals could be interpreted as chess pieces 
and omnipresent humans as the players. These (represented) creatures have no agency, 
they are pawns [sic] to be moved at the will of the godlike beings playing their strategic 
game. In this scenario, it becomes clear that the pieces (the animals) have little say over 
the direction of their lives. They are moved, promoted or sacrificed according to larger 
strategic plans. Despite rank – queen or bishop, pawn or knight – they are powerless – 
they have no means to act upon the world – they do not have subject of a life (Regan 
2006:17–18). By extrapolation, it includes Alice who is a white pawn in the chess game. As 
the exemplar of humankind, and like her fellow chess pieces the animals, she is lost and 
powerless in the gigantic game of chess. In this scenario humankind is both the 
controlling force and the victim of that force.  
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A similar impulse informed the installation Cradle II (2014–2015) (Fig 3.16), a variation of 
Cradle (2012).!The conceptual underpinning of Cradle in both variations, was informed by 
the awareness of overpopulation by the human species over which human beings have no 
control (See Chapter 2). In Cradle II (2014–2015), instead of a river of forms placed upon 
the floor the armless babies are packed one on top of the other in two large, transparent, 
plexiglass boxes, each on a black, plexiglass base. The forms are lit from the interior by 
concealed LED lights. The boxes provide a formal alternative to the babies on the floor. 
Boxed and piled one on top of the other like so many discarded bodies, the figures 
evoke, according to Younge, apocalyptic scenarios like Dachau and the Ntarama church 
following the Rwandan genocide (2012:7).!
!
!
Fig 3.16. Wilma Cruise Cradle II detail (2014). Ceramic forms in perspex box with stand, 
box: 60 x 60 x 60 cm, stand: 60 x 60 x 120 cm. (Photographed by the artist). 
 
 
In making these works my intention was never that specific – I had no intention to invoke 
past holocausts. Neither was the decision to box the forms guided by a specific 
iconographic intent. Instead, the plan was directed by formal and practical considerations 
dictated by the spatial requirements of the gallery. The disorder of the jumble of babies in 
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the boxes of Cradle II, contradictorily confined and ordered, nevertheless offered a 
different reading which, in the context of the chess game suggested by the title of the 
exhibition, implied control (by the omnipresent artist?).  
!
Taking the opportunity to utilise the two built-in cabinets that line the walls of the museum 
and which normally display small, functional ceramics, I made a series of small sculptures 
(Fig 3.17 & Fig 3.18).  
 
 
Fig 3.17. Wilma Cruise The Borogoves (2015) detail. Ceramic, sizes various 10–17 cm.  
 
 
 
Fig 3.18. Wilma Cruise The Borogoves (2015). Ceramic, sizes various 10–17 cm. 
(Photographs by Pierre van der Spuy). 
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In creating these sculptures, the imperative of the hand ruled. They emerged from what 
Swanepoel called the “primeval mess” of clay. The hand, the material, and a driving 
impulse saw the forms rapidly materialise without much precognition as to what animal or 
animal morph was going to emerge. In order to capture the impulsive nature of the 
making I entitled the installation, The Borogoves, a word derived from Carroll’s nonsense 
poem, The Jabberwocky. 
 
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogoves, 
and the mome raths outgrabe, etc. (Carroll 1982:134).  
 
As Humpty Dumpty later explains to Alice in Through the Looking Glass: “Borogoves are 
thin shabby looking birds with feathers sticking out all round”. “Slithy toves”, on the other 
hand, are slimy, lithe creatures “like badgers or corkscrews” (Carroll 1982:185); words that 
better describe my clay heads. In the gallery the disembodied heads were positioned to 
stare out at the piles of babies. They acted as witnesses to the scene of disorder in the 
boxes of Cradle II.  In both The Borogoves and Cradle II the compulsion that drove the 
creation of the forms, that which Baker called “its initiating momentum” (2013:91), was 
reined in by the formal structure of the display, suggesting a tension between chaos and 
control, madness and rational thought; one that ironically mimics the act of making art.  
 
Perhaps because of the suggestion of an omnipotent presence – Red Queen to Play, has 
less to do with the animal and more to do with the human side of the equation. Unlike the 
other exhibitions in the series, the animal-other has been displaced to the margins. Yet, in 
spite of the apocalyptic scenario evoked by the notion of the end game, this exhibition 
like the others in the series, is not intended as a homily. Nor is it intended as an illustration 
of Carroll’s tales. To remind myself of this fact, I attached the following extract to the wall 
in vinyl letters, “You know very well you are not real” (Carroll 1982:164). Rather, it is a way 
of making sense of an increasingly confusing and dangerous world. Life can be a dream 
or a nightmare. Our task is to try to make sense of our place in it as we tumble through 
time, together with our co-travellers, the animals whose planet we share. 
!
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CHAPTER 4 
Language: The wound without a name 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1. Wilma Cruise Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2013-2014). Installation 
view. 
 
 
 
 
 
Words are cold muddy toads trying to understand the sprites dancing in the field 
(Martell 2010:88).  
 
 
 
 
 
!  
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Exhibition 
Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2013–2014)56 
 
Following Derrida, I investigate the use of language and how it determines our 
perceptions of the (other) animal. I inquire into the slippage of language and its tenuous 
hold on logic and meaning using Alice’s encounters with the animals in Through the 
Looking Glass. Images from my 2013–2014 exhibition, Will you, won’t you, will you join the 
dance? in conjunction with Carroll's texts offer a parallel meditation on the “question of 
the animal” and how we speak about them and how we speak to them. I suggest that the 
un-utterability of inter-species communication (in logocentric terms) finds resonance with 
écriture féminine. I also suggest that communication across human and the (other) animal 
divide is still a largely unknowable terrain.  
 
Normal language seems to be inadequate for the task of describing the process of 
creativity, yet one of necessity has to rely on words, however “cold and muddy” they may 
be. There is an essential contradiction between the creative process of making visual art 
and the deductive reasoning required by the analysis of it. It is a war between affect and 
reason, one that uncomfortably suggests a Cartesian dualism of mind and body. However, 
taking cognisance of the contradiction, one continues with the task aware that language is 
a blunt knife.  
 
The possession or lack of language is central to the animal question. In ontotheological 
humanism it has traditionally been used to define what is human and what is animal. The 
animals’ lack of (human) language, and therefore (human) reason, makes it somehow 
lesser. But is the animals’ lack of words a fault as traditionally supposed? In a small 
paragraph Derrida suggests a radical notion:  namely that the animals’ lack of speech 
might be “something other than a privation” (Derrida 2008:48). In other words, the lack of 
language is only perceived to be a deprivation from a human anthro-centred logos-
dependant perspective. What if it were not? suggests Derrida. As usual with Derrida the 
question is not either or. He steps between the binaries of the perceiving subject, the “I” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? National Arts Festival, Grahamstown, 27 June to 7 
July 2013 and Oliewenhuis Museum, Bloemfontein July to August 2014.  
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and the gaze of the other – in this case his cat. Conceding the facticity of cogito ergo sum 
on the part of the subject, Derrida suggests that the responding animal,  
  
 …it itself is, this aptitude to being itself, and thus the aptitude to being capable of 
affecting itself, of its own movement, with traces of a living self, and thus of 
autobioparaphing itself as it were. No one has ever denied the animal this capacity to 
track itself or retrace a path of itself. Indeed, the most difficult problem lies in the fact 
that it has been refused the power to transform these traces into verbal 
language…(2008:50)57.  
 
In these terms, what Derrida’s cat communicated in their encounter was profound. Seeing 
himself reflected in the gaze of his cat Derrida’s subject position was upset.  
 
The subject no longer occupies a separate, higher ground as the source of knowledge. 
As we regard Derrida standing naked and ashamed before his cat, the object of 
knowledge shifts from him as subject to his cat who, in turn, reflects it back, altered 
and re-arranged to the bewildered Derrida. This is the critical phase of deconstruction, 
which consistently seeks to occupy the space between the binaries. It is this constant 
deferral that completely undoes the logocentric forces at play between humans and 
(other) animals (Cruise, A. 2014:80).  
 
“The animal that I am (following), does it speak?” asks Derrida (2002:401). Derrida’s 
question is not only philosophical – it is also empirical. DO animals speak, albeit in 
different languages to the one used by humans? And if so what is the nature of this 
language? It is an important question, as Derrida has noted, “if one defines language in 
such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to say? But if one re-
inscribes language in a network of possibilities that do not merely encompass it but mark 
it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes” (Derrida, 1995:284. Emphasis mine). 
 
Derrida criticizes Lacan for reserving “the differentiality of signs for human language only, 
as opposed to animal coding” (Derrida 2008:124). That is, animals only react while 
humans respond (Derrida 2008:124). Reaction is noted for its fixity of signs to reality. On 
the other hand, in “[human] language signs take on their value from their relations to each 
other in the lexical distribution of semantemes as much as in the positional, or even 
flectional, use of morphemes….” (Lacan in Derrida 2008:123-124). Derrida says that by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 In Derridean terms both human and the (other) animal are autobiographical creatures on equal 
terms without the complicating factor of the logos. 
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denying animals the ability to respond renders the animal-as-machine and reduces their 
languages to a fixed system of signs (Derrida 2008:125). However, in true Derridean 
fashion instead of erasing the difference between reaction and response, Derrida 
maintains it is a matter of taking that difference into account and not “reducing this 
differentiated and multiple difference, in a conversely massive and homogenizing 
manner, to one between the human subject, on the one hand, and the nonsubject that is 
the animal in general, on the other… “ (Derrida 2008:126). By restricting the animal to 
reaction forever locks it in the realm of the imaginary and denies it access to the symbolic 
(Derrida 2008:128), thereby denying it passage from the animal to human order (Derrida 
2008:130). In Cartesian dogma it is symbolic language – the word – that separates man 
from animal. The animal is not only deprived of the word, but the power conferred by the 
word.  
 
Derrida creates a new word “animot” to replace that of “animal”. The word, animot draws 
attention to the role of language by the addition of the suffix mot, which translates as 
“word”. But animot sounds exactly the same as the French plural for animals, animaux. 
This is a typical Derridean pun that signals the role of language in our perception of the 
animal with its implication of non-human generality. 
 
Derrida questions the belief of human exceptionalism enshrined in the Genesis tale, by 
asking, “Who was born first, before names? Which one saw the other come to this place 
so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant, and therefore the master? Who the 
subject? Who has remained the despot for so long now?” (Derrida 2008:18). The 
suggestion is that it is the willingness to forgo the position of master and despot that 
opens possibilities of connection with (other) animals, instead of having it foreclosed by 
the Cartesian assumption of the superiority, and exclusivity, of the human logocentric 
system.  
 
The significance of naming is illustrated in Alice’s encounter with the creatures in the 
railway carriage.   
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What’s the use of their having names,” the Gnat says, “if they won’n’t answer to them?”  
“No use to them,” said Alice; “but its useful to the people that name them, I suppose. If 
not, why do things have names at all?”  (Carroll 1982:150). 
 
Admitting to the possibility of language(s) beyond the logos of anthropocentrism does 
open possibilities of communication, as Alice found out as she stumbled into the garden 
of live flowers in Through the Looking Glass:  
 
“O Tiger-lily!” said Alice, addressing herself to one that was waving gracefully about in 
the wind, “I wish you could talk!” 
“We can talk,” said the Tiger-lily, “When there’s anybody worth talking to” (Carroll 
1982:137). 
 
Although speaking plants are admittedly absurd (other than in dreams), Carroll suggests 
that the possibility of communication is opened up if only “there’s somebody worth 
talking to”, or, as I expressed in a jotting from The 100 Page Diary58, if we are only willing 
to hear. 
 
I do not know… 
The scream is 
muted  
barely heard 
Speak up  
Speak up! 
SPEAK UP  
I can’t hear  
I CAN’T HEAR 
I can’t HE(A)R (Cruise 2007). 
 
But it is not only the languages animals may (or may not) use that are of concern, it is also 
the language we use to analyse the human-animal divide that colours the way we perceive 
the non-human other. As with feminism, so too do grammatical structures impact on 
perceptions and prejudices in speciesism. The use of diminutives such as girl (for woman) 
was an example irksome to feminists. Hélène Cixous in particular draws attention to the 
patriarchal nature of symbolic language, what Deleuze and Guattari would call 
“arborescent” order. Patriarchal language corrals experiences in a way that does not fit 
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58 Wilma Cruise The 100 Page Diary (2006– 2007). Pen and ink with various media, 100 x A3 
pages. 
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the subjective nature of female experience. It is also inadequate in dealing with the nature 
of the human-animal interface. 
 
 In speciesism, as with feminism, language plays a role as a diminishing and reductive 
force. This manifests itself in the use of pronouns. Pronouns such as “who”, “she”, “he”, 
favour the human subject, while “it” and “which” diminish and objectify the animal. Marc 
Bekoff points out that if one had to ask the question, “Who is for dinner?” instead of 
“What's for dinner?” everything changes. We become aware that the “beef” on our plates 
was once a living cow – a sentient being capable of feeling pain and pleasure (Bekoff 
2016). “The cow who came for dinner”, causes a shift in awareness from something that is 
intended to satisfy our appetites to a consciousness of a once living, now dead, animal.   
 
When Alice sat down to her inaugural queenly feast in Through the Looking Glass she was 
presented with a joint of mutton. Alice looked at it rather anxiously as she never had to 
carve a joint before (Carroll 1982:225). 
 
“You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg of mutton,” said the Red Queen. 
“Alice  – Mutton: Mutton – Alice.” The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a little 
bow to Alice:  and Alice returned the bow, not knowing whether to be frightened or 
amused. 
“May I give you a slice?” she said, taking up the knife and fork, and looking from one 
Queen to the other. 
“Certainly not,” the Red Queen said, very decidedly: “it isn't etiquette to cut anyone 
you've been introduced to. Remove the joint!” (Carroll 1982:225).  
  
Via a polite introduction, the mutton had become a “who”. Bekoff would approve! 
 
Jane Goodall, the chimpanzee researcher, was advised to refer to the chimpanzees as 
“it’s” instead of “she’s” or “he’s” (Safina 2015:140). Her first scientific paper was returned 
because she named the animals rather than numbered them. By personalising the apes 
through naming and the use of “human” pronouns, she committed what was considered a 
scientific fault, one that compromised the purported objectivity of her research.  
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Notably in Kafka’s Metamorphosis, when Gregor Samsa wakes up to discover that he has 
turned into a loathsome cockroach his family rebuff him and lock him in his room out of 
sight of the lodgers. It is only his sister, Grethe, who is prepared to champion his cause. 
But, finally, she too comes to a point when she rejects Gregor and, along with her family, 
she decides to get rid of the unsavoury creature. At this point in the narrative she swaps 
pronouns. She no longer refers to Gregor as “him” but “it” as if emphasising the absolute 
alterity of the insect that was once her mentor and brother. (Gregor obligingly dies before 
his sister can carry out her threat.)  
 
Language not only harbours prejudice within its structure, it also controls our perception 
of the world in the provision of descriptive terms, the supply of which on occasions can be 
impoverished. As Carl Safina observes, our understanding of the animals’ vocal 
repertoires is circumscribed by the words we use describe their utterances.  For example, 
“bark” or “howl” is insufficient in describing the range of dog vocalisations (Safina 
2015:90). A dog barking to go out of a door sounds different to the same dog barking at 
another dog on the other side of the door. We do not have words to describe these 
differences in pitch and intensity, which we clearly do understand and interpret correctly 
(Safina 2015:90). By limiting our vocabulary we limit our ability to hear the nuances of dog 
(and other species) language. “[W]hen it comes to other animals, we harbour no 
vocabulary other than the crudest words…” (Safina 2015:83).  
 
The choice of metaphor likewise governs reception of meaning.  Elizabeth Costello, noted 
in her first lecture on the lives of animals, that the image of the slaughterhouse is 
habitually evoked in descriptions of the Nazi death camps of WWII: “They went like sheep 
to the slaughter”. “They died like animals” (Coetzee 1999:64). Costello adopts the simile 
to hammer home the comparison between modern abattoirs and the death camps. “Let 
me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty and killing 
which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is 
an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, poultry, live-stock 
ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them” (Coetzee 1999:65)59. Costello is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 The figure of the Holocaust is a point Derrida also makes (see Chapter Two). 
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unapologetic about her use of such an extreme metaphor. She has chosen her language 
carefully even though she had at her disposal the cool rational means of philosophical 
discourse. 
  
Such a language is available to me, I know. It is the language of Aristotle and Porphyry, 
of Augustine and Aquinas, of Descartes and Bentham, of, in our day, Mary Midgeley 
and Tom Regan… But the fact is, if you had wanted someone to come here and 
discriminate for you between mortal and immortal souls, or between rights and duties, 
you would have called in a philosopher, not a person whose sole claim to your 
attention is to have written stories about made-up people (Coetzee 1999:66). 
 
Language and logic are central to the Alice tales and the games Carroll plays with his 
speaking creatures form a large (and significant) part of the narratives, especially in 
Through the Looking Glass. In this story, Carroll not only demonstrates his interest in 
naming and the meaning of words, but he extends his enquiries (via Alice of course) 
into the realm of communication. Here Alice attempts to communicate with her kitten but 
is frustrated by her apparent lack of language. Upon wakening from her dream, she finds 
that the Red Queen has transmogrified into Dinah’s black kitten. 
 
Your Red Majesty shouldn’t purr so loud,” Alice said, rubbing her eyes, and addressing 
the kitten respectfully, yet with some severity. “You woke me out of oh! such a nice 
dream; and you’ve been all along with me, Kitty – all through the Looking-Glass world. 
Did you know it dear?” It is a very inconvenient habit of kittens (Alice had once made 
the remark) that, whatever you say to them, they always purr. “If they would only purr 
for ‘yes’ and mew for ‘no,’ or any rule of that sort,” she had said, “so that one could 
keep up a conversation! But how can one talk to a person if they always say the same 
thing?”  (Carroll 1982:231). 
 
Derrida accuses Alice of making a “very Cartesian response” to her kitten’s purr. This is 
surely a critique of the understanding of language as a system of fixed binary oppositions 
in which terms are constant: “An argument will only be cogent and convincing if in each of 
its occurrences the word in use retains a fixed meaning with the same name and same 
reference frame for the same kind of object or idea” (Patten 2008). Derrida’s central 
concept différence would a priori challenge this view and instead draw attention to the 
instability and constant deferment of meaning (Richards 2008:16–17). But it is in the black 
kitten’s response that Derrida’s criticism lies: She “doesn’t reply, not really, not ever, that is 
what Alice concludes. Exactly like Descartes” (Derrida 2008:8). “…[I]sn’t Alice’s incredulity 
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rather incredible?” he asks (2008:9).  Derrida’s Cartesian accusation is arguably 
unwarranted. Apart from the historicism of his claim, Carroll’s assertion that “If they would 
only purr for ‘yes’ and mew for ‘no’”, might merely function as an instruction to his young 
readers on the workings of language in a pre-deconstruction era or, (and this is more 
likely), is ironically intended. It all “comes down to knowing not whether the animal 
speaks, but whether one can know what respond means” (Derrida 1995:9. First emphasis 
mine).  But surely that is the point. Does the animal speak (say something) within its 
moment of response? What Derrida’s cat is saying to him is no clearer than the black 
kitten’s purr is to Alice! At that moment, during the visual exchange between philosopher 
and animal, what was Derrida’s ordinary little cat saying? As Haraway points out, Derrida 
failed to indulge in cat-human behavioural semiotics and thereby stepped back from the 
abyss of a true encounter with an(other) animal (2008:21). Not knowing anything more 
about his cat he retreated to the safety of his own philosophical canon. He fell back on a 
philosophical argument returning in a circular fashion to the word: “The question of the 
animal response has as its stakes the letter, the literality of a word, sometimes what the 
word word means literally” (Derrida 2008:8). 
 
When Derrida accused Carroll (via Alice) of being “Cartesian”, he failed to recognise a 
fellow traveler who, in spite of a separation of a century or so, shares his penchant for 
wordplay. Both writers investigate language through illusions, puns, word games and 
neologisms. Charles Dodgson, alias Lewis Carroll, is no stranger to language that has a 
slippery, tenuous relationship to meaning. Within the matrix of the children’s tales he 
plays with words and logical conundrums. In the Queens’ lesson in Through the Looking 
Glass, the Red and White Queens thought to instruct Alice on arithmetic. What follows 
leaves her bemused not least of all because the meaning of the terms, “addition”, 
“subtraction” and “division” seem arbitrarily to shift and change. Detractors of Derrida 
would appreciate Alice’s frustration that words do not always mean what they seem to 
mean, as the following extract demonstrates. 
 
“She ca’n’t do Subtraction,” said the White Queen, “Can you do Division? Divide a loaf 
by a knife – what’s the answer to that? 
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“I suppose –” Alice was beginning, but the Red Queen answered for her. “Bread-and-
butter of course. Try another Subtraction sum. Take a bone from a dog: what 
remains?” 
Alice considered. “The bone wouldn’t remain, of course, if I took it – and the dog 
wouldn’t remain: it would come to bite me – and I am sure I shouldn’t remain!” 
“Then you think nothing would remain?” said the Red Queen. 
“I think that’s the answer.” 
“Wrong, as usual,” said the Red Queen: “the dog’s temper would remain.” 
“But I don’t see how–” 
“Why look here!” the Red Queen cried, “The dog would lose its temper, wouldn’t it?”  
“Perhaps it would,” Alice replied cautiously.  
“Then if the dog went away, its temper would remain!” the Queen exclaimed 
triumphantly.  
Alice said as gravely as she could, “They might go different ways.” But she couldn’t 
help thinking to herself, “What dreadful nonsense we are talking!” (Carroll 1982:217–
218). 
 
The unhinging of words and objects from their normal contexts allows for a kind of 
madness, or in Alice’s words, a “dreadful nonsense”. The destabilisation of meaning 
makes the world a less sure place as Alice found in the upside down world of dreamland. 
Her encounter with the nursery rhyme character of Humpty Dumpty, a fanciful creature, 
half man, half egg who appears in her daydream in Through the Looking Glass is the 
quintessential example of nonsensical word play. To Alice’s considerable frustration she 
always finds herself on the losing end of Humpty Dumpty’s arguments. She has no riposte 
to his form of irrational logic. 
 
“Why do you sit out here all alone?” asked Alice, not wishing to begin an argument. 
“Why, because there’s nobody with me!” cried Humpty Dumpty. “Did you think I didn’t 
know the answer to that?” (Carroll 1982:180). 
 
There is no answer to that! 
 
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’”, Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled 
contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down 
argument for you!’”  
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice objected.  
“When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”. 
“The question is”, said Alice, “Whether you can make words mean so many different 
things”.  
“The question is”, said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all”.  
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything... (Carroll 1982:184). 
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Humpty Dumpty veers between insisting on the literal meaning of words to claiming that 
they can mean anything he wants them to mean. The irony is that his haughty assertion 
does contain a seed of truth. Words do mean only what the master says they mean at any 
one time, as Derrida demonstrated nearly a century after Lewis Carroll wrote this! He said 
that “a never-ending chain of signifiers” prevents closure to the process of interpreting 
signs. The “signified… is never total, never complete” (Richards 2008:16). 
 
Dunn and McDonald identify Humpty Dumpty’s arguments as a form of eristic logic, which 
they define as follows: “Eristic logic turns its back on the intellectual virtue of honest 
inquiry and uses thought to fend off reality and paper over facts rather than open them up 
for exploration” (2010:73). On the basis of these distinctions Dunn and McDonald 
differentiate between tolerable and intolerable logic in Wonderland. The natural universe 
in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass seems to offer the tolerable, but the 
creatures themselves are intolerably illogical (2010:62). Although the physical world in 
Wonderland and on the other side of the looking glass, is absurd and nonsensical, it is still 
subject to the laws of possibility and logic. As Dunn and McDonald, quoting Hume point 
out, “The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible” (2010:73). If you eat one side of 
the mushroom you grow bigger and if you eat the other side, you shrink. That is, although 
things might be improbable, they are still logically possible: like a baby turning into a pig 
as it does in the Pig and Pepper chapter in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll 
1982:62). But what is forever impossible and cannot be imagined is something like a 
square circle – (or a sensible response to Humpty Dumpty).  
 
Taking my cue from Lewis Carroll, I too use words to illustrate the failure of words to 
convey truths. To date I have used the absurdities and aphorisms from Alice in 
Wonderland and Alice through the Looking Glass in prints, the diary pages and paintings. 
This extract from the poem Jabberwocky is the most famous example of nonsense: “Twas 
brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe: All mimsy were the 
borogoves, and the mome raths outgrabe” (Carroll 1983:134). Carroll’s texts are littered 
with conundrums. “Do cats eat bats? Do bats eat cats?” (Carroll 1982:19) or “What is the 
difference between and flamingo and mustard?” (Both bite except mustard isn’t a bird) 
(Carroll 1982:84). In a discussion on arithmetic the Mock Turtle enumerates its different 
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branches: Ambition, Distraction, Uglification and Derision (Carroll 1982:90), which is a 
play on words for addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. I have also scrawled 
text on the walls of the galleries, providing a link between the images in the frames, the 
sculptures on the floor and the original tales. The words do not explain the images nor do 
they make (logical) sense suggesting the failure of language in the face of animal-human 
interaction – they make visible a threatening madness. As Alice said about Jabberwocky, 
“Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas – only I don’t exactly know what they are!” 
(Carroll 1982:134).  
 
*** 
 
I approached the 2013/14 exhibition, Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? with 
these issues as a basis for my visual explorations. But it is important to re-iterate that the 
artworks are not illustrations of the concepts nor are they meant as didactic 
representations. Much like the recognition that the languages we use to communicate 
with animals are not logocentric and reasoned, so too does my visual language occupy a 
parallel universe. In my art, my aim is to make the inchoate and barely apprehended in 
some way visible.  
 
The title of the exhibition, Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? is a phrase gleaned 
from the Lobster Quadrille.  
 
“Will you walk a little faster?” said a whiting to a snail, 
“There’s a porpoise close behind us, and his treading on my tail 
See how eagerly the lobsters and turtles all advance! 
They are waiting on the shingle – will you come and join the dance? 
Will you, wo’n’t you, will you, wo’n’t you, will you join the dance?  
Will you, wo’n’t you, will you, wo’n’t you, wo’n’t you join the dance? (Carroll 1982:93). 
 
The invitation to dance is an implicit encouragement to the viewers of the exhibition to 
join the game. They are invited to unravel the conundrums and the absurdities contained 
within Carroll’s tales and re-interpreted in the artworks of The Alice Sequence. It is up to 
the viewer to make the connection between thinking, speaking humankind, as 
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exemplified by Alice, and the non-speaking other – even if it is, as in the case of Humpty 
Dumpty, an imaginary (speaking) anthropomorphic egg!  
 
In Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? I explore in three-dimensional form the 
character of Humpty Dumpty. In this series of artworks, Humpty Dumpty’s bad tempered 
persona is roughly modelled into a bulbous ceramic shape. Named H.D. Arnoldus, he is 
half the absurd anthropomorphic egg of the nursery rhyme and half the mischievous imp 
that was said to sit on my shoulder as a child (Figs 4.2 & 4.3).  
 
 
Fig 4.2. Wilma Cruise H.D. Arnoldus (Dancing 2) (2013), Ceramic, 103 cm.   
Fig 4.3. Wilma Cruise H.D. Arnoldus (seated) (2013), Ceramic on found object, 87 cm. 
(Photographed by Adam Cruise). 
 
 
He is depicted in corporeal form perched on a log, legs crossed. Elsewhere he is upside 
down, or dancing, his spherical form precariously balanced on his underdeveloped legs. 
As an indicator of his vanity, he is shod in a pair of bright red ballet slippers. He also 
appears in two dimensions in a number of diary pages, in which I explore the role of 
words and language in the game implied by the invitation to join the dance. The 
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sculptures were produced in 2013. In 2016, nearly three years later, they were the 
inspiration for a suite of collaged drawings, entitled The HD Series (Figs 4.4 and 4.5).  
 
 
Fig 4.4. Wilma Cruise A Mouth Full of Teeth (2016). Collage, 120 x 87 cm. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.5. Wilma Cruise Chit Chat (2016). Collage, 87 x 120 cm. 
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Modeled on the conflation of Humpty Dumpty and the mythic Arnoldus, they evolved a 
personality reminiscent of Alfred Jarry's Ubu Roi. Ubu Roi, written in 1888, is “a satirical 
and grotesque expression of the way in which arbitary power engenders madness” 
(Christov-Bakargiev 1998:18). Although Alfred Jarry was satirising a political situation, I 
am more inclined to see HD’s madness as of the kind that William Kentridge used in his 
first manifestation of Ubu60,  that is an interpretation free from any “predefined ideological 
position” (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:119).  Thus, HD does not represent any outrage vis à 
vis speciescism for example.  Instead, his madness is of the confused nonsensical sort, 
expressed by the eponymous Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll's tale. In most of the 2016 
drawings HD is represented in the company of rats. They run over his feet, peer into his 
mouth, or sit on his head (Figs 4.6 and 4.7). In one drawing HD exclaims, “Oh my word!” 
(Fig 4.7.). This phrase not only describes HD’s state of mind, but indicates the importance 
of the word, literally the word, (and its failure), that I emphasise in my research into the 
animal question. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6. Wilma Cruise Rattus Rattus (2016). Collage, 70 x 100 cm. 
Fig 4.7 Wilma Cruise Oh My Word! (2016). Collage, 70 x 100 cm. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 The animated film Ubu tells the Truth (1997) is less polemical than the subsequent 
theatre production Ubu and the Truth Commission (1997) (Christov-Bakargiev 1998:118). 
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The rats can be read as a cipher for animal kind in general. As one of the most maligned 
species on the planet they are not even accorded animal-rights protection under USA 
legal system. They are bred specifically for laboratory experimentation where they can be 
abused beyond the reach of the law. Outside the laboratory, and, barring a few 
household pets, rats are perceived as harbingers of death and pestilence. Their 
threatened, misunderstood status stands for animal kind in general – and Humpty 
Dumpty, armless and therefore lacking agency, represents confused humankind. But this 
interpretation is of necessity post hoc and does not describe the playfulness that defined 
the studio practice of creating the persona of HD. In 2016, late in the Alice series, I 
created the last figure in the suite of sculptural HD’s. Painted blue and balanced on a pair 
of silver ballet slippers, this absurd figure refuses to reveal its meaning.  His clumsy form is 
neither human nor animal, nor does it even suggest, like Swanepoel’s “Little Creatures”, a 
conflation of the two.  Instead I offer the interpretation that HD Dennis (Fig 4.8.) is a 
physical manifestation of my attempts to unravel the animal question. As such the figure 
gives material form to an inchoate but frustrated desire for clarity and resolution. 
 
 
Fig 4.8. Wilma Cruise H.D. Dennis (2016), Ceramic and steel, 228 cm. (Photographed by 
Pierre van der Spuy). 
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That the Alice tales provide a fecund metaphor for a post-humanist reading on the 
question of eating animals can be illustrated with reference to the tale of the Walrus and 
the Carpenter. This poem, recited by Tweedledee, becomes a fable about the human 
animal’s greed and duplicity when it comes to eating (other) animals. The protagonists in 
the poem, the anthropomorphised Walrus and his human companion, the Carpenter, trick 
a group of young oysters to come for a walk along the “briny beach”. They are invited to 
feast.  
 
‘Now if you’re ready, Oysters dear, 
We can begin to feed’. 
  
‘But not on us!’ 
The oysters cried, 
Turning a little blue.  
‘After such kindness, that would be 
A dismal thing to do!’  
‘The night is fine,’ the Walrus said. ‘Do you admire the view?’ 
 
‘It was so kind of you to come! 
And you are very nice!’  
The Carpenter said nothing but 
‘Cut us another slice. 
I wish you were not quite so deaf –  
I’ve had to ask you twice!’  
 
‘It seems a shame,’ the Walrus said, 
‘To play them such a trick. 
After we’ve brought them out so far,  
And made them trot so quick!’  
The Carpenter said nothing but 
‘The butter’s spread too thick!’ 
 
‘I weep for you,’ the Walrus said: 
‘I deeply sympathize.’ 
With sobs and tears he sorted out  
Those of the largest size, 
Holding his pocket-handkerchief 
Before his streaming eyes. 
 
‘O Oysters,’ said the Carpenter, 
‘You’ve had a pleasant run! 
Shall we be trotting home again?’ 
But answer came there none – 
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And this is scarcely odd, because  
They’d eaten every one (Carroll 1982:161–62). 
 
The Walrus can easily be seen as a personification of the hypocrisy of the couch activist 
who complains about animal abuse and argues for animal rights, yet, unthinkingly eats 
pork for dinner!   
 
In Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2014) the framed A4 size diary pages were 
hung sequentially, functioning as a dada rail along the walls of the galleries (Fig 4.9).  
 
 
 
Fig 4.9. Wilma Cruise Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2014) Installation view. 
 
 
Viewers were invited to partake in the games suggested by the juxtaposition of drawings, 
extracts and my notes. One such conversation depicted in a number of diary pages, was 
Alice's discussion with Humpty Dumpty. “When I make a word do a lot of work like that…I 
pay it extra… . You see it's like a portmanteau — there are two meanings packed up into 
one word” (Carroll 1982: 184-185). As Dunn and McDonald note, “[T]he arguments that 
go on in these curious worlds are something [Alice] never can win — because the 
creatures are constantly asserting, in one form or another, that two and one equals 
something other than three!” (Dunn and McDonald 2010:67). This is aptly illustrated in 
Alice’s conversation with Humpty Dumpty, about naming. 
 
“It's very provoking to be called an egg...” 
“My name is Alice…” 
“It's a stupid name… what does it mean?” 
“Must a name mean something? 
“Of course it must — my name means the shape I am and a good handsome shape it is 
too” (Carroll 1982:180). 
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Claiming that his name means a “good handsome shape” is patently absurd. As post-
structuralist thinkers have pointed out, the signifier and the signified are not intricately, 
nor necessarily, interdependent. Yet, ironically, the name, “Humpty Dumpty”, if not 
handsome, has some hundred and fifty years later, come to mean a round egg-like body 
along with all the implications of pomposity and absurdity. Thus do the meanings of 
words shift and change. A note juxtaposed with a drawing of Humpty Dumpty reads: ”A 
postmodern Humpty”, and then: “Meet HD Arnoldus”, thereby drawing attention to the 
conflation of Humpty Dumpty with the personification of my childhood temper. In this way 
Humpty Dumpty becomes part of my personal ontology. 
 
But it is not only in the diary pages that I explore the word and its implications. I also 
exploit ambiguity and double entendre in a suite of large mixed media drawings entitled 
Decline a Mouse I, II and III (Fig 4.10) made for Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? 
 
 
 
Fig 4.10. Wilma Cruise Decline a Mouse I, II & III (2013). Mixed media on paper, 
155 x 90 cm each. 
 
 
 I based these drawings on Alice’s encounter with the mouse in the pool of tears. 
Swimming around with the creature she is confused as to the proper way in which to 
address it. Remembering a Latin declension in her sister’s schoolbook, “A mouse – of a 
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mouse – to a mouse...” She addresses him thus: “O Mouse!” she says but gets no response 
(Carroll 1982:29). I play on the idea of declension in Decline a Mouse I, II and III; the pun 
suggesting that we have refused the mouse. I suggest that what we have denied it is 
Singer’s notion of equal moral consideration, or, if one prefers a Derridean approach, the 
possibility of the mouse, (specifically Alice’s mouse), of being a singular unsubstitutable 
creature that deserves respect beyond the condemnation of the generalised and 
ultimately reductive term, “animal”. 
 
The figure of Alice in three sculptural manifestations is central to the exhibition, Will you, 
won’t you, will you join the dance? (Fig. 4.11 see also Fig 2.18 in Chapter 2).  
 
 
 
Fig 4.11. Wilma Cruise Biggest Alice (2012). Ceramic on steel base, 182 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). 
 
 
The “Alice’s” stand apart and isolated from the other figures – the dancing HD Arnoldus’s – 
as if emphasising the isolation and aloneness Alice felt in her dream world peopled by 
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strange and incomprehensible others. The Alice’s are armless. Neither do they have facial 
features other than small scratches to indicate the position of the eyes. Their bodies are 
simplified, their size distorted and their necks elongated. The shift in scale and proportion 
indicates the illogicality of the world Alice finds herself in down the rabbit hole. The 
subtitle of the works indicates her conundrum – Big, Bigger, Biggest.  It might just as easily 
have been Small, Smaller, Smallest. In her dream world, the meaning of “big” and “small” 
has ceased to have relevance.  
 
Like Lewis Carroll and Derrida, I use a (visual) language that allows for a multiplicity of 
readings which mimic animal-human communication in its knowing unknowability. My 
works, like Cixous’ writing are made affectively. “Crawling with secrets” (Derrida 1994), the 
viewer, and I as the artist-as-viewer, have to decipher them. My sculptures lack the usual 
means to communicate either orally or gesturally. Like the creatures in the carriage they 
can only “think” their thoughts and hope to find an echo in the viewers. I offer no single 
definitive interpretation, but invite layers of response, taking due note that the language 
used to describe the response is of necessity imperfect in capturing the reality. Meaning is 
relative and depends on who is using the words. In our world as well as the upside down 
world of dreamland, words, (or artworks), do not always mean what they are meant to as 
Humpty Dumpty claims. But this does not necessarily follow that animals and humans 
cannot communicate. In the next chapter, I offer a suggestion that communication 
between human and animal, and animal and animal, is of a material semiotic nature, one 
that has been largely ignored by human hubris. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Take a Bow 
 
 
Fig 5.1. Wilma Cruise Take a Bow The Caucus – Puppy (2011- 2012). Bronze (Edition 10), 
45 x 84 x 33 cm. Pup – Zara (2013 – 2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. 
(Photographed by Nicolene Swanepoel). 
 
 
 
 
 
Those who insisted that language is unique to humans, …simply raised the bar on 
what counted as language (Singer 2011).  
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Exhibitions 
Menagerie at Tokara: Musings (2014) 61 
 
In this chapter I look at behaviourism and its rejection of imaginative empathy or 
anthropomorphism, a stance which served to advance the Cartesian model of the 
separation of human and animal with the concomitant distancing that allowed for animal 
abuse in the form of factory farming and experimentation.  I question the language 
experiments conducted on chimpanzees in the USA in the early '70's and argue that the 
failure of these experiments was due to the refusal to impute (at least experimentally) an 
emotional life to the animals. After Donna Haraway, I offer a suggestion that 
communication between human and animal and animal and animal is of a material 
semiotic nature. Such is the mock bow used in dog play. As is my wont, I address the 
problem via the art object relying on the work exhibited on Menagerie at Tokara: Musings, 
near Cape Town, South Africa in 2014. 
 
 
 
The question of whether animals can speak was largely deferred when Jeremy Bentham 
asked, “...the question is not can they reason? Nor can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” 
(Bentham 2007:8). His query drew attention away from language and the interior life of 
animals and focused it instead on the question of suffering. Just what suffering is, is left to 
the human to decide; a debate, which forms a large part of the discourse in the animal 
rights movement. As Adam Cruise has noted “suffering” revolved around defining the 
meaning of the word in relation to a variety of species of animal. Does a fly suffer in the 
same way as an elephant, for example? 
 
Vulnerability, or sentience for wont of a better noun, as an ethical consideration sends 
us careering down the wrong path toward a ceaseless debate as to nature, extent, and 
moral weight of what suffering is.  This has led to an entire field of inquiry focused on 
determining whether animals can suffer and to what extent this can be confirmed 
empirically. What such a question merely highlights is that empirical, biological and 
ontological findings on sentience only lure animal theorists to continue to redraw the 
same insuperable line between those beings included and those excluded from an 
ethic (Cruise A. 2012:2). 
 
But what happens if we were to return to the unanswered part of Bentham’s quote, the 
questions that Descartes so famously answered in the negative: “Can they reason?” “Can 
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61 Menagerie at Tokara: Musings. The sculpture garden at Tokara Wine Estate, 16 March to 
October. Curated by Ilse Schemers. 
!
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they talk?”. These questions have been banned by scientific and philosophical discourse 
up until recently, when the burgeoning interest in the “animal question” re-opened the 
debate. Previously, under the accusation of “anthropomorphism”, any investigation into 
the interiority of the animal mind, consciousness and awareness of self, was prohibited62.  
 
Arguably the Cartesian, mechanistic view, reached its apogee in the behaviourist 
movement of the mid twentieth century. Behaviourism was, inter alia a reaction to the 
psychoanalytical models of psychology of Freud and Jung, specifically claiming that the 
id, the ego and the collective unconscious, were not identifiable and measurable in 
empirical terms and therefore the effects, even existence, of these entities was in 
question. Behaviourism had a philosophical underpinning in the theories of logical 
positivism, an approach associated chiefly with philosophers of the Vienna School (Macey 
2000:232). Logical positivists rejected the metaphysics of traditional philosophy and 
based their thinking on pragmatic principles of science and logic. In these terms 
philosophy’s task was “to reduce statements to their empirical components and to verify 
their truth claims” (Macey 2000:232). Behaviourism and associate “sciences” were 
anchored in the real world where cause and effect were verifiable and measurable. The 
research methodology was based on the operational definition63 of behaviour defined by 
the observable (and measurable) elements of stimulus and response in managed 
experimental conditions.  
 
The stimulus/response model of behaviour was initially demonstrated by Pavlov in his 
experiments with classical conditioning64. This was followed in mid century with B.F. 
Skinner’s experiments with rats in a “Skinner box”65 that demonstrated the principles of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 In 1993 Time magazine announced that anthropomorphism is no longer a sin, that it’s okay now 
to say that animals think, hope, are puzzled, have expectations, are disappointed, even, for some, 
make their own little plans in a time scheme of their own (Hearne 2007). 
63 Like logical positivism, operationalism emphasises close contact with experiment as necessary 
to objective discourse, but focuses on concepts rather than statements, seeking to safeguard them 
against meaninglessness by defining them solely with reference to precisely defined experimental 
operations (Honderich 1995:635).  
64 Pavlov found that a dog, his experimental subject, would spontaneously salivate in reaction to 
the stimulus of a bell once bell and food had been paired a few times.  
65 Developed by B. F. Skinner, a Skinner box is a chamber that contains a bar or key that an animal 
can press or manipulate in order to obtain food or water as a type of reinforcement. The Skinner 
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“operant conditioning”. Bracketed by these iconic examples, the behaviourist approach 
was to view behaviours in reductive terms without any need to impute interior processes, 
either physiological or mental to the behaving subject. Skinner’s demonstration of the 
principles of operant conditioning became applicable in a variety of different spheres 
including the treatment of phobias, education and specifically the training of animals in 
which manifestation it is still operant [sic!]. Donna Haraway, for one, acknowledges a 
contemporary place for behaviourism in the training of dogs and other animals. She says,  
 
“Throughout my academic life… I had looked on behaviourism as a vapid science at 
best, hardly biology at all, and an ideological, determinist discourse at heart… . All of a 
sudden Cayenne [her dog] and I became subject to a knowledge practice I had 
despised. I had to understand that behaviourism is not my caricature of a mechanistic 
pseudoscience … but a flawed, historically situated, and fruitful approach to material 
semiotic questions in the fleshy world” (Haraway 2008: 223).  
 
In terms of the radical behaviourism of Skinner, behaviours are broken down into 
molecular components. Each unit of behaviour can then be governed by a system of 
rewards (reinforcements) and less frequently punishments. (Punishment is usually a case 
of withholding rewards to decrease the occurrence of behaviour and is to be 
distinguished from negative reinforcement66). Once each unit of behaviour is identified, 
its frequency and strength of occurrence, or disappearance, can be controlled by external 
stimuli. 
 
This extreme determinist view of (animal) behaviour perversely confirmed the Cartesian 
view of animal-as-machine, a point of view supported by Lacan who also claimed that the 
animal is only capable of reaction while the human responds (Derrida 2008:120). Lacan’s 
differentiation effectively places animal and human in opposition to each other. That is, in 
the behaviourist model, animals are biological subjects, subjected to pre-determined 
stimuli to which they react in predictable and pre-determined ways. What this meant for 
the study of animals is that the animal was reduced to a bio-automaton.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
box also had a device that recorded each response provided by the animal as well as the unique 
schedule of reinforcement that the animal was assigned (Cherry n.d.). 
66 In negative reinforcement, a response or behavior is strengthened by stopping, removing, or 
avoiding a negative outcome or aversive stimulus (Cherry n.d). 
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Added into this mix were the then new ideas of Konrad Lorenz in the embryonic field of 
Ethology67. Lorenz wrote inter alia about the imperatives of instinct. Using an example of 
imprinting in geese, he demonstrated that an animal’s reaction to specific stimuli at 
specific time of its life was genetically coded and thus pre-determined (Lorenz n.d). 
 
Does the animal speak? Does it think? What is the nature of its thought? These are the 
conundrums that the behaviourists refused to face. By raising the spectre of 
anthropomorphism, they drew ever further away from engaging in a meaningful sense 
with (other) animals. But, as Berger says, it was anthropomorphism with its projection of 
imaginative empathy that connected us to the animals and kept us in (empathetic) 
proximity to them (Berger 2007:254). Derrida concurs. Although he refused to (over) 
interpret what his cat was saying to him, he nevertheless rejected the “asinine” alternative 
of not trying to imagine the world from her point of view, a position that would have 
foreclosed sympathy and compassion.  
 
Forbidding myself thus to assign, interpret or project… that which would consist in 
suspending one’s compassion and in depriving the animal of every power of 
manifestation, of the desire to manifest to me anything at all, and even to manifest to 
me in some way its experience of my language of my words and of my nudity (Derrida 
2008:18). 
 
Engaging with his cat Derrida felt himself looking deep into the eyes of God. “I hear the 
cat or God ask itself, ask me: Is he going to call me, is he going to address me?” The cat 
did this without “breathing a word” (Derrida 2008:118). Thus deprived of language, the 
animal is rendered mute and in its muteness there is a great sadness. OR as Derrida 
suggests in a classical deconstructive reversal, its sadness renders it mute (Derrida 
2008:19). Yet in spite of its silence, its lack of logos, Derrida admits to the possibility that 
the animal thinks. “The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps 
begins there” (Derrida 2008:29). Thinking about the animal’s thinking is the point. It is a 
leap into the territory banned from the Cartesians’ and behaviourists’ lexicon.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Konrad Lorenz along with Nikolaas Tinbergen is regarded as the founder of modern Ethology. 
Man Meets Dog was first published in English in 1954. 
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 In spite of the degree of engagement Derrida had with his cat, Haraway accuses him of 
not getting down and dirty with her. She says that he avoided the messy co-
entanglements of the semiotics of cat behaviour. Baldly put, he did not listen to what his 
cat was saying or how she was saying it, if at all. Yet as if anticipating this kind of criticism, 
Derrida says that it would be too easy to be “overinterpreting what the cat might be thus 
saying to me, in its own way, what it might be suggesting or simply signifying in a 
language of mute traces, that is to say without words” (Derrida 2008:18. Emphasis mine). 
Thus while Derrida points to the imperfection of communication between species, he 
acknowledges that a non-linguistic exchange occurred and even if he did not know the 
precise nature of it, some information was transferred between man and animal. In spite 
of Haraway's criticism, something was communicated between him and his cat, but just 
what it was defies the structure and order of symbolic language. 
 
Carroll explored the notion of nonverbal communication in Through the Looking Glass. In 
the railway carriage, Alice decides that “there’s no use in speaking” to her fellow animal 
travellers, since the animals all echoed her unspoken thoughts with their own. “They all 
thought in chorus,” notes Carroll. Carroll almost immediately retracts this radical notion of 
the transference of information other than by the spoken word, by saying, “(I hope you 
understand what thinking in chorus means – for I confess that I don’t)”. Retreating to his 
previous Cartesian position he asserts the centrality of symbolic language by saying, via 
Alice of course, “Language is worth a thousand pounds a word!” (Carroll 1982:147). 
 
Ann-Marie Tully calls this kind of mute knowing, “imaginative empathetic transposition” 
(Tully 2014:108). She derives this notion from Elizabeth Costello’s idea of sympathetic 
imagination, which is the ability to imagine yourself in the place of the other, even if the 
other is a non-human animal (Coetzee 1999:80). Costello proposes that sympathy, a 
faculty derived from the heart, allows one to imagine the being of another. She asks with 
reference to Nagel, “if we are capable of thinking our own death, why on earth should we 
not be capable of thinking our own way into the life of a bat?” (Coetzee 1999:79). This 
ability has everything to do with the subject and little to do with the object, “as we see at 
once when we think of the object not as a bat… but as another human being” (Coetzee 
1999:79). There are no limits, she maintains, to sympathetic imagining. "If I think my way 
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into the existence of a being that never existed, then I can think my way into the existence 
of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life” 
(Coetzee 1999:80).  
 
But what Costello is talking about is still communication from the human transposed and 
imagined onto the animal. It is a one-way street as it were. Where is the responding living 
animal in the abstract scenarios that Costello evokes? Haraway draws comparisons 
between Costello and another of Coetzee’s fictional characters, Bev Shaw, the volunteer 
animal caretaker in Disgrace, whose task is to euthanase condemned dogs. This duty she 
does with respect and regard for her charges, getting down and dirty with the sad 
business of killing them. In contrast, Costello seems to be locked into the abstractions of 
her lectures without engaging with actual animals in messy co-entanglements (Haraway 
2008:81). But Haraway’s accusation might also be, arguably, a touch unfair. Costello 
herself objects to the cold reason of the philosophers preferring the company of those 
who engage with the animals. “[I]f reason is what sets me part from the veal calf, then 
thank you but no thank you, I’ll talk to someone else” (Coetzee 1999:112).  Nevertheless, 
Haraway’s criticism points towards the necessity of multi-directional relationships between 
humans and (other) animals. Conceding the asymmetry of such relationships she 
advocates a response/response-abilty, post humanist (non-humanist) way of interacting in 
which “a relationship is crafted in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects, 
come into being… . If this structure of material-semiotic relating breaks down or is not 
permitted to be reborn, then nothing but objectification and oppression remains” 
(Haraway 2008:71). However, conceding emotional lives to animals comes with a caveat: 
anthropomorphism must be appropriate. In this respect Wendy Woodward’s concept of 
“relational epistemologies" is relevant (Woodward 2008:3).  
 
The concept of “relational epistemologies” is illustrated in the scene in Alice in 
Wonderland in which she encounters the mouse swimming in the pool of her own tears.  
Striking up a conversation with him, she suggests introducing him to her cat Dinah. She is 
completely puzzled by his terrified response. “Would you like cats if you were me?” he 
squeaks. The disjunction between two species-specific points of view encompasses 
Woodward’s concept of “relational epistemologies” in which a human’s concept of “cat” is 
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clearly different to that of a mouse’s. By acknowledging the difference in epistemologies, 
it opens the doors to an appropriate response to the reality of the other-animal. It allows 
for the projection of imaginative empathy into the mind of a mouse or even, as Elizabeth 
Costello maintains, into the mind of a bat (Coetzee 1999:79). 
 
Still the danger exists that empathy might be misplaced. Empathetic projection opens the 
trap for misplaced emotion, which Scruton describes as “the vice of sentimentality” 
(Scruton 2011:38). It is easy to impute human emotions onto animals, especially pets, but 
these sentimental feelings often arise out of a narcissistic engagement with the human-
self – the animal functioning as a convenient mirror. 
 
[S]entimentality … consumes our finite emotional energies in self-regarding ways and 
numbs us to realities. It atrophies our sympathies, by guiding them into worn and easy 
channels, and so destroys not only our ability to feel, but also our ability to help where 
help is needed and to take risks on behalf of higher things… . Sentimentalists turn a 
blind eye to unpleasant facts and their feelings skate rapidly over the rabbits, 
pheasants and chickens who must die at the fox's behest. Besides, if they were in 
charge, the fox would be gently dissuaded from its habits, in return for a bowl of 
canned meat, delivered each morning by some official manager of the countryside, 
wearing the uniform of the RSPCA (Scruton 2011:38).  
 
But, just how does one steer a course through empathy and sentimentality? It is a task 
worthy of Scylla and Charybdis. Kari Weil suggests using a “critical anthropomorphism”, 
one which is based not merely on an empathy with the other, but an empathy that 
recognises the irreducible, different and often inaccessible being of the other (Weil 
2012:220). In other words, humans might be able to imagine pain or pleasure in other 
animals, but cannot know their experience in any (human) meaningful terms. In this sense, 
Weil is not too different from Woodward in acknowledging the unique experience of the 
Other without having to project a self-centred human interpretation. 
 
Post behaviourist thinkers, such as Arluke and Sanders (2007:63–71), also suggest a 
middle ground between an outright condemnation of theorists who use anthropomorphic 
descriptions of behaviour and those (such as pet owners) who routinely make use of 
anthropomorphism for making sense of their animal’s behaviour. They see 
anthropomorphism as a useful tool, what they term a "heuristic device” (Arluke & Sanders 
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2007:67). Arguing that the privileging of language is overrated as the primary vehicle of 
cognition, they too advocate a critical anthropomorphism based on introspection, 
reasoning by analogy, interpretative analysis and intuition (Burghardt in Arluke and 
Sanders 2007:67).  
 
Similarly, Marc Bekoff, a cognitive ethologist, argues for a biocentrically anthropomorphic 
position (Bekoff 2007:72). Like Woodward, he maintains that it is necessary to approach 
animal behaviour from a species’ specific point of view. Thus, if studying dogs it is 
necessary to be “dog-o-centrist” (Bekoff 2007:74) and similarly for chimpanzees and so 
on. Bekoff has inter alia studied the evolution of morality in a variety of species particularly 
those that function in groups. Observing canids at play he has documented the operation 
of justice and fairness, concepts that can be inferred from a number of discrete behaviour 
patterns including “the bow”. The bow is a frequent behaviour in dog games – a 
behaviour I depicted in an installation which was exhibited on the exhibition Menagerie at 
Tokara: Musings in 2014 (Fig 5.3). The installation, Take a Bow, included two sculptures 
made two years apart – The Caucus – Puppy (2011–2012) and Pup Zara (2013–2014). The 
Caucus – Puppy is based on John Tenniel’s original illustration in Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland (Fig 5.2).  
 
 
Fig 5.2. John Tenniel “Puppy” (Carroll 1982:45). 
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Fig 5.3. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Puppy (2011–2012). Bronze (Edition 10), 45 x 84 x 33 
cm, Pup – Zara (2013–2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. (Photographed by 
Nicolene Swanepoel). 
 
 
In the book the puppy’s playful stance is an exhortation to Alice to join in a game of catch. 
But Alice has shrunk to a fraction of her normal size. She is terrified of the giant, 
rambunctious puppy and hides under a thistle bush. In spite of her terror, Alice 
recognizes that the puppy is only doing what puppies are meant to do. “And yet what a 
dear little puppy it was!” she says while planning her escape (Carroll 1983:46). Alice quite 
correctly reads the semiotics of the dog’s stance with its implicit invitation to play. At the 
exhibition at Tokara in 2014, the puppy similarly invites the other pup, Zara68, to play by 
assuming the position of a mock bow. Bemused, Zara watches his antics. It is just an 
instant before she leaps in to join the game – a moment that any observers of dog play will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Pup-Zara is a portrait of a neighbour’s dog. It is less a realistic portrait than an attempt to 
capture the essence of a singular, gentle canine being. 
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recognize69.  The placement of the two dogs occurred by chance. The two sculptures 
were in fact made some time apart but, once put in relational juxtaposition, the gap 
between became a conduit for communication and thereby became the raison d’être of 
the installation.  
 
Two key principles arise out of the placement of the two sculptures in close proximity. 
Firstly, that communication occurs between two subjects. This is so self evident as to be all 
but invisible. It leapt into startling view when the two animals were placed close to each 
other. The space between them was bridged and they entered into a communicative 
relationship. Secondly, the key to understanding communication between humans and 
other animals is grounded primarily in body and behaviour and not dependent on spoken 
language. As a concomitant to the other concepts, the embodied semiotics of the two 
dogs playing is not only understood by the dogs themselves but is also readable by other 
species such as humans. “Any dog who goes into a play bow is inviting you, 
understanding that you might engage… . Dogs and others don't play-bow to trees, chairs 
or other inanimate objects” (Safina 2015:248. Emphasis mine). 
 
Matthew Calarco, following Brian Massumi, suggests that “creativity and play may 
immanent to an animality itself” (Calarco 2015:62). “Play constitutes a zone in which the 
anthropological difference [between human and animal] is replaced by a more complex 
set of identities and differences” (Calarco 2015:62). Play thus becomes an activity in which 
human animal distinctions collapse and is probably the reason why human beings can 
read semiotics of animal games. 
 
A similar interaction was revealed in a work made contemporaneously with Pup Zara: 
Oracia – Watching the Hours (2013 – 2014) which, when placed in proximity with an earlier 
work, The Caucus – Rabbit (2012) (Fig 5.4) became an installation, which offered a 
different reading.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 I am aware of my conflation of the sculptures of dogs with real dogs, but for the purposes of the 
argument the depiction of the real and the real are the same thing.  
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Fig 5.4. Wilma Cruise Oracia – Watching the Hours (2013–2014). Ceramic. 176 cm. The 
Caucus – Rabbit (2012). Ceramic. 105 cm. (Photographed by Gavin Younge). 
 
 
Again the construction of the sculptures occurred over a year apart but once put in 
proximity with each other the mutual gaze became charged with unspoken 
communication. The rabbit’s eye is focused intently on featureless Oracia, who returns the 
look indicated only by the angle of her head. Both pairs of sculptures point to the 
embodiment of communication, ones that are not only species specific, but cross the 
species’ divide. 
 
Thus, if one has to regard language as more than the one spoken (to such good effect) by 
humans, the possibility exists of a multiplicity of species languages. Following Bekoff 
there would be, for example, “Dog” and “Horse”, two languages I am reasonably familiar 
with. But here is the caveat. Before we can assign language to animals it behooves us to 
define the term, for the blatant fact remains that logocentric language in all its ability for 
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infinite permutations and abstractions remains a uniquely human phenomenon. Noam 
Chomsky proposed the concept of an innate human ability for language – a hardwiring of 
what he calls a Universal Grammar. Chomsky's colleague, Marc Hauser, phrases it thus: 
 
As we and many other language scientists see it, the core competence for language is 
a biological capacity shared by all humans and distinguished by the central feature of 
discrete infinity—the capacity for unbounded composition of various linguistic objects 
into complex structures (Hauser et al. 2014). 
 
Basically this claim re-asserts human exceptionalism along the traditional divide of 
language – humans speak, animals are dumb70.  In order to refute Chomsky’s claim, 
attempts were made in the mid twentieth century to establish whether other non-human 
animals were able to use language in a way that moved beyond the simple use of signs. 
The most notable of these was the Nim Project71 in which a chimpanzee named Nim 
Chimsky was removed from his mother and brought up as a human infant on the 
assumption that on being exposed to the right environment he would pick up the 
rudiments of language. His name was a pun on “Noam Chomsky” and the experiment was 
intended to challenge Chomsky’s belief in the innate human ability to use language in all 
its infinite permutations. The chief experimenter, Herbert Terrace, had been trained by 
Skinner and, as a confirmed behaviourist, he hoped to prove that language, rather than 
being an inherent faculty, was learned (Hess 2008). Nim was clothed, fed from a bottle, 
potty trained and socialised like his young human siblings. Recognising the physiological 
limits of his ability to actually articulate speech, the experimenters trained Nim in 
American Sign Language (ASL). This physiological limitation is, in light of later events, 
strangely the only concession to species-otherness that the experimenters made. For all 
other intents and purposes Nim was treated as a human. Nim learned a long list of words 
and rudimentary sentences. In the process he bonded with his human mothers and his 
subsequent handlers, nearly all of whom developed an emotional attachment to him. In 
the long process of “humanising” him (my word), his emotional connection to his human 
handlers was overlooked by Terrace in favour of the rigours of data collecting for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 It is important to note that Chomsky, Hauser et al. later changed their minds about the 
uniqueness of human language, arguing for a much stronger continuity between animals and 
humans with respect to speech than previously believed (Haraway 2008:235). 
71 This discussion is based on a film Project Nim (2011) directed by James Marsh. 
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language experiment. Although Nim did learn ASL, Terrace, later claimed that Nim was 
only making conditioned responses to his teachers’ subtle and unconscious stimuli. This 
was - the Clever Hans effect in operation72. In other words, his language acquisition was a 
result of behaviourist-like conditioning and could not be compared to the acquisition of 
language in a human child who was presumably hardwired to learn language. But this 
observation was made only after the experiment had been terminated and not for reasons 
to do with the language experiment itself, but because Nim started behaving like the wild 
chimpanzee he actually was and on occasions bit his handlers severely enough to cause 
hospitalisation. What happened to Nim next was disastrous. Having decided that he was 
not fit for life as a speaking human after all, he was relegated to a caged existence, 
including for a time as a subject for medical experiments. He predictably descended into 
a depressive state. The terms of the experimental model that Herbert Terrace was 
operating under, precluded him from seeing what was before his eyes, namely that the 
communication that actually occurred between Nim and his handlers was an affective one 
based on bodily semiotics. Language was being spoken but not the logocentric one that 
Terrace focused on.  
 
We all wished that he could have learned. But it didn’t happen because it couldn’t 
happen, despite his and his relatives’ genetic similarity to humans and the aberrational 
tendency of some animal rights advocates to anthropomorphize simians as humans 
(Terrace 2011). 
 
 
The betrayal of Nim was profound since the experimenters refused to acknowledge his 
chimpanzeeness and his failure to learn language was blamed on his conditioned 
(unthinking) reaction to a range of stimuli. “…Nim Chimpsky, the chimpanzee that 
produced the only public corpus of data in all animal language studies, produced signs 
considerably below the expected degree of combinatorial diversity seen in two-year old 
children” (Yang, 2013), and with no understanding of syntactic structure or semantic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 The Clever Hans effect is a form of involuntary and unconscious cuing. The term refers to a 
horse (Kluge Hans, referred to in the literature as "Clever Hans") who responded to questions 
requiring mathematical calculations by tapping his hoof. “The horse was simply a channel through 
which the information the questioner unwittingly put into the situation was fed back to the 
questioner. The fallacy involved treating the horse as the source of the message rather than as a 
channel through which the questioner's own message is reflected back” (Hyman 1989:425) (see 
also Wynne and Udell 2013:11–14). 
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interpretation” (Hauser et al. 2014).  This is an outright condemnation of Nim who bore 
the burden of the failed experiment when it should have been the experimental model 
that was questioned. The experimenters ignored (at least experimentally) the profound 
emotional communication that was actually occurring. Nim was speaking to his handlers 
but not in the symbolic language that they were used to. They chose to ignore the 
bodily/embodied semiotics he was using. He was signing to them but not in ASL as they 
had expected. Donna Haraway’s concept of material semiotic co-entanglements is a 
useful description of what was happening, one that the experimenters chose to ignore.  
 
Haraway says continuity between humans and other animals, should not imply a single 
line nor a single “chasm of difference” (Haraway 2008:235). In a remarkable echo of 
Derrida she says that this oversimplified figure of difference between human and animal 
be rejected as a disaggregate of singulars to be replaced by “fields … with many 
geometries of system and subsystem architecture and junctions and disjunctions of 
properties and capacities, whether at scales of different species or of the brain 
organization of a single critter” (Haraway 2008:235). Arguing for complexity of the 
communicative space between human and animal, she suggests that the continuity theory 
should serve the status of a null hypothesis before any claims to uniqueness of the human 
species can be validated. Her observations imply that the question, “Do animals speak?” 
might just be the incorrect one, especially if it is argued from an anthropocentric, 
logocentric perspective. The communicative space between humans and other animals is 
far more complex than can be encapsulated in, or by, human symbolic language. 
 
Marc Bekoff rightly points out that it is in the realm of emotion that the most vehement 
accusation of anthropomorphism occurs. Granting animals emotional lives is the last 
frontier as it were. Behavioural specialists are conditioned to record and analyse 
happiness and sadness in terms of “as if” in phrases such as, “They look as if they are 
happy/sad/ grieving”. It is as if researchers are wary of imputing human emotions to 
animals in case they are accused of the sin of anthropomorphism. However, in his book 
The Emotional Lives of Animals, Marc Bekoff records that there might be a physiological 
basis for anthropomorphism or empathetic recognition. He notes the discovery of “mirror 
neurons” by Vittorio Gallese and Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues at the University of 
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Parma in Italy, who suggest a “neurobiological basis for sharing intentions which they 
discovered on Macaque monkeys” (Bekoff 2007:128). Research on these neurons, 
supports the notion that individuals can reflect the feelings of others, and then mentally 
project themselves into the other individual’s shoes. It has been demonstrated that rhesus 
monkeys will not accept food if another monkey suffers, when they do so, and mice react 
more strongly to painful stimuli after observing other mice in pain (Bekoff n.d). Bekoff  
states that while much research needs to be done the evolutionary continuity between 
species points to the reasonable conclusion that it is highly likely that mirror neurons exist 
in many different species other than human (2007:130). Thus rather than signifying foolish 
sloppiness in experimental work, imaginative empathy – the mirroring of other’s feelings – 
may well be an evolutionary response to the pain or joy of others. 
 
The concept of sympathetic imagination is a problem with which I engaged in a series of 
works exhibited on Menagerie at Tokara: Musings in 2014 (Fig 5.5).  
 
 
Fig 5.5.  Figures for Menagerie at Renzo Vignali Foundry, Pretoria. (Photograph by Carla 
Crafford). 
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The exhibition was sited in a sculpture garden on a wine estate. The title was intended as 
a gentle, ironic invitation to contemplate the “curiosity” of a collection of (sculpted) 
animals73. However, in my menagerie, the bronze and clay animals – sheep, dogs, a bird 
and baboons – are inert and lifeless. Yet, contradictorily I tried to breathe life into their 
static material forms. Relying on Derrida’s emphasis on the specificity of his cat’s look, I 
attempted in the animal sculptures to capture the distinctiveness of the individual animal’s 
experience, and to evoke in the viewer an awareness of the emotion of the unique being. 
In other words, to acknowledge the subjectivity of the other-than-human-animal and in so 
doing bridge the divide between human and animal. In the catalogue I included a 
statement of intent which encapsulated the desire to bridge “the gap between”; a wish 
that can be extrapolated to the whole of The Alice Series: “Animals have entered the 
space of my being-in-the world. They form part of the (auto)biography that is both part of 
my life and inseparable from it” (Cruise 2012). I interpreted the word, “inseparable”, not 
only metaphorically but also literally in a sculpture, entitled After Harrismith (Fig 5.6). 
 
 
Fig 5.6. Wilma Cruise After Harrismith (2014). Ceramic on steel base, 157 cm. 
(Photographed by the artist). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Menagerie: a collection of [wild] animals kept in captivity for the curiosity and entertainment of 
the public… a diverse, exotic or peculiar group of…things (merriam-webster.com. Sv. 
“menagerie”.) 
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After Harrismith, (2014) as the name implies, is modelled on the 2007 sculpture and print, 
and, like the earlier works, it depicts a human female figure around whose neck is draped 
a large cat. The cat presses into the head of the figure, becoming inseparable from it. The 
figure bows her head submitting to the burden of the self-satisfied cat. In my menagerie I 
have granted cats the same status as pigs, that of knowing outsiders. Cats more than any 
other creatures have the ability to stare down the human gaze. Derrida’s cat shamed him. 
The philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was not sure whether he was playing 
with his cat or whether she was toying with him (De Montaigne cited in Kalof & Fitzgerald 
2007:57). What do they know? both philosophers pondered. Faced with the inquiring 
stare of his cat, Derrida came to the conclusion that animals, like humans, are specific, 
particular and sapient beings. The cats have a consciousness – a subjectivity and 
recognition of us as the other. The tables are turned and the habitually observed 
becomes the observer. The object gazing back is an uncomfortable feeling, as Derrida 
discovered. Certainly, the cat in After Harrismith, is more the subject, the one in charge 
and knowing, than the human object who submits to her presence.  
 
In a shed adjacent to the sculpture garden I exhibited the two horses that make up the 
sculpture, Poor Horace – Watching The Hours (2009) (Fig 5.7, see also Fig 2.6.).  
 
 
Fig 5.7. Wilma Cruise Poor Horace: Watching the Hours foundry view (2009). Acrylic resin 
and mixed media, 267 x 155 x 80 cm. (Photographed by Carlo Gamberini.) 
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In the version at Tokara the two sculptures stand apart. One sculpture was placed on a 
trolley; the other straddled two wooden boxes. Both the movable stand and the 
immovable one emphasised Horace’s static stance – head down and feet squarely 
planted. The height of the shed and the shadows suggested a large stable, which added a 
theatrical component, one enhanced by the ghostly white of the forms. If one were to 
permit the projection of empathy, the installation can be read as a dramatisation of 
Horace’s plight as an instrumentalised being, one who has no ability to direct his destiny 
or have any say over his life’s journey. 
 
Three baboon sculptures entitled Small Baboon on Steel Bench x 2 (2012) (Fig 5.8) and 
The Caucus – Baboon on found object (2012 – 2013) (Fig 5.9) were also exhibited. 
 
 
 
Fig 5.8. Wilma Cruise Small Baboon on Steel Bench (2012). Bronze (Edition 10),51 x 43 x 
24 cm. 
Fig 5.9. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Baboon (2012–2013). Bronze and found object 
(Edition 10), 69 x 63 x 43 cm. (Photographed by Nicolene Swanepoel.) 
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Although my interest in primates and primate behaviour dates from my years as a young 
student when I embarked on undergraduate studies in primatology, my recent interest in 
baboons was sparked by the crisis faced by the local baboon population in the Western 
Cape of South Africa. Here man and animal compete for space and resources. The “wars” 
are hot and fierce with passions running high amongst the divided humans. There are 
those who want the baboons euthanased or at best removed and those who wish to live 
in harmony with them. It is a microcosm of human/animal conflict in which the individual 
animal is often forgotten. It appears that the question about the effects of death and 
translocation on the emotional well being of the remaining baboons is seldom raised. 
 
I was not so much interested in depicting the animals realistically, nor was I willing to 
engage in a proselytizing conversation; rather I attempted to capture the essence of what 
I read as “babooness”. I focused on the individual trying to imagine his/her experience of 
being in a world shared by uncooperative humans. I did not consciously attempt to 
anthropomorphise the baboons, but instead I tried to evoke an “imaginative empathy” — 
recognition of the emotional similarity between species. Ashley Pryor calls this approach 
“kindness”, which he defines as a mind-set that extends beyond a “subjective and 
volitional attitude of cheerful solicitude or tender hearted sympathy for our animal ‘others’ 
and names a more fundamental relationship” (Pryor 2012:290). This relationship can be 
defined as a phenomenological one of lived experience that “disrupts the primacy of the 
detached and objective point of view” (Pryor 2012:291). In these terms, kindness is 
something other than anthropomorphism or the projection of misplaced sentimentality. It 
also implies that the artist does not stand outside as an objective observer, but is 
intimately and emotionally involved. Notably, the concept of “kindness" is not dissimilar to 
Costello’s idea of “sympathetic imagination”, Derrida’s concept of “pity”, Regan’s notion of 
“care” or Scrutons’ idea of “piety”. All these thinkers and writers share a fundamental need 
to cross the divide between human and the other animal recognising the affective nature 
of the interchange. 
 
In a variation of the original, The Caucus – Baboon, I installed the baboon, her suitcase  
beside her, on a park bench on a busy street corner in the centre of the university town of 
Stellenbosch, (Fig 5.10).  
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Fig 5.10. Wilma Cruise Kom Sit: Travelling Baboon (The Caucus – Baboon) (2012–2014). 
Bronze with found object (Edition 10), height from bench 53 cm. 
 
 
My motivation was encapsulated in my artist’s statement and accompanying sketch (Fig 
5.11). 
 
 
Fig 5.11. Wilma Cruise Working drawing for Kom Sit: Travelling Baboon (2014). 
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Kom Sit: Travelling Baboon is lost. The encroaching humans who have inhabited her 
territory have displaced her. Finding herself in ‘Bossies’ [Stellenbosch] she is waiting 
for someone – or something – to arrive to take her away. Her baggage is contained in 
one small suitcase (Artist’s statement 2014).     
 
 
In depicting the baboon in a human setting, one in which she would never appear, I skirt 
dangerously close to sentimental anthropomorphism. However, relying on Elizabeth 
Costello's injunction to imagine the mind of the animal other, I argue that my depiction of 
the baboon invites empathetic recognition of her plight. The implication is that the 
baboon’s emotional experience of translocation is not too dissimilar to the one 
experienced by humans. And indeed a decision has been taken to remove all the 
peninsula troops to a sanctuary (J Trethowan of Baboon Matters Trust, personal interview, 
Cape Town, June 2015). Problem solved? Or is one of the last connections to wildness to 
be torn from our sense of being human? 
 
A similar concept of redeploying the same image in different settings, was employed in a 
work entitled Monkey Business (Fig 5.12).  
 
 
Fig 5.12. Wilma Cruise Monkey Business (2014). Bronze (baboons) and mild steel 
(seesaw). 135 x 270 cm. (Photographed by the artist). 
 
In this work, two images of The Caucus Baboon were placed on either end of a seesaw 
frozen in perpetual motion. In setting up Monkey Business I found there was a critical 
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distance between the baboons that implied a communicative relationship – a tension that 
speaks of the space-between that holds the key to their communication. The contradiction 
between emphasizing each individual animal’s singular experience and the use of the 
multiple, as in Monkey Business, requires explanation. It appears as if, by repeating a 
single form, I am symbolically negating the very individuality that I am trying to 
emphasise. But, this ambiguity has as much to do with my studio practice as with its 
conceptual underpinnings. The multiple in my work has a number of sources – most 
obviously the studio tradition of clay manufacture in which repetition of the same form is 
standard practice74. But mainly my source of inspiration came from Rodin’s Gates of Hell in 
which The Three Shadows on top of the gate are in fact the same figure re-orientated 
(Story 1951:plate 12). 
 
The use of the same image duplicated in varied settings raises new questions. For 
example, I asked whether there was significance in the employment of the multiple that 
refers to the Deleuze and Guattarian notion of the aggregate of the pack, which I interpret 
as a democratizing impulse even while it harbours the anomalous individual in its midst. 
Certainly a new dialogue was set up when multiples of Little Baboon on Cast Suitcase 
were photographed with an edition of The Caucus Baboon.  
 
 
Fig 5.13. Wilma Cruise The School Room (2015) The Caucus Baboon with multiples of 
Small Baboon on Cast Suitcase. (Photographed by the artist). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 In!“fine”!art, as opposed to the craft of ceramics, the use of the multiple has a different 
etiology – a critique on the production process itself. 
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The image of the little baboons in front of the larger one immediately evoked the notion 
of a school in which the “classroom” of younger pliant animals face their elder (Fig 5.13). 
 
*** 
 
Anthropomorphism is a dangerous territory. Implementing interpretations of animal 
behaviour in terms of emotional projection, opens the doors for sentimentality.  But by 
denying sympathy and the projection of empathetic feeling onto the animal other, leads 
to more acute consequences than the danger of misplaced sentiment. As I tried to 
demonstrate with the animals on Menagerie, emotion is conveyed by bodily means, which 
invite semiotic engagement of a material nature.  Under the guise of a scientific method 
that dominated social science research in the mid-20th century, anthropomorphism 
allowed an emotional distancing that opened the space for the use and abuse of the other 
animal for the benefit of humankind. In this ideology, animals were denied emotional 
lives. But as I have argued in relation to Nim Chimpsky, emotion and affect can be the 
primary means of communication between human and the other animal, one which was 
so profoundly ignored during the Nim project. While most experimenters admitted to 
feeling affection for Nim, they failed to read the significance of his reciprocal gestures, nor 
did they allow this to influence their perceptions of the experimental results. Ironically, 
Herbert Terrace, the chief experimenter, who had announced the failure of the Nim 
experiment, pointed in the direction of the next problem in the larger question of the 
animal, when he said, “In a nutshell, simians lack what is called a ‘theory of mind’—the 
ability to perceive what another simian is thinking” (Terrace 2011. Emphasis mine). As 
Donna Haraway has noted a “theory of mind” is the ability to “know other beings have the 
same or similar sorts of motives and ideas that oneself has” (2008:236). In other words, do 
other animals have a consciousness of themselves as separate individuals? If animals do 
have a theory of mind, the next logical question is what is the nature of that mind? What 
do animals think and feel? What is the nature of their subjectivity? What is their being? 
This will be dealt with in the next chapter – more to follow. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Wittgenstein’s Lion and Heidegger’s Hand 
 
!
!
Fig 6.1. Wilma Cruise Heidegger’s Hand  (2016). Bronze 1/1, 60 x 35 x 55 cm. 
(Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy). 
 
 
 
Does it cry? Does it grieve? Does it get bored? Does it lie? (Derrida 2008:63). 
 
 
…and no truth appears to me more evident than that beasts are endowed with 
thought and reason as well as man. The arguments are in this case so obvious, that 
they never escape the most stupid and ignorant (Hume 1888:176). 
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Exhibition 
Advice from a Caterpillar (2015)!75!
!
In this chapter, I return to the question whether animals can reason, as well as feel, talk, 
manipulate and take decisions. Based on Wittgenstein statement “If a lion could talk, we 
could not understand him” (cited in Wolfe 2003:44), I follow Wolfe in raising questions 
about relations between language, species and the question of the subject and, in so 
doing, present doubts as to whether the ontological difference between human and 
animal should be constituted by human symbolic language. I analyse this question in 
terms of a number of experimental models in which I broach questions about the analysis 
of the results and conclude that mid 20th century scientific notions of rigour hamper 
interpretation of the results. I look at Derrida’s critique of both Lacan and Heidegger, in 
which he accuses them of dogmatic Cartesianism. I note the irony in Heidegger’s notion 
of the human exceptionalism of the (thinking) hand particularly in view of the hand’s 
significance in my own work. 
!!
!
In May 2015 the fifth exhibition in The Alice Sequence, Advice From a Caterpillar, opened 
at The David Krut Project Space in the Maboneng precinct in downtown Johannesburg76. 
The title of the exhibition, Advice from a Caterpillar, was inspired by Alice’s encounter with 
the hookah smoking Caterpillar. She enters into a conversation with him, which revolves 
around ontological questions. 
!
“You!” said the Caterpillar contemptuously. “Who are you?” 
Which brought them back again to the beginning of the conversation. Alice felt a little 
irritated at the caterpillar’s making such very short remarks, and she drew herself up 
and said, very gravely, “I think you ought to tell me who you are first”. 
“Why?” said the Caterpillar (Carroll 1982:47). 
!
Indeed why. It is the usual human position not to question whether animals have a sense 
of self and the knowledge of who they are. Since the mid-20th century, observers of 
animal behaviour, ever wary of the accusation of anthropomorphism, have shied away 
from the problem. As Carl Safina puts it, “Permissible questions [about other animals] are 
“it” questions: about where it lives, what it eats, what it does when danger threatens, how 
it breeds. But always forbidden is the one question that might open the door: Who?” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Advice From a Caterpillar David Krut, Maboneng Gallery, Johannesburg, May and June 2015. 
See also Chapter 3. 
76 Advice From a Caterpillar was also exhibited at the David Krut Project Space at the AVA Gallery 
in Cape Town in September 2015. 
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(Safina 2015:1-2). Who are the other creatures that we are with? What kinds of other 
minds share our world? What do they know?77 
!
But can we know what animals know?  Wittgenstein observed enigmatically, “If a lion 
could talk, we could not understand him” (cited in Wolfe 2003:1). As Wolfe articulates it, 
“What can it mean to imagine a language we cannot understand, spoken by a being who 
cannot speak – ?“ (Wolfe 2003:44). The assumption underlying Wittgenstein's declaration 
is that the lion’s world view is so different from ours, that even if he could speak he would 
have nothing to say that we could understand. The contents of the lion’s cognitive 
representations are so different from our own that we lack the capacity to grasp or 
express them. The humans with their uniquely human inter-subjectivity stand on one side 
of the divide with the beast, mute and silent on the other. In other words, the lion’s 
consciousness is beyond our reach – for all practical purposes it does not exist. This seems 
to affirm the behaviourists’ position of a denial of the existence of unobservable entities – 
thought, reason, feeling – and indeed Wittgenstein has been associated with the Logical 
Positivists of the Vienna School. Vicki Hearne, the philosopher and animal trainer, however 
rejects Wittgenstein’s proposition saying that he made a “mistake”. There are conditions 
in which a lion can speak to a human depending on the context, as, for example, in the 
training situation in which a lion tamer communicates with his lion and vice versa (Wolfe 
2003:2). Hearne reads Wittgenstein’s "mistake" as not whether the lion has consciousness, 
but rather that the lion’s reticence emphasises the contrast between the human and the 
mute beast. “The lovely thing about Wittgenstein's lion is that Wittgenstein does not leap 
to say that his lion is languageless only that he is not talking… the reticence of the lion is 
not the reticence of absence, absence of consciousness, say, or knowledge, but rather of 
tremendous presence…” (Hearne cited in Wolfe 2003:3). The animal’s muteness provokes 
“a sceptical terror” of the existence of other minds (Wolfe 2003:3). In this way, the 
question to be asked is not whether Wittgenstein's lion (and other animals), have 
consciousness, but how we as human beings confront that consciousness. This shifts the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Safina distinguishes the concepts of consciousness, sentience, thought and cognition. 
Consciousness is “the thing that feels like something”; sentience is the ability to feel sensations 
and, thought is the process of considering something that's been perceived. Cognition refers to 
the capacity to perceive and acquire knowledge and understanding (Safina 2015:20).  
!
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problem back to the human and, like Derrida observed with his cat, her sense of self 
reflected from her to him – from the object to the subject – inverts the hierarchical binaries 
between human and animal (Derrida 2008:50-51). The lions’ consciousness becomes a 
decidedly human problem. 
!
The conundrum of animal consciousness was echoed in 2007 in a note I made 
contemporaneously with the digital print The All Knowing Ass (Fig 6.2):  
!
 
Fig 6.2. Wilma Cruise The All Knowing Ass (2007). Digital Print, 160 x 80cm, Edition 7. 
!
The all-knowing ass 
knows 
she does 
know 
in her knowing 
she is 
known (Cruise 2007). 
!
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Like Wittgenstein’s lion, The All Knowing Ass holds her secrets close. It is not that she 
cannot speak — it is that she withholds the information. That she has a consciousness, is 
revealed by her knowing smile and the listening angle of her ears. She knows what she 
knows and is self-satisfied in the knowledge she chooses to withhold. This view is echoed 
by Rilke in his eighth Duino elegy.  
 
With their whole gaze the creatures behold what is. Only our eyes 
are as though reversed, and set like traps around themselves, 
keeping us inside. That there is something out there 
we know only from the animals' countenance… (Rilke 1923). 
 
This is an inversion of the normal order of things. The animal is in a privileged position of 
seeing, and the human is in the position usually reserved for that of the animal – of the 
animal barred by his so-called lack from access to knowledge. As Calarco would phrase it, 
Rilke reverses the “human epistemic privilege” (Calarco 2008:36). 
!!
But not everyone grants animals an interior life. After the failure of the Nim Project, 
Herbert Terrace said, “In a nutshell, simians lack what is called a ‘theory of mind’ — the 
ability to perceive what another simian is thinking. Unlike human language, which is 
conversational, an ape’s only expectation when signing is a reward” (Terrace 2011). But, 
just what is theory of mind? Ever since Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the 
chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” this question has dominated the study of social 
behaviour in nonhuman primates (Heyes 1998). Heyes defined the concept: “An animal 
with a theory of mind believes that mental states play a causal role in generating behavior 
and infers the presence of mental states in others by observing their appearance and 
behavior under various circumstances” (Heyes 1998:102). More simply, theory of mind is 
“knowing that another can have thoughts that differ from yours” (Chedd cited in Safina 
2015:243).  
!
In her comprehensive analysis of the experimental studies on theory of mind, Heyes 
reviews the, up to then, body of experimental evidence on theory of mind. She notes that 
in “common experience”, “People spontaneously speak, not only of other primates, but of 
nearly all other living things, as if they had mental states and a theory of mind” (Heyes 
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1998:114. Emphasis mine). Yet, Heyes dismisses “common experience” as a basis for 
theory of mind. Her critique is aimed chiefly at the design of the experimental models. 
Thus, while she does not a priori deny the existence of theory of mind, she is skeptical of 
its existence without a sound scientific base for its proposition78. 
!
Heyes’ dependence on the scientific model demonstrates a phobia of anthropomorphism 
– a skepticism based on the fear of asking “who” the animal is instead of how it behaves. 
The study of animal behaviour is a young science based on strict rules of observation and, 
as noted in Chapter 5, imputing cognition to an animal is frowned upon within the 
prescribed scientific practice. There have been historic exceptions to this view of denying 
animals interior lives. The naturalist, Eugene Marais, who was a researcher of baboon 
behaviour in the Waterberg in the north of South Africa during the 1930s, observed that it 
was impossible not to gain an impression that baboons could talk (Marais 1971:55). 
Noting the complex structure of baboon society, Marais said that the leader “seldom or 
never makes a noise without a definite purpose” (Marais 1971:55). In one case he noted 
that the leader consulted with other elders about which route to navigate: “…there was a 
hushed ‘talking’ and ‘whispering’ coupled with hesitant movements. It was all so 
completely human that it was impossible not to gain the impression that, … they were, as 
became wise and authoritative old gentlemen, busy discussing the matter from all angles” 
(Marais 1971:55). Eight decades later, Don Pinnock writing on the behaviour of Chacma 
baboons in the Okavango Delta comments on the research of Cheney and Seyfarth who, 
much like Marais, observed that baboons spend much time “gossiping and 
eavesdropping” (Pinnock 2014:30). Pinnock suggested that baboons might have an 
embryonic language of the mind. They “have a sense of self and of ... separation from the 
others and the world" (Pinnock 2014:30). As Pinnock noted, they have a demonstrable 
ability to “work out complex problems”. He suggests that baboons have a preliterate but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 It is now generally accepted that animals have consciousness as the Cambridge Declaration on 
Consciousness demonstrated in 2012: “We declare the following: ‘The absence of a neocortex 
does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence 
indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and 
neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional 
behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in 
possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non- human animals, 
including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess 
these neurological substrates.’” (Low 2012). 
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ordered conceptual language but it remains utterly un-utterable. “It must be very 
frustrating not to be able to say what they can clearly think” (Pinnock 2014:31)79.  
!
The theory of mind raises the question as to the ability of other animals to use symbolic 
language, thereby raising the old Cartesian conundrum – do animals speak and reason? It 
is generally assumed that animals are capable of “only a coded message or of a meaning 
that is narrowly indicative …, strictly constrained; one that is fixed in its programming” 
(Derrida 2008:119–120). As Derrida points out in his critique of Jacques Lacan, in And say 
the animal responded?, Lacan’s claim that the animal is only capable of reaction while the 
human responds, “forever immobilised the animal, … within the snare of the imaginary, 
thus depriving it any access to the symbolic that is to say, to the law and to what ever is 
held to be proper to the human” (Derrida 2008:120). Lacan’s differentiation places animal 
and human in opposition to each other. Derrida rejects Lacan’s distinction between 
reaction and response – saying that his claim is “quite literally Cartesian” (Derrida 
2008:123). Derrida argues not so much for the recognition of animal consciousness or 
subjectivity (Derrida 2008:125), but criticises the “massive homogenizing” manner to 
which the topic has been reduced to simple binaries (Derrida 2008:122). Critically, 
Derrida suggests that it is not just a matter of refusing the animal powers such as  
!
(speech, reason, experience of death, mourning, culture, institutions, technics, 
clothing, lying, pretence of pretence, covering of tracks, gift, laughter, crying, respect, 
etc. – the list is necessarily without limit, and the most powerful philosophical tradition 
in which we live has refused the “animal” all of that). It also means asking whether what 
holds itself human has the right rigorously to attribute to man, which means therefore 
to attribute to himself, what he refuses the animal… (Derrida 2008:135).  
!
Working on the basis that we have no right to refuse the animal attributes usually 
assigned to the human, opens the possibility of animal consciousness. Rather than 
assuming that animals do not have consciousness it behoves us to try and understand that 
consciousness, as Hearne suggests pace Wittgenstein's lion. Even if they are without 
language, and cannot speak, if we are only willing to listen and hear, we may discover 
other forms of communication in other animals. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Pinnock falls into the anthropocentric trap. Of course baboons can speak, only they speak 
“baboon” not “human”. 
!
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!
In his book, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel, Carl Safina notes that 
ethologists and biologists who study animals in the wild, have demonstrated patterns of 
complex communication, problem-solving, as well as demonstrable displays of emotion 
like grief and joy. For example, Vervet monkeys in the Amboseli reserve in Kenya have a 
range of calls with distinct meanings. They can identify specific threats such as “unfamiliar 
human”, “Martial eagle” or “snake” and communicate them to their fellow monkeys.  Like 
humans these “words” are learned and passed on from generation to generation (Safina 
2015:87). In other words, the monkeys have words! Detractors will argue that this can still 
be interpreted as the use of signing, a system learned by operant conditioning, and not 
the use of symbolic language, which is identified by the complex use of syntax. But 
research is showing that some species are able to demonstrate a syntactical use of their 
calls, modifying their warning calls adjectivally according to the perceived seriousness of 
the threat (Safina 2015:88). Moreover, as Safina argues, “If syntax is about where the 
words appear in relation to one another, then context itself is a kind of syntax… . When 
your dog is scratching the door, she doesn’t need to give the soliloquy on desire, you just 
need to know which side of the door she's on” (Safina 2015:90). Further, additional 
information is passed along through the order of the calls, not just the individual 
components. This has been demonstrated in Campbell's monkeys who use their 
sequence of calls “in a syntax-like way, where order changes meaning – to announce 
whether they actually see or just hear a predator” (Safina 2015:87). In this way and across 
species, researchers have demonstrated that in many species the use of specific calls have 
precise meanings and that the combination of calls demonstrate a form of syntax. Having 
observed the behaviour of elephants, wolves, dolphins and whales in their natural 
habitats, Safina concludes that “Animals know who they are; they know who their family 
and friends are. They know their enemies. They make strategic alliances and cope with 
chronic rivalries. They aspire to higher rank and wait for the chance to challenge the 
existing order. Their status affects their offspring's prospects. Their life follows the arc of a 
career. Personal relationships define them” (Safina 2015:2). In this sense they are human-
like – like humans80 an observation that echoes those of Marais and Pinnock.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Using this argument, Safina supports the continuity thesis. “All life is one… Each is a distinction 
on a continuum like notes on a violin’s fingerboard” (Safina 2015:34). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
161 
*** 
 
Alice had no trouble in speaking to the animals in the world on the other side of the 
mirror and down the rabbit hole. The animals and Alice shared a language even if it was at 
times illogical. “[T]hat’s because the nonsense is only provisional, only on the surface, 
beneath which a diligent investigator like Alice is able to discover perfectly intelligible, 
albeit unexpected, laws of cause and effect. ‘One side will make you grow taller, and the 
other side will make you grow shorter,’ remarks the caterpillar about the rule that governs 
mushroom ingestion in Wonderland” (Dunn and McDonald 2010:65). Nevertheless, 
sharing a language and partaking in a conversation does not necessarily mean that the 
Caterpillar and Alice understand each other, as her frustrating conversation with the 
irascible creature shows. In reply to his question “Who are you?” Alice says,  
!
“I – I hardly know, Sir, just at present – at least who I was was when I got up this 
morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.” 
“What do you mean by that?” said the Caterpillar sternly. “Explain yourself!” 
“I ca’n’t explain myself, I’m afraid, Sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself you see.” 
“I don’t see,” said the Caterpillar. 
“I’m afraid I ca’n’t put it more clearly,” Alice replied very politely, “for I ca’n’t 
understand it myself to begin with and being so many different sizes in a day is very 
confusing.” 
“It isn’t,” said the Caterpillar. 
“Well, perhaps you haven’t found it so yet,” said Alice; “but when you have to turn into 
a chrysalis – you will someday, you know – and then after that into a butterfly, I should 
think you feel it a little queer, wo’n’t you?” 
“Not a bit,” said the Caterpillar. 
“Well, perhaps your feelings may be different,” said Alice; “all I know is, it would feel 
very queer to me” (Carroll 1982:47). 
!
When Vicky Hearne said that Wittgenstein’s lion could be understood under certain 
conditions (Hearne cited in Wolfe 2003:3) she might've been referring to Alice. It seems 
as if Alice, when she shrunk to the Caterpillar’s size, was able to bridge the difference 
between human and insect ontologies. Only three inches high, she could chat to the small 
creature and, even though their understanding of each other was imperfect, she was able 
to find out something about the Caterpillar’s being. Although she encountered a world 
view different from hers, she broke through the barrier thrown up by Wittgenstein when 
he said that even if the lion could speak we could not understand him. 
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In the biological sciences, the establishment of theory of mind is made on the basis of a 
number of criteria, one of the most interesting being the power to dissimulate and 
deceive. It is a topic picked up on by Lacan and debated at length by Derrida in And say 
the animal responded?. Lacan claims that while the animal can pretend (deceive), it is 
incapable of a second order of pretending to pretend, a position that Derrida rejects for 
amongst other reasons, that it seems difficult to identify and conceptually determine the 
limit of pretense and pretense of pretense (Derrida 2008:120).  Moreover, he questions 
whether the statement that animals are incapable of pretending to pretend can apply to 
all animals – animals in general – and, finally and tellingly, he says Lacan does not have 
“any ethological knowledge… or any experience, observation or personal attestation that 
would be worthy of credence. The status of the affirmation that refuses the pretense of 
pretense to the animal is that of simple dogma” (Derrida 2008:133). Safina has noted 
equally dogmatic positions from researchers who work in the field. He says, while some 
ethologists grant the ability to project into the mind of the other to higher order 
mammals, most reject it for other species, even when the evidence is there. For example, 
researchers observing spotted hyenas, were able to watch the deceptive behaviour of a 
lower ranked hyena, who fooled his companions as to the position of a kill. Deception as 
an indication that an animal can foresee that his behaviour would affect that of another, is 
an indicator of theory of mind. Yet, as Safina observed, these researchers “incredibly” 
claimed that, “spotted hyenas appear to show no understanding of the thoughts or beliefs 
of others” (Safina 2015:264).  
!
It appears that the demand for the existence of theory of mind, consciousness, or 
cognitive capacity in the animal, needs to be “proved” preferably in the laboratory under 
controlled experimental conditions or in the field under strict observational principles. In a 
substantive review, Stanford University investigated a range of experiments investigating 
areas of animal cognition such as communication, mind reading or theory of mind, 
metacognition and moral practice (Andrews 2016). While the results of these experiments 
were variable, as was their interpretation, it seems that most of the researchers were in the 
grip of the old behaviourist dictum, namely that it is not correct to impute interiority to the 
animal if a simpler behavioural explanation is available. This is known as Morgan’s canon 
which reads: “In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher 
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psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand 
lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (Morgan 1903 cited in 
Andrews 2016). 
!
One such case revealed the difficulty in designing a reliable and valid experimental 
model. This is the mirror self-recognition test (MSR). The test was developed by Gordon 
Gallup in 1970. An animal is marked on a part of its body with ink. If the animal on viewing 
itself in a mirror tries to wipe the spot off its own body, it is said to demonstrate self 
recognition. Gallup argues that this is evidence of self-concept (Gallup cited in Wynne 
and Udell 2013:190). The number of species that pass the mirror self-recognition test is 
quite limited and seems to be confined to the great apes. It excludes dogs. Does one 
then conclude that dogs do not have self recognition? This deduction is challenged by 
amongst others, the cognitive ethologist, Marc Bekoff, who in his classical “yellow snow” 
experiment, demonstrated that dogs have self recognition based on a sense of smell. 
After compiling and statistically analysing the data, Bekoff found that Jethro, his own dog 
and the subject of the experiment, paid significantly less attention to his own displaced 
urine than he did to the displaced urine of other dogs (Bekoff 2001).  In his paper Bekoff 
did not specifically claim that this proves that dogs have self-awareness, but the question 
is raised as to whether there is a fundamental difference between an animal recognising 
its own image in a mirror and one recognising its own scent in yellow snow? As dogs 
prioritise smell above vision, it is entirely logical that they would ignore the visual cues in 
the mirror when not accompanied by identifying smells. Smell and sight involve different 
cognitive processes. Bekoff himself has suggested that the yellow snow test may be more 
indicative of a sense of “mine-ness” in dogs than of a sense of “I-ness”. However, his final 
point is pertinent and offers a critique of MSR experiments and those like it: “At a 
minimum…the yellow snow test stands as a useful warning that we humans need to be 
careful not to make quick judgments about animal intelligence or cognitive capacity (or 
lack thereof) based on tests that are well-suited to humans, but that fail to match the skills 
and abilities of the particular animal” (Bekoff 2001).  
!
Laboratory studies and field research tend to focus on animal vocalisation and the 
similarity of animals’ communication systems to the symbolic language of humans. Hence 
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the endless debate on the use, or nonuse, of syntax in other species. This in large part 
ignores the gestural communication that animals use – that which Donna Haraway calls 
bodily semiotics. The importance of gestural communication is emphasised by some 
researchers who go as far as to suggest “that human language evolved from body 
movements such as gesture, miming, and dance” (Corballis 1992, 2002 and Donald 1991 
cited in Andrews 2016). The gestural theory of language acquisition suggests other 
models of research and other ways of thinking of animal languages. One such idea is to 
abandon the model of anthropocentric symbolic language against which other animal 
languages are tested. In this context, Safina has proposed the concept of “prosody” 
(2015:202). Prosody, the patterns of rhythm and sound used in poetry (Oxford dictionary 
n.d. Sv. ‘prosody’). constitutes paralinguistic features of song, tempo and tone, which 
convey meaning without words. While a dog is incapable of using words, it is nevertheless 
able to communicate via bodily semiotics and sounds which, crossing species’ barriers, 
human beings are able to understand. For example, we are able to interpret our dog’s 
whine even though we are not a dog. We know that a growl means something different 
from a bark; and that a cat’s hiss differs from her purr. It is not as the Cheshire cat 
suggests, “madness” that we know the difference between a dog growling when he is 
angry, and wagging his tail when it is pleased, and the cat growling when she is pleased 
and wagging her tail when she is angry (Carroll 1982:64). We are quite capable of 
interpreting such situations correctly and acting upon them in the appropriate manner. 
Prosody enables us to distinguish a lullaby from a scream in humans, or a short upward 
call indicating alarm from a soothing downward one in other animals. That is, sound, 
without words, carries emotion and meaning and notably this occurs across species. 
Prosody links us to other animals. It might be that which re-establishes the sacred 
connection to other animals. Yet, hampered by “scientific rigour”, researchers are 
reluctant to translate these sounds. With reference to Joyce Poole’s work with the African 
elephant, Safina notes that while she takes meticulous recordings of the elephants’ 
vocalisations, using measurable scientific means such as the frequency and amplitude of 
the sounds, other than noting the context in which they are made, she fails to interpret 
their vocalisations. She does not translate from elephants’ language to human language. 
In this way her experimental methodology, and others like it, does not reach beyond 
description. In other words, we know that the animals are communicating, but not what 
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they are saying. Safina accuses these researchers of ignoring the obvious. “At its simplest 
if the animal behaves joyously in a joyous situation, it would be the most uncomplicated  
and direct to interpret the emotion of joy” (Safina 2015: 29). Our inability, or refusal, to 
translate renders us tone deaf to their utterances.  
!
Jacob Beck offers some interesting insights on the conundrum of the untranslate-ability 
from animal to human language. On surveying the empirical literature, he notes that, 
while animal researchers are learning a lot about the cognitive representations of animals, 
they are not making serious progress in interpreting these representations (Beck 
2013:534). He reiterates Wittgenstein's query: “If animals really have cognitive 
representations with determinate contents, why can’t anybody say what those contents 
are?” (Beck 2013:520-521). He offers a number of suggestions as to why this should be, 
chief of which is that there is no precise linguistic analogue for animal cognition. He said 
that we cannot say what an animal thinks because animals think in a nonlinguistic format, 
that is, they may have content but it is not expressible in “natural” language. He draws an 
analogy with art – a painting may have content without it necessarily being (directly) 
translatable in “natural” language (Andrews 2016). As Safina points out, while translation 
is required from one form to another, inevitably things get lost in translation! But that 
does not explain why we do understand so much of animal cognition. Beck says that in 
evolutionary terms humans and animals share a large number of cognitive systems. Citing 
Carey (2009) he calls these shared systems ‘‘core cognition,’’ and contrasts them with 
“linguistically encoded conceptual representations” (Carey cited in Beck 2013:534). That 
is, there is a sense in which human beings are perfectly capable of understanding some of 
the animals’ cognitive contents and “by thinking with the more primitive aspects of our 
minds” (Beck 2013:535), we can use core cognition processes whether or not we can 
“precisely characterise them in language” (Beck 2013:535).  
 
In fact, many philosophers have rejected the hegemony of linguistic content by 
arguing that there exists an important class of contents—nonconceptual contents—that 
by their very nature are not linguistically expressible (Beck 2013: 254). 
!
I explored this concept of non-linguistic communication in 2015 when I placed two 
sculptures in opposition to each other (Fig 6.3).  
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Fig 6.3 Wilma Cruise Louis’ Baboon with Role Over foundry view (2015). Role Over (2015). 
Bronze (Edition 12), 140 x 80 cm. (Photographed by the artist). 
 
One depicted the human in life-size format. This figure (Role Over) was made in 2002–
2003 and cast into bronze in 2016. It was placed in conjunction with the depiction of a life-
size baboon – Louis’ Baboon (2015). A communicative gap was created by the intersecting 
gaze between the human and the animal. The space-between became charged with the 
unspoken. What is being conveyed in that space cannot be known in any precise sense – 
the communication is felt rather than articulated. Does the need to understand matter 
more to the human than the animal? It seems as if the figure reaches out appealingly to 
the baboon who stares bemusedly back across the species divide. Their exchange is a 
frustrating exercise in (in)comprehension, one that mimics the real life interchange 
between human and other animals in its unknowability. As Beck noted, “[P]ace 
Wittgenstein, if God gave a lion the gift of the gab, we could know precisely what it was 
thinking. But without that gift, our evidence is simply too impoverished to allow us to pin 
down animals’ cognitive contents” (Beck 2013:530). In this regard, I fall back on Jacob 
Beck’s assertion that animal language has no analogue in human symbolic language. “The 
problem is not one of impoverished methods or epistemic limitations. Rather, the format 
of animal cognition makes its contents impossible to translate into natural language. Even 
God couldn’t tell us precisely what a lion is thinking” (Beck 2013:522).  
!
It is a point I made in the exhibition of Louis’ Baboon at the David Krut Project Space in 
Johannesburg in which the animal was placed on a stand two metres above the heads of 
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the viewers (Fig 6.1). The viewers have to look up at the baboon – not directly at, or down 
on – as is the case with the other baboon sculptures. He is positioned like the Cheshire 
Cat, who appears in the branches of the trees above Alice’s head in Wonderland from 
where he proceeds to give Alice lessons on madness, bodily semiotics and language.  
!
“Now I growl when I am pleased, and wag my tail when I’m angry. Therefore I’m mad.” 
“I call it purring, not growling,” said Alice. 
“Call it what you like,” said the Cat (Carroll 1982:64).  
!
At which point he vanishes leaving Alice with the enigma of his smile but none the wiser 
as to the meaning of their exchange. Nevertheless, in Louis’ Baboon, I suggest that we can 
read her mood signalled by her body posture – the slump of her shoulders, the steadiness 
of her gaze and the stillness of her hands. Like the wagging tail of a dog, her body is the 
means of communication (Fig 6.4.). 
!
!
Fig 6.4. Wilma Cruise Louis’ Baboon (2015). Bronze (Edition 10), 47 x 31 x 55 cm. 
(Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy). 
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Heidegger’s project on an animality began with an attempt to see the world from the 
animals’ point of view81. “And how would we grasp this otherness?” he asked (Heidegger 
in Atterton & Calarco 2004:17). Heidegger’s project aimed to contest the classical 
anthropocentric view that human beings are the centre of all creation by challenging the 
phylogenetic hierarchy that an animal is somehow lower or simpler than human beings 
(Calarco 2008:21). He proposed three “theses” that: “[1.] the stone (material object) is 
‘worldless’; [2.]  the animal is ‘poor in world’; [3.] man is ‘world forming’” (Heidegger cited 
in Atterton & Calarco 2004:17). In Heidegger’s epistemology, a stone has no world, an 
animal is in the world, and the human has world. For example, while a rock has no access 
to the world – it is just there – a lizard lying on the rock has a relation to the rock, to the sun 
and other things in its circumscribed environment, yet it cannot understand the 
environment or access it in the way the human can (Heidegger in Atterton & Calarco 
2004:17). Being “poor in world” means that animals have no sense of Being as such. A 
dog, for example, has no Dasein - (Derrida 2008:158), a condition reserved exclusively for 
the human. The human Dasein “exists”, the animal merely “lives”, human Dasein “eats”, 
the animal “feeds” and so on (Calarco 2008:26). The three tiers of being are mutually 
exclusive – the difference between human and animal and animal and stone being one of 
kind not of degree as a Darwinian would propose.  
!
In spite of the pejorative implications of the word “poor”, Heidegger insists that there is no 
hierarchy in his thesis that the stone is “worldless”, the animal is “poor in world”, and man 
is “world-forming”. Derrida claims that this position is indefensible since “poor” does 
mean less rich (Derrida 2008:155). In spite of his denials to the contrary, Heidegger seems 
to assert the ontotheological hierarchy of human and animal based on the position that 
humans “have” and animals “have not” (Derrida 208:146). He draws a single insuperable 
line between human and animal by insisting that man alone ek-ists (Calarco 2008:52). The 
difference between human beings and animals is “a rupture that is utterly untransferable” 
(Calarco 2008:22). Thus, although Heidegger tries to avoid the philosophical tradition of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Questions concerning human and nonhuman life lie at the very heart of Heidegger’s 
philosophical project (Calarco 2008:18). 
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viewing animals through a human lens and finding them to be lacking, he ends up by re-
asserting, quite dogmatically, the classical divide between human and animal. 
Nevertheless, his approach to animality “is not anthropocentric in any simple sense” 
(Atterton & Calarco 2004:29). By not taking it as “philosophically evident that there is a 
straightforward distinction to be drawn between human being and animal, or between 
living beings and nonliving beings” (Calarco 2008:21), Heidegger laid the foundation of a 
new perception of human-animal relations by admitting to the notion of “being-with” each 
other in a shared world (Buchanan 2012:271). This opened up a space for new human-
animal interactions and allowed the entry of concepts such as “sympathetic imagination” 
(Selbach 2012:311). It is a point made by Derrida who says, “Heidegger, to his credit, 
localizes, complicates, precisely treats ‘as such’ thematically, with a breadth and rigor of 
analysis that I find incomparable” (Derrida 2008:145). 
!
In spite of his admiration, in the final chapter of The animal therefore I am, “I don't know 
why we doing this?” Derrida says that Heidegger’s claim that animals are “poor in world” 
effectively forecloses the notion of animal consciousness (Baker 2003:151). In 
Heideggerian terms, animals only can gaze “across the abyss not only at all that is human, 
but also all that is associated with thought, generosity and creativity” (Baker 2003:152). 
Heidegger reserves subjectivity and self-hood for the human. He says that the animal has 
no notion of itself in the world, which he extrapolates into no awareness of its future or 
own finitude. The animal’s responses are limited to the level of instinct which encircles the 
animal restricting its access to other beings (Atterton &  Calarco 2004:24). In this way 
animal life literally holds itself captive within the limitation of its own instincts. The lizard 
has no world – only humans have world. By extrapolation, humans have knowledge of 
death and language. “The leap from living animals to humans that speak is as large if not 
larger and that from the lifeless stone to the living being” (Heidegger cited in Atterton & 
Calarco 2004:18).  
!
Not only do humans have consciousness, subjectivity and selfhood but they also, 
according to Heidegger, have the gift of hands. Humans are capable of giving, whereas in 
the animal the paw, talon or claw can only grasp. Derrida says this is Heidegger’s “most 
seriously dogmatic” statement (Baker 2003:152) one that emphasises both human 
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exceptionalism and human’s god-like power to decide who has and who has not. 
Heidegger chose to distinguish human from animal on this basis. He grants hands an 
essence – an essential attribute that is given to humans but denied animals. 
!
The human hand is a peculiar thing. In the common view, hand is part of our bodily 
organism. But the hand’s essence can never be determined, or explained, by its being 
an organ which can grasp. Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have 
hands. The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs – paws, claws or fangs – 
different by an abyss of essence (Heidegger cited in Atterton &  Calarco 2004:19). 
!
Ironically, this essentialist view is corroborated by Baker who emphasises the hand’s role 
in the act of creativity. It is also one that accords with my experience. And as I have 
elsewhere noted, it is as if the hand does the thinking – it seems to have an independent 
“will-to-form”. It has an imperative which even in the absence of rational explanation 
needs to be trusted. Citing Joseph Beuys’ performance, I like America and America likes 
me, Baker noted that Beuys gave his gloves – his symbolic hands – to the animal to play 
with, thereby literally gifting him with that which makes him human (Baker 2003:149). 
Baker suggests, that when artists grant animals hands in their images, as Beuys does 
metaphorically with the coyote, they problematise their identity. “For many contemporary 
artists, the animal stands in as a new form of being, a creative postmodern being, and it 
emphatically does have hands” (Baker 2003:153). Steve Baker, inverted Heidegger’s 
proposition of the exceptionalism of the human hand by asserting the presence of hands 
in animals as “creative postmodern beings” (Baker 2003:153). He thereby acknowledges 
the animals’ subjectivities, their being in themselves, equal to that sense of them being 
human. But, animals are not humans. They are uniquely themselves with their own 
ontology's and epistemologies. While we cannot know in any definitive sense what they 
know, it is important for us to open our being to their being – to listen to their rumbles, 
hisses and purrs. This we have to do without any preconceptions, whether of an 
ontotheological or scientific nature.  
!
In my baboon series of sculptures and prints, I have granted the animals arms and hands. 
This runs counter to my penchant to leave figures armless and without the agency of the 
hand. In Endgame (Fig 6.5.) the twin baboons have hands hanging over their knees. It is 
as if they could use them at any moment to move a chess piece. By giving arms and hands 
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to my baboons, it could be said that I challenge Heidegger’s distinction which definitively 
separates humans from other animals. Providing the animals with hands that go beyond 
the grasp, (to play a game of chess, for example) suggests that they too could be part of 
the human sphere and by logical extrapolation we could be part of theirs.  
 
 
Fig 6.5. Wilma Cruise Endgame (2015). Clay and plaster version with ceramic chess 
pieces, 60 x 35 x 55 cm each. (Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy). 
!
!
In the sculpture, Heidegger’s Hand (Fig 6.6.), a single baboon figure, extracted from the 
installation Endgame sits with his hands hanging between his knees, heavy and inert82. 
The creation of this work coincided with onset of a debilitating tremor in my hands, which 
rendered them clumsy and useless. By emphasising them in Heidegger’s Hand, both 
sculpturally and in the title, it is as if the human’s enabling hand becomes the animal’s 
disabling paw/claw, only this time reversed.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Endgame consists of two baboons sitting opposite each other. The figures are in fact two 
editions of the same sculpture. 
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The baboon’s hands are painted red and green further emphasising their significance as 
the means of producing art, while at the same time alluding to the material of art.  
 
 
 
Fig 6.6. Wilma Cruise Study for Heidegger’s Hand (2016).  
 
 
The inspiration for this gesture was derived from Marlene Dumas’ image of her young 
daughter in The Painter83 in which the child is “caught in the act” of playing with paint (Fig 
6.7). Paint marks her naked torso and drips from her hands. A shroud of green surrounds 
her head as she stares defiantly out of the picture frame. If nothing else, The Painter is an 
image of the embodied nature of the act of painting – a fact that loops back to the point of 
this thesis that art, (and animal communication), are both dependent on the embodied 
act. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 The Painter (1994), Oil on Canvas, 200 x 100 cm. (Van den Boogerd, B Bloom & M 
Casadio1999:71). 
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Fig 6.7. Marlene Dumas The Painter (1994). Oil on Canvas, 200 x 100 cm. 
http://africanah.org/marlene-dumas-image-burden-tate-modern/. 
!
 
Safina said the question of theory of mind gets less interesting as the richness of, and 
perceptions in other animals becomes more apparent (Safina 2015:247). What he is 
suggesting is that we should observe and connect with animals without any 
preconceptions or theoretical models, such as theory of mind, to cloud our vision. In this 
way we open ourselves to animal worlds – and while we cannot in any definitive way know 
what the lion knows, we can approximate his knowledge through careful and sensitive 
“being with”, a goal that Heidegger reached for but did not achieve. 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
174 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Fig 7.1. Wilma Cruise En Passant foundry view (2016). Ten figures in acrylic resin, 
100–120 cm. (Photographed by the artist.) 
 
 
Always speak the truth – think before you speak – and write it down afterwards (Carroll 
1982: 216). 
 
 
!  
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Exhibitions 
The 8th Square (2016) 
Six Impossible Things to Do Before Breakfast (2016)!84 
 
The final shows in The Alice Sequence, The 8th Square and Six Impossible Things to Do 
Before Breakfast were presented in parallel at two different venues in Stellenbosch in 
November and December 2016. The exhibitions formed part of the text of this doctoral 
dissertation. The titles of the exhibitions metaphorically refer to Carroll's tale, Through the 
Looking Glass and What Alice Saw There. The 8th Square, references the chess game that 
underpins the narrative of Alice's journey on the other side of the glass. In chess, the 
eighth square is the ultimate goal for a pawn, who, like Alice, on reaching the last line 
(rank) is entitled to the status of Queen and all the freedom of movement that that implies. 
“[I]n the Eighth Square we shall be Queens together, and all [will be] feasting and fun!” 
promises the Red Queen (Carroll 1982:145). This is in fact what happens. There is 
“feasting and fun” at a celebratory banquet in which Alice, a newly crowned Queen, is 
introduced to a leg of mutton and a talking pudding. Alice finally wakes up to the reality 
of the hearth and the presence of the black and white kittens. Her dream has ended. The 
finality of the eighth square signals Alice’s endgame. It also metaphorically marks the end 
of The Alice Sequence.  
 
The 8th Square is twinned with Six Impossible Things to Do Before Breakfast. This latter 
exhibition is held at the Gallery of the University of Stellenbosch (GUS), in the city of 
Stellenbosch. The title of this exhibition is based on a conversation Alice has with the 
rumpled and befuddled White Queen. In discussing their respective ages, Alice rather 
proudly announces that she is seven and a half, “exactly”, to which the White Queen 
replies, 
 
“I’m just one hundred and one, five months and a day.” 
“I ca’n’t believe that!” said Alice. 
“Ca’n’t you?” the Queen said in a pitying tone. “Try again: draw a long breath, in and 
shut your eyes.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84  Cavalli Gallery, Cavalli Wine Estate, Stellenbosch 6 November to 4 December 2016. 
Gallery University Stellenbosch (GUS), Stellenbosch November to December.  
!
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Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” she said: “one ca’n’t believe impossible things.” 
“I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, I 
always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six 
impossible things before breakfast” (Carroll 1982:173). 
 
Believing in speaking animals, as Alice does in Wonderland, opens the possibility of 
believing the impossible – or believing the impossible allows the possibility of speaking 
animals! In the context of this research, allowing for the “impossible”, (the possibility of 
the impossible), arguably opens the doors to the recognition of minds other than our 
own. This returns us to the phrase that initiated this research, “We have shut our ears to 
their primal screams, their rumbles, hisses, purrs…” (Cruise in Schmahmann 2007). By 
admitting to the possibility of impossibility, I invert the phrase into the imperative, “We will 
open our ears to their primal screams, their rumbles, hisses, purrs.” 
 
The journey across the “chequered landscape” that defined this research into the animal 
turn, was at times as confusing and directionless as Alice's forays into her dream worlds. It 
began with JM Coetzee’s novels Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello and Wendy Woodward’s 
monograph, The Animal Gaze, but soon led into the realms of philosophy – Derrida and 
Deleuze and Guattari mainly, but also, and importantly differently, the Anglo-American 
philosophers represented by Peter Singer and Tom Regan. I was at various stages 
directed to the research of cognitive ethologists and those researchers working in the 
laboratories and fields of animal research. I came across the writing of thinkers (and 
trainers) such as Donna Haraway, whose concept of cum panis, breaking bread, with the 
animal other was a defining moment. As I moved from one field of research to another, 
from philosophy to ethology, from biology to psychology and literature, and from one 
text to another, my position vis à vis the animal turn became clearer. I began to see a way 
of taking a position about the space-between, which was my chosen site of contestation. I 
had begun my quest with the proposition that two beings – animal and animal or human 
and animal – placed in relational proximity to each other create a space between them 
which becomes charged with unspoken communication. It is the interrogation of the 
nature of this communication that provided the central conundrum of this dissertation. As 
Wittgenstein noted, how do we know what the other animal is thinking – if it is thinking at 
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all? Moreover, is it speaking and if so how? The search for the answer to these questions is 
the subject of the previous six chapters. 
 
It is in the nature of the enterprise that at the end of my (re)search, I state my theoretical 
position and in this respect I depend on Calarco’s differentiation between “identity”, 
“difference” and “indistinction” theories (Calarco 2015:3-4). To briefly summarise: 
“Identity” theorists acknowledge the difference between human and animal but tend to 
measure this difference by the similarity of animal traits to humans. They tend to extend 
human traits to animals – to compare the two and accord equality of consideration and 
rights on that basis. Their “egalitarian ethics” is thereby dictated by the closeness of the 
animal to the human (Calarco 2015:48). In their epistemology, human beings are still the 
centre of the moral universe. Theorists such as these are the utilitarian philosopher, Peter 
Singer and animal rights activist, Tom Regan. On the other hand, “indistinction” theorists 
collapse the binary terms human and animal into a single construct. Exemplars of such a 
theoretical approach are Deleuze and Guattari. While ideologically attractive, such 
theories tend to be impractical in the sense that the terms of reference are conflated 
making discourse difficult. Straddling the middle ground are the “difference” theorists 
whose approach is based on the singularity of the individual and rich differentiation of 
modes of existence found among animals (Calarco 2015:50). Approaches such as this are 
exemplified by Derrida and more recently Bekoff  with his compassionate conservation 
approach exemplified in the aphorism: "First do no harm" in which the importance of the 
individual nonhuman animal is stressed (Bekoff 2015). “Unlike the dominant utilitarian 
approach to conservation, which puts the cost of reaching conservation targets squarely 
on the shoulders of other animals, a compassionate ethic for conservation brings empathy 
into decision making alongside other values. It is not a rights position but, rather, puts 
forward a scientific and evidence-based conceptual approach that stipulates that 
conservation initiatives should first do no harm” (Bekoff 2015 citing Bekoff 2010). In 
Derrida’s and Bekoff’s philosophies, the human is decentred; human essence and 
exceptionalism is challenged and hegemonic ideas about animal and animality are 
interrogated (Calarco 2015:34). The singular animal becomes the focus of attention. 
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While it is tempting to lean towards an indistinction theoretical position, in which no 
differentiation is made between human and animal, I reject it because it eliminates the 
terms of reference and renders meaningless the human-animal discourse. With no 
differentiation, all cows are black in the dark (Calarco 2015:55).  I maintain that one has to 
recognize the complexity, difference and singularity of each individual animal – the very 
“otherness” of other animals – without using man as the measure of all things. As Linzey 
articulates it. 
!
They are not simply “things” out there; they are not “mini humans”, or even our 
“brothers” (understood in as humanly defined way); their very “otherness” should give 
us pause and excite our imagination. Of course we know that animals are in some ways 
highly similar – and in one way especially, namely the capacity for suffering – but we do 
them an injustice if we simply rush from instrumentalism to claiming that we know 
everything about them because they are “like us”. In fact, it is their very unlikeness – 
and the corresponding unknowing – that should inspire, at least in part, an attitude of 
reverential respect” (Linzey in Regan and Linzey: 2010:xiv). 
!
Giving animals reverential respect in, and because of, their otherness is a position I 
support. In this sense I follow Derrida, who complicates and multiplies the differences 
between human and the other animals, while at the same time not asserting human 
exceptionalism through reason and language. That is, Derrida’s “difference theory” is 
based on singularity, which permits an appreciation of the rich diversity among animals 
(Calarco 2015:50), a position echoed in contemporary times by the compassionate 
conservation approach. It is the particular animal - the individual - that matters. Gazing 
into the eyes of his cat, Derrida saw God (and as a result generated an important essay on 
the nature of the animal). The dependence on the individual encounter between human 
and another animal, is also stressed by Donna Haraway, who in spite of being, according 
to Calarco, an “indistinction theorist” (Calarco 2015:51), maintains that it is necessary to 
get down and dirty with the individual animal. It is only in the messy co-entanglements 
between human and animal that insight can be reached. In this respect, I reject Deleuze 
and Guattarri’s indistinction theory, as neither Deleuze and Guattari even like cats or dogs, 
never mind getting into untidy entanglements with them. Nevertheless, Deleuze and 
Guattari provide a rich source of metaphor for re-reading the human animal relationship. 
Their “becoming-animal”, a slippery concept that describes process more than being, 
effectively collapses the dominant status of human beings over other animals. This idea 
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along with the concept of “writing like a rat” is a useful construct in describing my artistic 
praxis in which reason appears to be suspended. Writing like a rat finds sympathetic 
resonance with the notion of the hand as a “thinking” part of the body – an idea that plays 
into the emphasis that Heidegger places on the importance of the (human) hand – a 
thought which resonates with me, while at the same time I reject the implications of 
human exceptionalism implied by the idea of the hand’s exclusivity to human beings. 
!
Dependency on the hand draws attention to the other aspect of this research, which is 
that which took place in the studio beyond the reach of theoretical notes and linguistic 
conundrums of this dissertation. It is tempting to say that the studio is a place where 
thought is suspended. That would not be true. One has to be a rational animal in order to 
manipulate paint or clay and to handle an angle grinder. Rather, the thinking that takes 
place in the studio is of a different order than that which takes place in front of the 
computer. It is of a non-linguistic kind. This can be said to mimic the human animal 
exchange, which I, following Beck, propose is fundamentally different from human 
symbolic language. Thinking in the studio is through what the animal theologian the Rev. 
Andrew Linzey calls “imagination” – not imagination as in fantasy, but imagination as a 
means of “grasping truth” (Linzey in Regan and Linzey 2010: xiii). Imagination takes time, 
work and patience in order “to grasp the truth of what is not ourselves” (2010:xvii). What 
Linzey is arguing for is a kind of truth that cannot be accessed via the normal discourses of 
philosophy and rational debate, but through “the power of perception, the capacity for 
feeling and imagination” (Linzey in Regan and Linzey 2010: xvii). Imagination is the 
capacity to reach beyond that anthropocentric “I” to the animal “you”– something which 
should be done with respect and humility for the otherness of the animal. That is, a 
different sort of text, emerged from the confines of my studio, one that nevertheless 
evolved from the same impetus that drove this manuscript. It spoke a fundamentally 
different language to that read or spoken. It appealed to affect rather than reason; the 
seen and felt, instead of the logical and rational. In this sense making art begins to 
approximate the model of the human animal exchange and emphasises the intuitive 
nature of the interchange. As Ron Broglio suggested artists, freed from language and 
reason “(including the limits of reason)”, are the ones who are “most likely to offer new 
insights into the question of the animal” (Broglio 2011:xx). The dependency on the hand 
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stresses that the act of making art is an embodied one. Embodiedness opposes thinking 
with, what Elizabeth Costello calls, “fullness” and “the sensation of being” (Coetzee 
1999:78). Moreover, like the communication of other animals it is through the body – the 
semiotics of the body – that animals communicate. As I discussed in Chapter 4, such as the 
bow dogs use to invite each other to play. 
!
One of the ironies of The Alice Sequence is, that in spite of my critique of the hegemony 
of the “word”, I depend on the word, not only, and most obviously, within the pages of 
this dissertation, but also in the studio, a place where I argue the logos should be banned 
in favour of affect. But the word has always been central to The Alice Sequence, not only in 
the aphorisms I write on the walls of the galleries, but also in the pages of the diaries I 
have kept throughout the sequence. It is in this sense that Lewis Carroll's tales offer such a 
rich source of metaphor. Carroll's games with language and logic illustrate the slippery 
and evasive nature of the relationship between the signified and the signifier and as such 
provided an impetus for this research. In 2016 I continued with my practice of keeping a 
diary of notes, drawings and collages. But instead of confining myself to the usual A3 
format, I used larger A0 sheets of paper in landscape format to keep a running 
commentary of my thoughts and actions (Fig 7.2.).  
 
 
Fig 7.2. Wilma Cruise, two pages from Diary 2016 (2016). Mixed media on paper, 70 x 
100 cm. 
 
This process implies self-reflection – a considered action – which was not the case. Instead, 
I allowed the hand to do “the thinking”. Without pausing to consider the consequences of 
my actions, rapid intuitive decisions were taken about making a note, scribbling a mark, or 
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pasting an image. In this way approximately sixty diary pages emerged from the paper 
studio to form a ribbon of images, aphorisms, statements and wishes. These represented 
a stuttering attempt to find meaning in the field of the animal turn, a process which acted 
in parallel to the creation of the sculptures and the writing of this dissertation. 
 
Occasionally, when following the paper trail of this research, I stumbled across surprising 
texts. Such was the discovery late in the writing of this dissertation of The 8th Duino Elegy 
by Rainer Maria Rilke, which recalls one of the phrases that initiated my research. Made by 
Elizabeth Costello in the second of her lectures, she stated that it is via the poets (and 
poetics) that understanding with the animals might be reached: “I urge you to read the 
poets who return the living electric being to language” (Coetzee 2004:111). Heeding her 
clarion call, I quote Rilke in full. The 8th Duino Elegy thus serves to both summarise and 
provide a full stop to my search.  
!
 
With their whole gaze the creatures behold what is. Only our eyes 
are as though reversed, and set like traps around themselves, 
keeping us inside. That there is something out there 
we know only from the animals' countenance, 
for we turn even the young child, forcing her 
to look backwards at the shapes we make, 
not outwards into the open, which is reflected 
in the animals' eyes. 
 
Free from death. We alone see that. 
For the animals, their death is, as it were, completed. 
What's ahead is God. And when they move, 
they move in timelessness, as fountains do. 
 
Never, not for a single day, do we let 
the space before us be so unbounded 
that the blooming of one flower is forever. 
We are always making it into a world 
and never letting it be nothing: the pure, 
the unconstructed, which we breathe 
and endlessly know, and need not crave. 
Sometimes a child loses herself in this stillness 
and gets shaken out of it. Or a person dies 
and becomes it. For when death draws near, we look beyond it 
with an animal's wide gaze. Lovers come close 
to the open, filled with wonder, 
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when the beloved doesn't block the view. 
It surges up behind the other, unbidden. But it's hard 
to grasp, so it becomes again the world. 
 
Ever turned toward what we create, 
we see only reflections of the open, overshadowed by us. 
Except when an animal mutely looks us through and through. 
This is our fate: to stand 
in our own way. Forever 
in the way. 
 
If the confident animal, coming toward us, 
had a mind like ours, 
the change in him would stun us. 
But his own being is endless to him, undefined, and without regard 
for his condition: clear, 
like his eyes. Where we see future, 
he sees all, and himself 
in all, made whole for always. 
 
And yet in the warm, watchful animal 
there is the weight of a great sadness. 
For what at times assaults us 
clings to him as well: the sense 
that what we strive to reach 
was once closer and more real 
and infinitely tender. 
Here all is distance – 
there it was breath. 
After that first home 
the second feels invaded, and windy. 
 
And we: always and everywhere spectators, 
turned toward the stuff of our lives, and never outward. 
It all spills over us. We put it to order. 
It falls apart. We order it again 
and fall apart ourselves. 
Who has turned us around like this? 
Whatever we do, we are in the posture 
of one who is about to depart. 
Like a person pausing and lingering 
for a moment on the last hill 
where he can still see his whole valley – 
this is how we live, forever 
taking our leave (Rilke 1923).  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
183 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, C. J. 2015. The sexual politics of meat: A Feminist-vegetarian critical theory. 
[Online] Kindle edition. Bloomsbury Academic. Available: 
https://www.amazon.com/Sexual-Politics-Meat-Feminist-Vegetarian-Revelations-
ebook/dp/B016N2QTU8/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr. [cited 
2017-01-10]. 
 
Aloi, G. 2011. Beyond animal liberation: An interview with Peter Singer in Antennae: The 
Journal of Nature in Visual Culture (19) Winter: 9–14. 
 
Aloi, G. and Bennison, R. 2011. Sue Coe: I am an animal rights activist artist. Antennae: 
The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture (19) Winter: 106–119. 
 
Anon. n.d. Collins Dictionary, [online] Available: http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-
cobuild/neo%20shamanism [Accessed 2015, December 12]. 
 
Andrews, K. 2016. "Animal Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2016 Edition), edited by N Edward. 
Available:  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/cognition-animal/>. 
[Accessed 2016, 9 July]. 
 
Atterton, P. & Calarco, M. (eds). 2004. Animal philosophy: Ethics and identity. London and 
NY: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
 
Baker, S. 2002. What does becoming-animal look like? in Representing animals, edited by 
N Rothfels. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press: 67–98. 
 
Baker, S. 2003. Sloughing the human, in Zoontologies: The question of the animal, edited 
by C Wolfe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 147–164. 
Baker, S. 2007. What is the postmodern animal? in The animals reader: The essential 
classic and contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New York: 
Berg: 278–288 
Baker, S. 2011. What are the relevant questions? Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual 
Culture (19) Winter: 5–6. 
 
Baker, S. 2013. Artist/animal. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Baker, S. 2013. Artist/animal. [Online] Kindle edition. University of Minnesota Press. 
Available: < https://www.amazon.com/Artist-Animal-Posthumanities-Steve-
Baker/dp/0816680671> [cited 2016-01-17]. 
 
Bann, S & Allen, W (eds.) Interpreting contemporary art. London: Reaktion Books.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
184 
Beck, J. 2013.  Why we can’t say what animals think. Philosophical Psychology, (26): 520–
546. [Online]. Available: http://www.yorku.ca/jbeck/why-we-cant-say-  
what-animal.pdf. [2016, June 12]. 
 
Bekoff, M. 2001. Observations of scent-marking and discriminating self from others by a 
domestic dog (Canis familiaris): tales of displaced yellow snow. Behavioural Processes, 
[Online], 55 (2), 75-79. Available: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ez.sun.ac.za/science/article/pii/S0376635701001425. 
[cited 2016-07-14]. 
 
Bekoff, M. 2007. The emotional lives of animals. [Online] Kindle edition. California: New 
World Library. Available: < https://www.amazon.com/Emotional-Lives-Animals-Scientist-
Explores/dp/1577316290> [cited June 12, 2015]. 
  
Bekoff, M. 2007. Wild justice and fair play: cooperation, forgiveness and morality in 
animals, in The animals reader: The essential classic and contemporary writings, edited by 
L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New York: Berg, 72–90. 
 
Bekoff, M. 2015. Compassionate Conservation: More than “Welfarism Gone Wild” [Online].  
Available: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-
emotions/201502/compassionate-conservation-more-welfarism-gone-wild . [2016, 
August 16]. 
 
Bekoff, M. 2016. Do animals have emotions? Of course they do! [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.newworldlibrary.com/ArticleDetails/tabid/230/ArticleID/15/Default.aspx#.VsB
HVrQRqi4. [2016, February 16]. 
 
Bekoff, M. 2016. Is an unnamed cow less sentient than a named cow? [Online]. 
Available: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-emotions/201602/is-
unidentified-cow-less-sentient-familiar-cow. [2016, February 7]. 
 
Bentham, J. 2007. Principles of Morals and Legislation, in The animals reader: The 
essential classic and contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and 
New York: Berg, 8–9. 
 
Berger, J. 2007. Why look at animals? in The animals reader: The essential classic and 
contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New York: Berg, 252–
261. 
 
Best, S. n.d. My dog or your child? Ethical dilemmas and the hierarchy of moral value, 
[Online]. Available: http://www.drstevebest.org/MyDogOr.htm. [ 2016, June 9]. 
 
Blackham, H.J. 1961. Six existentialist thinkers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Blocker, G.H. 1979. Philosophy of art. London: Charles Scribner & Son. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
185 
 
Borm, J. & Graves, M. Anatomy of restlessness: Uncollected writings. London and 
Basingstoke: Picador.  
 
Broglio, R. 2011. Surface encounters: Thinking with animals and art. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Burgin, V. 1991. Perverse space in Interpreting contemporary art, edited by S Bann and W 
Allen. London: Reaktion Books: 124–138. 
 
Buchanan, B. 2012. Being with animals: Reconsidering Heidegger’s animal ontology, in 
Animals and the human imagination: A companion to animal studies, edited by A Gross 
and A Vallely. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press: 265–288. 
 
Calarco, M. 2008. Zoographies: The question of the animal from Heidegger to Derrida. 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Calarco, M. 2015. Thinking through animals: Identity, difference, indistinction. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Carroll, L. 1982. The Complete illustrated works of Lewis Carroll. London: Chancellor 
Press. 
 
Carstens, D. 2016. Tricksters, animals, new materialities and indigenous wisdoms. About 
to be published in Indigenous Creatures: …. Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Chatwin, B. 1997. Anatomy of restlessness: Uncollected writings, edited by J Borm, and M 
Graves. London and Basingstoke: Picador.  
 
Cherry, K. 2015. What's the Skinner box in psychology? [Online].  
Available: http://psychology.about.com/od/sindex/g/def_skinnerbox.htm. [2015, April 9].  
 
Cherry, K. n.d. What is negative reinforcement, [online]. Available:  
http://psychology.about.com/od/operantconditioning/f/negative-reinforcement.htm 
[Accessed 2015, April 8]. 
 
Christov-Bakargiev, C. 1998. William Kentridge. Société des Expositions du Palais des 
Beaux-Arts de Bruxelles. 
 
Cixous, H.  2004. Birds, women and writing, in Animal philosophy: Ethics and identity, 
edited by P Atterton & M Calarco. London and NY: Continuum International Publishing 
Group: 165–167. 
Cixous in Dobson, J. 2004. Hélène Cixous (1937 - ), in Contemporary critical theorists, 
edited by J Simons. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: 118–134. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
186 
Coetzee, J.M. 2004. Elizabeth Costello – eight lessons. London: Vintage Books.  
 
Coetzee, J.M. 1999. The lives of animals. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Coetzee, J.M. 1999. Disgrace. London: Vintage Books.  
 
Coward, H.G. 1985. Jung and eastern thought. New York: State University of New York 
Press. 
 
Cruise, A.J. 2014. Ecce animot (Behold the animal): How language affects our treatment of 
(other) animals, [Online]. Available: http://greenactionnews.net/blog/ecce-animot-
behold-the-animal/. [2015, January 20]. 
 
Cruise, A.J. 2014. Delinearizing the insuperable line: deconstruction as animal ethic. 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University. 
 
Cruise, A.J. 2012. The question of vulnerability makes some animals more equal than 
others. (Unpublished paper for Animal Studies Round Table in Africa, 2 November, 2012, 
Centre for Humanities Research, UWC). 
 
Cruise, W. 1997. Artist as subject: subject as object. (Masters) Thesis. Submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Fine Arts in the 
Department of History of Art and Fine Arts at the University Of South Africa. 
 
Cruise, W. 2000. In search of rapRack – Shadowlands. Johannesburg: Botsotso Publishing.  
 
Cruise, W. 2007. in Schmahmann, B. Cocks, Asses &… (I can’t hear). Johannesburg: David 
Krut Publishing. (Catalogue for an exhibition held at the University of Johannesburg 7 to 
28 November.)  
 
Cruise, W. 2011. Hybrid herds. Ceramics: Art and Perception 86: 50–53. 
 
Cruise, W. 2012. Preface in Wilma Cruise: The Alice Diaries, edited by G Younge. 
(Catalogue for an exhibition at Circa on Jellicoe, Johannesburg 25 July to 25 August.) Art 
+ Text. 
Davis, R.B. (ed.) 2010. Alice in Wonderland in philosophy: Curiouser and curiouser. 
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Deleuze, G. & Guatarri, F. 1987. A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F.  2004. Becoming–animal, in Animal philosophy: Ethics and 
identity, edited by P Atterton and M Calarco. London and NY: Continuum International 
Publishing Group: 88–100. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
187 
 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. 2007. Becoming–animal, in The animals reader: The essential 
classic and contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New York: 
Berg: 37–50. 
De Montaigne, M. An Apology for Raymond Sebond, in The animals reader: The essential 
classic and contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New York: 
Berg: 57–58. 
Derrida, J. 1994. The Hélène Cixous reader, edited by S Sellers. [Online] Kindle edition. 
[London and New York: Routledge and Taylor and Francis e-Library 2003]. Available: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/H%C3%A9l%C3%A8ne-Cixous-Reader-Susan-
Sellers/dp/041504930X/. [cited Mar. 10, 2016]. 
Derrida, J. 1995. Points… Interviews 1974–1994, edited by E Weber and translated by P 
Kamuf and others. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 284. 
Derrida, J. & Wills, D. 2002. The animal that therefore I am (more to follow). Critical Inquiry 
28(2), Winter: 369–418. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Derrida, J. 2008. The animal that therefore I am (more to follow), translated by J Wills. New 
York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Dobson, J. 2004.  Hélène Cixous (1937 - ), in Contemporary critical theorists, edited by J 
Simons. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: 118–134. 
 
Dunn, G.A. & McDonald, B. 2010. Six impossible things to do before breakfast, in Alice in 
Wonderland in philosophy: Curiouser and curiouser, edited by RB Davis. Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons: 61–78. 
 
Francione, G.L. 2007. Introduction to animal rights: your child or the dog. Philadelphia: 
Templeton University Press.    
 
Gallager, A. 2012. Damien Hirst. London: Tate Publishing. 
 
Geers, K. 1990. Gallery’s crucial role in ‘showcasing art’, The Star Tonight, 17 October: 10. 
 
Gigliotti, C. 2011. The case for animal rights an interview with Tom and Nancy Regan in 
Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture, (19), Winter: 42–49. 
 
Grimm, J & Grimm, W. 2014.The original folk and fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm: The 
complete first edition. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Gross, A and Vallely, A. (eds.) 2012. Animals and the human imagination: a companion to 
animal studies. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press. 
 
Gunter, E, personal correspondence and interview. May 2016, Cape Town. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
188 
Haraway, D. 2008. When species meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Hauser, M., Berwick, R.C., Tattersall, I., Ryan, M.J., Watumull, J., Chomsky, N. & Lewontin, 
R.C. 2014. The mystery of language evolution. [Online]. Front. Psychol. 07 May 2014. 
Available:  doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00401 
journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00401/abstract. [2015, Nov. 19]. 
 
Hearne, V. (Introduction by Donald McGaig) 2007. Adam’s task: Calling animals by name. 
[Online]. Kindle edition. Canada: Skyhorse Publishing Inc. Originally Published: New York: 
Knopf, 1986. Available: https://www.amazon.com/Adams-Task-Calling-Animals-Name-
ebook/dp/B00CKX8WW8/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1468918724&sr=1-
1&keywords=Adam%E2%80%99s+task%3A+calling+animals+by+name. [cited Apr. 25, 
2016]. 
 
Herzog, H. 2010. Some we love, some we hate, some we eat: Why it is so hard to think 
straight about animals. New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Hess, E.  2008. Nim Chimpsky: The Chimp Who Would Be Human. [Online]. Kindle Edition. 
[Bantam]: Amazon Digital Services LLC. Available: https://www.amazon.com/Nim-
Chimpsky-Chimp-Would-Human-
ebook/dp/B0013TPY8K/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=. [cited Mar. 
12, 2016.]. 
 
Heyes, C.M. 1998. Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 
[Online] (21): 101–148.   
Available: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/117063/1/download.14pdf.pdf. [cited 2016-07-12] 
  
Hirst, D. n.d. [Online].  
Available: http://www.damienhirst.com/texts1/series/nat-history. [2015, Jan. 11]. 
 
Honderich, T. 1995. The Oxford companion to philosophy. S.v. ‘Operationalism’. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hume, D. 1888. A treatise of human nature. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Available: 
https://books.google.co.za/books?id=o7ENAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=…
and+no+truth+appears+to+me+more+evident+than+that+beasts+are+endowed+with+
thought+and+reason+as+well+as+man.+The+arguments+are+in+this+case+so+obviou
s,+that+they+never+escape+the+most+stupid+and+ignorant”+(Hume+Treatise+of+Hu
man+Nature,+176).+Nature,+176&source=bl&ots=3YnWzHJXdg&sig=aLYkUdAzhS2QrK
lB-
pgUqCq7DdU&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=…and%20no%20truth%20app
ears%20to%20me%20more%20evident%20than%20that%20beasts%20are%20endowed
%20with%20thought%20and%20reason%20as%20well%20as%20man.%20The%20argu
ments%20are%20in%20this%20case%20so%20obvious%2C%20that%20they%20never%
20escape%20the%20most%20stupid%20and%20ignorant”%20(Hume%20Treatise%20of
%20Human%20Nature%2C%20176).%20Nature%2C%20176&f=false. [Accessed 2016, 
14 July]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
189 
Hurn, S. 2012. Humans and Other Animals: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Human- Animal 
Interactions. [Online]. Kindle Edition. [Amazon Digital Services LLC]. Available: 
https://www.amazon.com/Humans-Other-Animals-Cross-Cultural-Perspectives-
ebook/dp/B007STZYU2/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=#nav-
subnav> [cited June, 29, 2015]. 
Hyman, R. 1989. As quoted in Clever Hans phenomenon. [Online]. Available: 
http://skepdic.com/cleverhans.html. [2015, June 18]. 
Hyman, R. 1989. The elusive quarry: A scientific appraisal of psychical research. Buffalo, 
N.Y.: Prometheus Books: 425. 
Irigaray L. 2004. Animal compassion, in Animal philosophy: Ethics and identity, edited by 
P Atterton and M Calarco. London and NY: Continuum International Publishing Group: 
193–195. 
Jamieson, D. (ed.) 2000. Singer and his critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Kafka, F. 1996. Metamorphosis and other stories. [Online]. Kindle edition. [Dover Thrift 
Editions]. Translated by S Appelbaum. Available: 
https://www.amazon.com/Metamorphosis-Other-Stories-Thrift-Editions/dp/0486290301. 
[cited: Apr. 15, 2015]. 
Kalof, L. & Fitzgerald, A (eds.) 2007. The animals reader: The essential classic and 
contemporary writings. Oxford and New York: Berg. 
Kerstetter, M. 2009. Coming to terms with Damien Hirst. [Online]. 
Available: www.escapeintolife.com/essays/ [2016, Feb. 13]. 
 
Kolhatkar, S. 2016. Racism fueled outrage over cincinnati gorilla killing. [Online] Available: 
http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/racism_fueled_outrage_over_cincinnati_gorilla_ki
lling_20160602. [2016, June 8]. 
 
Konrad Lorenz, n.d. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.muskingum.edu/~psych/psycweb/history/lorenz.htm [2015, Mar. 27] 
 
Kristeva, J. 1995. New maladies of the soul, translated by R Guiberman. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Lamb C.A. 2011. A dissertation upon roast pig and other essays. [Online]. 
Available: www.angelfire.com/nv/mf/elia1/pig.htm [cited 2015-11-8]. 
 
Linzey, A. 2010. Preface: Animals, literature, and the virtues, in Animals in modern 
literature: Other nations, edited by T Regan and A Linzey. Waco. Texas: Baylor University 
Press:ix–xx. 
 
Lockwood, A. 2016. The pig in thin air. [Online]  
Available: https://www.academia.edu/23234058/The_Pig_In_Thin_Air. [2016, April 22]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
190 
Low, P. 2012. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, edited by J Panksepp et al. 
[Online] Available: 
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf. [Accessed 
11 July 2016]. 
 
Macey, D. 2000. The Penquin dictionary of critical theory. S.v. ‘logical positivitism’, 
‘intentional fallacy’. London: Penguin Books. 
Macy, J & Barrows, A. (translators) The 8th Duino Elegy. [Online]. By R Rilke.  
Available: http://www.joannamacy.net/poemsilove/rilke-favorites/193-
8thduinoelegyrainermariarilke.html. [Accessed 2016, 16 July]. 
 
Marais, E. 1971. My friends the baboons. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau. 
 
Martell, Y. 2010. Beatrice and Virgil. Canongate: Edinburgh, London, New York, 
Melbourne.  
Medical Dictionary n.d [Online]. S.v. neo-shaminism. 
Available: http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/neo-shamanism. [2016, Jan. 7]. 
 
Merriman-Webster n.d. [Online]. S.v. menagerie, animism. 
Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/. [2016, Jan. 8]. 
 
Meyer, U. 1970. How to explain pictures to a dead hare in ARTnews posted  03/20/15 
Artist, Academic, Shaman: Joseph Beuys On His Mystical Objects, In 1970. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.artnews.com/2015/03/20/academic-artist-scholar-shaman-joseph-
beuys-on-his-mystical-objects-in-1970/. [2016, Jan. 16]. 
 
Morgan, S. 1995. An Interview with Damien Hirst, [Online].  
Available: www.damienhirst.com/texts/1996/jan--stuart-morgan. [2015, Dec. 5]. 
Naudé, D. 2012. Animal Farm. Munich, London, New York: Prestel. 
   
Obrist, H.U. 2008. ‘An Interview’, Beyond belief (Other Criteria/White Cube, 2008) 
Available: http://www.damienhirst.com/saint-sebastian-exquisite-pai. [2016, Feb, 20]. 
 
Orgaz. L. F. & Piccinini, P. 2007. The Naturally artificial world. Originally published as: 
(tender) creatures, exhibition catalogue. Artium. A conversation between Patricia Piccinini 
and Laura Fernandex Orgaz. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.patriciapiccinini.net/printessay.php?id=29. [2015, Jan. 21]. 
 
Oxford Dictionary n.d.  [online]. S.v. ‘prosody’  
Available: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ [2015, Dec. 9]. 
 
Patten, B. 2008. The Logic of Alice: Clear thinking in Wonderland. [Online] Kindle Edition. 
Prometheus Books. Available: https://www.amazon.com/Logic-Alice-Clear-Thinking-
Wonderland/dp/159102675X. [Cited 11 November 2015]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
191 
Pickover, M. 2008. Global lessons and future strategy a report compiled for beauty without 
cruelty South Africa. [Online].  
Available: http://www.bwcsa.co.za/files/South%20African%20Vivisection%20Report.pdf. 
[2016, May 20]. 
 
Pinnock, D. 2014. Smarter than you think. The Big Issue. Collector’s edition. 2014/2015: 
30–31. 
 
Project Nim, 2011. Film. Directed by James Marsh. UK: BBC Films, Passion Pictures, Red 
Box Films. 
 
Pryor, A.E. 2012. Heidegger and the dog whisperer: Imagining interspecies kindness, in 
Animals and the human imagination: a companion to animal studies, edited by A Gross & 
A Vallely. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press: 289–306. 
 
Regan, T. and Linzey, A. (eds.) 2010. Animals in modern literature: Other nations. Waco. 
Texas: Baylor University Press 
 
Regan, T. 1985. The case for animal rights, in Defense of Animals, edited by P Singer. New 
York: Basil Blackwell: 13–26. Available: http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-
m/regan03.htm 
 
Regan, T. 1985. Animal rights and human obligations, in Defense of Animals, edited by P 
Singer. New York: Basil Blackwell: 13–26.  
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic983317.files/Readings%20October%2026/Agai
nstZoos_DaleJamieson.pdf. [2016, Jan. 9]. 
 
Regan, T. 2006. Defending animal rights. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.  
 
Reynolds, J.  2004. Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: intertwining embodiment and alterity. 
Ohio Univeristy Press. 
 
Richards, K. M. 2008. Derrida reframed. London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 
 
Rilke, R.M. 1923. The 8th Duino Elegy. [Online]. Translated by J Macy and A Barrows.  
Available: http://www.joannamacy.net/poemsilove/rilke-favorites/193-
8thduinoelegyrainermariarilke.html. [Accessed 2016, 16 July]. 
 
Safina, 2015. Beyond words: What animals think and feel. [Online] Kindle edition. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company. Available: https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Words-
What-Animals-Think/dp/0805098887. [cited 22 February 2016]. 
 
Salaud J. 2011. Let’s be simple for starters: Reflections on Elisabeth de Fontenay’s ‘Le 
Silence des bêtes, la philosophie à l’epreuve de l’animalité’: For the defence of animals. 
Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture (19), Winter: 120–124. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
192 
Sanders, C.R. & Arluke, A. 2007. Speaking for dogs, in The animals reader: The essential 
classic and contemporary writings, edited by L Kalof, L. & A Fitzgerald. Oxford and New 
York: Berg: 63–71. 
Schmahmann, B. 2007. Cocks, Asses &... Johannesburg: David Krut Publishing. 
(Catalogue for an exhibition held at the University of Johannesburg, 7 to 28 November 
2007.)  
 
Scruton, R. 2011. The moral status of animals. Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual 
Culture (19), Winter: 25–40. 
 
Selbach, U. 2012. The lives of animals: Wittgenstein, Coetzee, and the extent of the 
sympathetic imagination, in Animals and the human imagination: A companion to animal 
studies, edited by A Gross & A Vallely. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Selden, R. & Widdowson, P. 1993. A reader's guide to contemporary literary theory. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Sellers, S. (ed.) 1994. The Hélène Cixous reader. [Online] Kindle edition. [London and New 
York: Routledge and Taylor and Francis e-Library 2003]. Available: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/H%C3%A9l%C3%A8ne-Cixous-Reader-Susan-
Sellers/dp/041504930X/. [cited Mar. 10, 2016] 
 
Simons, J. (ed.). 2004. Contemporary critical theorists. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.  
 
Singer, P. 1989. All animals are equal, in Animal rights and human obligations, edited by T 
Regan & P Singer. New Jersey: Prentice Hall: 148–162.  
Available: http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf. [2015, Oct. 
17]. 
 
Singer, P. 2011. The troubled life of Nim Chimpsky. NY Times Book Review 58(15), 
October 13.  Available:!http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2011/08/18/troubled-life-
nim-chimpsky/m [cited May 18, 2015] 
Spurling, L. (ed) Sigmund Freud: Critical assessments Vols I, III and IV.  London: 
Routledge. 
 
Stamp, J. 2013. The 64-Square Grid Design of ‘Through the Looking Glass’ 
The sequel to Alice's Adventure's in Wonderland was designed to be a playable, albeit 
whimsical chess problem. [Online]  
Available: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-64-square-grid-design-of-
through-the-looking-glass-24546391/#KASksQluRfWZD5AZ.99. [2016, Mar. 21]. 
 
Story, S. 1951. Auguste Rodin. London: Phaidon: Plate 12. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
193 
Sullivan, G. 2010. Art practice as research: Inquiry in visual arts. Los Angeles, London, New 
Delhi, Singapore, Washington D.C.: Sage Publications. 
 
Swanepoel, N. 2005. Spirit guards: A squad of ceramic dogs in South Africa. Ceramics Art 
and Perception (61), 66–69. 
 
Swanepoel, N. Personal correspondence, 2014. 
 
Terrace, H. 2011. Can chimps converse?: In response to The troubled life of Nim 
Chimpsky. NY Times Book Review November 24 2011 Issue.  
Available: www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/can-chimps-converse-
exchange/?pagination=false. [cited 2015, Aug. 23]. 
The Penquin dictionary of critical theory. 2000.  S.v. ‘logical positivitism’, ‘intentional 
fallacy’. London: Penguin Books. 
Trethowan, J, personal conversation, Cape Town, June 2015.!
!
Tully, A-M. 2012. The Alice sequence, in Wilma Cruise: The Alice Diaries, edited by G 
Younge. Art + Text. (Catalogue for an exhibition at Circa on Jellicoe, Johannesburg.)  
 
Tully, A-M. 2014. Figuring the animal autobiography: Animals and landscapes in Daniel 
Naudé’s Exhibition African Scenery & Animals. Journal of Literary Studies 30(4), 
December: 104–127. 
 
Urpeth, J. 2004. Animal becomings, in Animal philosophy: Ethics and identity, edited by P 
Atterton and M Calarco. London and NY: Continuum International Publishing Group: 101–
110. 
 
Van den Boogerd, B.,  Bloom, B. & Casadio, M. Marlene Dumas. London and New York: 
Phaidon. 
 
Vidyasagar, T. 2016. We mightn’t like it, but there are ethical reasons to use animals in 
medical research. [Online] 
Available: https://theconversation.com/we-mightnt-like-it-but-there-are-ethical-reasons-
to-use-animals-in-medical-research-58878 [2016, May 15]. 
Watt, Y. 2011. Artists, animals and ethics. Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual 
Culture (19), Winter: 62–72. 
 
Weil, K. 2010. A report on the animal turn. Differences: A journal on Feminist Cultural 
Studies (21) 2:1–23. [Online]. 
Available: http://differences.dukejournals.org/content/21/2/1.full.pdf+html. [cited 2016-
07-26]. 
 
Weil, K. 2012. Thinking animals. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
194 
Clever Hans, the wonderhorse. [Online]. Wild Equus - Equilibre. Available: 
wildequus.org/library/hans-the-wonderhorse/ [2015 May 18]. 
 
Williams, G & Baker, S. 2001. Where the wild things are: An interview with Steve Baker. 
Cabinet Magazine [Online], (4), Animals, Fall: n.p. 
Available: http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/4/stevebaker.php [cited 2015 June, 2]. 
 
Wolfe, C. 2003. In the shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion: Language, ethics and the question 
of the animal, in Animal rites, American culture, the discourse of species and posthumanist 
theory, edited by C Wolfe. Chicago & London: The Chicago University Press: 44–94. 
 
Wolfe, C. 2003. In the shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion: Language, ethics and the question 
of the animal, in Zoontologies: The question of the animal, edited by C Wolfe. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1–57. 
 
Wolfe, C. (ed.) Animal rites, American culture, the discourse of species and posthumanist 
theory. Chicago & London: The Chicago University Press. 
 
Wolfe, C. (ed.) Zoontologies: The question of the animal. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Wolfe, C. 2010. What is posthumanism? Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Woodward, W. 2008. The animal gaze: Animal subjectivities in Southern African 
Narratives. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.  
 
Wright, E. 1984. Psychoanalytic criticism: Theory in practice. New York: Methuen. 
 
Wynne, C.D.L. & Udell, M.A.R. 2013. (Second Edition) Animal cognition: Evolution 
behaviour & cognition. UK and USA: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Yanez, D. 2010. You are what you read. [Online] Available: 
http://blog.art21.org/2010/03/04/you-are-what-you-read/#.V0A16LQRqi5. [2016, Jan. 
19]. 
Younge, G. 2012. Countdown, in Wilma Cruise: The Alice Diaries, edited by G Younge. 
Catalogue for an exhibition at Circa on Jellicoe, Johannesburg: Art + Text. 24 July to 25 
August.)  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
195 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
PREFACE 
Fig 0.1 Wilma Cruise The 100 Page Diary installation view, Kizo Art Gallery Durban 2008. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Fig 1.1 Wilma Cruise, Adam and Eve Before the Fall (2006–2007). Ceramic on steel base, 
Adam 187 cm, Eve 100 cm. (Photographed by Carla Crafford). Private collection. 
Fig 1.2. Wilma Cruise Blue Doris (1988). Ceramic, 55 x 90 cm. (Photographed by the 
artist). Private collection. 
Fig 1.3. Sue Coe Finning (2011). (Aloi & Bennison 2011: 110). Antennae Issue 19. 
Fig 1.4.!Patricia Piccinini The Young Family (2002). Silicone, polyurethane, leather, 
plywood, human hair, 80 x 150 x 110 cm. Photograph by Graham Baring, Courtesy of the 
artist and Haunch of Venison 
file://localhost/(http/::weirdfictionreview.com:2012:09:patricia-piccininis-mythic-
imagination:) 
Fig 1.5. Damien Hirst Mother and child (Divided) (1993). Glass, stainless steel, Perspex, 
acrylic paint, cow, calf and formaldehyde solution, 2 parts: 2086 x 3225 x 1092 mm, 2086 
x 3225 x 1092 mm, 2 parts: 1136 x 1689 x 622 mm, 1136 x 1689 x 622 mm. 
(http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/hirst-mother-and-child-divided-t12751) 
Fig 1.6. The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991). Glass, 
painted steel, silicone, monofilament, shark and formaldehyde solution, 217 x 542 x 180 
cm. (http://www.damienhirst.com/the-physical-impossibility-of). 
Fig 1.7.!Joseph Beuys. I like America and America likes me. 1974. Performance New York. 
Photograph by Caroline Tisdall. Available: 
https://viewfromaburrow.com/2015/07/23/joseph-beuys-i-like-america-and-america-
likes-me/ 
Fig 1.8. Mary Britton Clouse Nemo – Portrait/Self Portrait (2005). Digital pigment print on 
Sekishu paper. Available: (http://www.upc-online.org/thinking/framed-clouse.html). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
196 
Fig 1.9. Guillermo Habacuc Vargas You Are What You Read (Eres lo que lees) (2007). 
Installation: dog, dog food, rope. Gallery of Managua, Nicaragua. 
http://fractalenlightenment.com/633/artwork/you-are-what-you-read | 
FractalEnlightenment.com.  
Fig 1.10. Homo Erectus and Homo Robustus (1999–2000). Ceramic, 183 cm each. 
(Photographed by the artist). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 1.11. Wilma Cruise Nicholas I (1990–1993). Bronze (edition 3), 30 x 43 x 33 cm. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp). 
Fig 1.12. Wilma Cruise Does a Sheep Know and I Think Therefore I Am (2004). Digital 
prints 61 x 82 cm each. 
Fig 1.13. Chanticleer (2007). Ceramic, 150 x 170 cm. Private collection. (Photographed by 
Carla Crafford).  
 
CHAPTER 2 
Fig 2.1 Wilma Cruise The Animals in Alice (2011) 
Fig 2.2 Wilma Cruise The Cat, The Dog and The Hare (2011). Beeswax, wax crayon, 
charcoal and oil stick on paper, 135 x 138 cm each. 
Fig 2.3.  Wilma Cruise The Pig (2011). Beeswax, wax crayon, charcoal and oil stick on 
paper, 135 x 138 cm. 
Fig 2.4. Wilma Cruise The All-Knowing Pig (2015). Drypoint and chine-collé (edition 15), 
43.7 x 45 cm.  
Fig. 2.5. Wilma Cruise If you turn into a pig I will have nothing more to do with you (2012). 
Ceramic on steel base, 112 x 44 x 44 cm. (Photographed by Ant Strack). Artist’s collection. 
Fig. 2.6. Wilma Cruise Poor Horace: Watching The Hours (2009). Acrylic resin and mixed 
media, 267 x 155 x 80 cm. (Photographed by Anne-Marie Tully). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.7. Wilma Cruise The Alice Diaries (2013). A3 folios, mixed media on paper, 42 x 30 
cm. 
Fig 2.8. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Pig (2012). Painted ceramic, 44 x 45 x 30 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.9. Wilma Cruise Hybrid Piglet (2011). Ceramic on steel base, 105 cm. 
(Photographed by the artist). Destroyed. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
197 
Fig 2.10. Wilma Cruise Alice: Self Portrait II (2011), mixed media drawing on paper 200 x 
100 cm. 
Fig 2.11. Wilma Cruise Cradle (2011–2012). 1000+ ceramic forms, approximately 30 cm 
each. (Photographed by Ant Strack). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.12. Wilma Cruise Cradle (2011–2012) detail. (Photographed by the artist). Artist’s 
collection. 
Fig 2.13. Wilma Cruise The Alice Diaries (2012). Installation view. (Photographed by 
Anthea Pokroy). 
Fig 2.14. Wilma Cruise The Mother (2011). Ceramic on steel base, 120 x 50 x 50 cm. 
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.15. Wilma Cruise Mother Other (2011). Ceramic on steel base, 108 cm. 
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.16. Wilma Cruise The Bird (2012). Ceramic and steel on steel base, 105 x 101 x 50 
cm. (Photographed by Ant Strack). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 2.17. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Rabbit (2012). Ceramic, 105 x 45 x 55 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). Private collection. 
Fig 2.18. Wilma Cruise Big, Bigger, Biggest (Alice) (2012). Ceramic on steel base, Biggest 
(Alice) 180 x 60 x 80 cm, Bigger  (Alice) 121 x 32 x 32 cm, Big (Alice) 90 x 20 x 28 cm. 
(Photographed by Anthea Pokroy). Artist’s collection. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Fig 3.1. Wilma Cruise The Queen (2015). Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15), 43 x 43.7 
cm. 
Fig 3.2. Wilma Cruise Self Portrait (1992), Ceramic on concrete base. 173 x 62 x 45 cm. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp). 
Fig 3.3. Elizabeth Gunter Last, last One (2015). Charcoal dust on paper, 180 x 140 cm. 
Fig 3.4. Elizabeth Gunter # 4000 (2015). Charcoal dust on paper, 190 x 145 cm. 
Fig 3.5.!Joseph Beuys!How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare. (1965). Gold leaf, honey, 
dead hare, felt pad, iron, fir tree, miscellaneous drawings and clothing items, Galerie 
Schmela, Dresden, Germany.!
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
198 
(http://uk.phaidon.com/agenda/art/articles/2014/march/03/why-joseph-beuys-and-his-
dead-hare-live-on/) 
Fig 3.6. Nicolene Swanepoel, ceramic, data unknown. 
Fig 3.7. Nicolene Swanepoel NikkiNkisi (n.d.) ceramic, size unknown. 
Fig 3.8. Nicolene Swanepoel Little Creature (2014). Ceramic, size unknown. 
Fig 3.9. Nicolene Swanepoel Little Creature (2014). Ceramic and found objects, size 
unknown. 
Fig 3.10. Wilma Cruise The End Game (2015). Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15), 45 x 
43,7 cm. 
Fig 3.11. Wilma Cruise Alice: Self Portrait I (2011), mixed media drawing on paper, 200 x 
100 cm. 
Fig 3.12. Wilma Cruise Harrismith (2007–2015). Etching on carborudum (Edition E.V.) 
paper size: 160 x 80 cm. 
Fig 3.13. Wilma Cruise Installation view Cocks Asses &… (I can’t hear). 2007. 
(Photographed by Doreen Hemp). 
Fig 3.14. Bradshawian rock painting, The Kimberley, North-west Australia. (Photographed 
by Wilma Cruise 2015). 
Fig 3.15.!Wilma Cruise Chess Pieces detail (2015). Ceramic 20–30 cm. (Photographed by 
Pierre van der Spuy). !
Fig 3.16. Wilma Cruise Cradle II detail (2014). Ceramic forms in perspex box with stand, 
box: 60 x 60 x 60 cm, stand: 60 x 60 x 120 cm. (Photographed by the artist). 
Fig 3.17. Wilma Cruise The Borogoves (2015) detail. Ceramic, sizes various 10–17 cm. 
(Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy). 
Fig 3.18. Wilma Cruise The Borogoves (2015). Ceramic, sizes various 10–17 cm. 
(Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy).  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Fig 4.1. Wilma Cruise Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2013-2014). Installation 
view. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
!!
199 
Fig 4.2. Wilma Cruise H.D. Arnoldus (Dancing 2) (2013), Ceramic, 103 cm. (Photographed 
by Adam Cruise). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 4.3. Wilma Cruise H.D. Arnoldus (seated) (2013), Ceramic on found object, 87 cm. 
(Photographed by Adam Cruise). Artist’s collection. 
Fig 4.4. Wilma Cruise A Mouth Full of Teeth (2016). Collage, 120 x 87 cm. 
Fig 4.5. Wilma Cruise Chit Chat (2016). Collage, 87 x 120 cm. 
Fig 4.6. Wilma Cruise Rattus Rattus (2016). Collage, 70 x 100 cm. 
Fig 4.7. Wilma Cruise Oh My Word! (2016). Collage, 70 x 100 cm. 
Fig 4.8. Wilma Cruise H.D. Dennis (2016), Ceramic and steel, 228 cm. (Photographed by 
Pierre van der Spuy). 
Fig 4.9. Wilma Cruise Will you, won’t you, will you join the dance? (2014) Installation view. 
Fig 4.10. Wilma Cruise Decline a Mouse I, II & III (2013). Mixed media on paper, 155 x 90 
cm each.  
Fig 4.11. Wilma Cruise Biggest Alice (2012). Ceramic on steel base, 182 cm. 
(Photographed by Ant Strack). Artist’s collection. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Fig 5.1. Wilma Cruise Take a Bow: The Caucus – Puppy (2011- 2012). Bronze (Edition 10), 
45 x 84 x 33 cm. Pup – Zara (2013 – 2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. 
(Photographed by Nicolene Swanepoel). 
Fig 5.2. John Tenniel’s puppy (Carroll 1982:45). 
Fig 5.3. Wilma Cruise The Caucus – Puppy (2011–2012). Bronze (Edition 10), 45 x 84 x 33 
cm, Pup – Zara (2013–2014). Bronze (Edition 10), 75 x 63 x 48 cm. (Photographed by 
Nicolene Swanepoel). 
 
Fig 5.4. Wilma Cruise Oracia – Watching the Hours (2013–2014). Ceramic. 176 cm.  
Destroyed. The Caucus – Rabbit (2012). Ceramic. 105 cm. (Photographed by Gavin 
Younge). Private collection. 
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(Photographed by Pierre van der Spuy). 
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CONCLUSION 
Fig 7.1. Wilma Cruise En Passant foundry view (2016). Ten figures in acrylic resin, 
100–120 cm. (Photographed by the artist.) 
Fig 7.2. Wilma Cruise Four pages from Diary 2016 (2016). Mixed media on paper, 70 x 
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APPENDIX 
List of Works on Exhibition 
The 8th Square Cavalli Gallery, 6 November – 4 December 2016 
!
!
 
Papio Ursinus 
2012/2016 
Bronze with found object (Edition 10) 
65 cm 
 
 
Endgame 
2015 
Bronze (Edition 4/10) 
60 x 35 x 55 cm per baboon 
 
 
The Waiting Room 
2016 
Bronze & found object (Edition 1/5) 
Caucus Baboon - 65 cm + 2 x Little Papio 45 
cm each) 
 
Louis’ Baboon  
2015 
Bronze (Edition 12) 
47 x 31 x 55 cm 
 
 
Heidegger’s Hand 
2016 
Bronze (Edition 1/1) 
60 x 35 x 55 cm 
 
 
Role Over 
2015 
Bronze (Edition 12) 
140 x 80 cm 
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Chanticleer 
2016 
Bronze (Edition 5) 
150 x 170 cm 
 
 
The Caucus – Puppy x 2 
2011/13 
Bronze (Edition 10) 
45 x 85 x 33 cm 
 
 
Pup – Zara x 2 
2013/14 
Bronze (Edition 10) 
75 x 63 x 48 cm 
 
 
Sheep (The Dolly Suite) x 3 
2012 
Bronze 
60 x 80 x 28 cm each 
 
Scribble, the Cat (the comma matters) 
2016  
Bronze (Edition 10) 
36 x 63 x 17 cm 
 
 
Box(ed) 
2016  
Bronze (Edition 10) 
40 x 67 x 31 cm 
 
 
Brillo 
2016  
Bronze (Edition 10) 
53 x 63 x 30 cm 
 
 
Phoebe 
2016  
Bronze 
Approx 60 cm height 
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Hybrid Piglet 
2015 
Bronze (Edition 12) 
105 cm 
 
 
3 Dogs on cast Rectangular Plinth 
2015 
Bronze Ed 2/10 
50 x 22.5 x 5.5 cm 
 
 
H.D. Ernest  
2013-2016 
Bronze  
87 cm.  
 
 
Chess pieces 
2015 
Ceramic 
Size: various approx 15 - 35 cm 
 
Borogoves 
2015 
Ceramic 
12 – 17 cm each 
 
 
The Caucus – Pig   
2012 
Painted Ceramic 
Ht. 44 cm 
 
 
Diary pages  
Collage and mixed media x 10 
2016 
100 x 60 cm 
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Decline a Mouse I, II & III  
2013 
Mixed media on paper 
155 x 90 cm each 
 
 
Will You?  
2013 
Mixed media on paper 
155 x 90 cm 
 
 
Rattus Rattus  
2016 
Collage and mixed media 
70 x 100 cm 
 
 
 
Queen 
2015 
Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15) 
45 x 43,7 cm 
 
 
The End Game 
2015 
Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15) 
45 x 43,7 cm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word 
2015 
Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15) 
45 x 43,7 cm 
 
 
Oh My Word!  
2016 
Collage and mixed media 
70 x 100 cm 
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The All Knowing Pig 
2015 
Drypoint and chine-collé (Edition 15) 
45 x 43,7 cm 
 
 
Harrismith 
2007–2015  
Etching on carborudum (Edition E.V.)  
paper size: 160 x 80 cm 
 
 
Chanticleer 
2007 
Spitbite, aquatint and drypoint 
Image size 99 x 66cm 
Paper size: 121.5 x 80 cm 
Edition 15 
 
Rats 
2016 
Oil on Canvas 
200 x 200 cm 
 
 
Would you like cats if you were me? 
2012- 2016 
Oil on Canvas 
200 x 200 cm 
 
 
 
Crucible 
2016 
Oil on Canvas 
200 x 200 cm 
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Six impossible things before breakfast 
Gallery University Stellenbosch, 9 November – 23 December 2016 
 
 
Bigger (Alice)  
2012 
Ceramic on steel base 
121 x 32 x 32 cm 
 
Big (Alice)  
2012 
Ceramic on steel base 
90 x 20 x 28 cm 
 
Biggest (Alice)  
2012 
Ceramic on steel base 
180 x 60 x 80 cm  
 
 
Cradle 
2011–2012  
1000+ ceramic forms 
approximately 30 cm each. 
 
 
 
Chit Chat  
2016 
Collage and mixed media 
87 x 120 cm 
 
 
HD Dennis 
2016  
Ceramic 
134 cm 
 
 
Alice –  Self portrait I 
2011 
Mixed media drawing on paper. 
Paper size +-  200 x 100 cm 
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If you turn into a pig I will have nothing 
more to do with you  
2012 
Ceramic on steel base 
112 cm 
 
 
Caucus 2 (white)  
2014 
Ceramic on steel base  
112 cm 
 
 
Caucus 3 (black)  
2014 
Ceramic on steel base  
112 cm 
 
 
Mother – Other  
2011 
Ceramic and steel on steel base 
Sculpture: 212 cm, base: 47cm 
 
 
Diary pages 1–34 
2016 
Collage and mixed media 
100 x 60 cm 
 
 
En Passant – 10 Figures 
2016  
Acrylic resin 
115 – 124 cm 
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